On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 03:34:59AM -0500, George Spelvin wrote: >> You're describing standard key-recovery attacks. For /dev/random, >> just knowing the *ciphertext* constitutes a successful attack.
> Um, no. The *ciphertext* is the output. The attacker can get all of > the ciphertext he or she wants by reading /dev/random (although we'd > probably do some folding as we currently do so the attacker won't even > get all of the ciphertext). What the attacker has to be able to do is > given some of the ciphertext bits, be able to predict future > ciphertext bits given some construction which uses AES as the basis. The attack I was thinking of was figuring out (without breaking root and using ptrace) what some *other* process on the same machine is reading from /dev/random. In other words, reading someone else's output. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
