From: Greg KH <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> 3.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Theodore Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu> commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream. If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help against any other adversaries. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <ty...@mit.edu> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-ty...@mit.edu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <h...@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { + int i; ktime_t now; unsigned long flags; @@ -974,6 +975,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy now = ktime_get_real(); mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); + for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) { + if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags)) + break; + mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags)); + } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
