Introduce apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid() to check the valid 
of nested apic access page and virtual apic page earlier.

Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index caf239d..02bc07d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -7838,6 +7838,50 @@ static void vmx_inject_page_fault_nested(struct kvm_vcpu 
*vcpu,
                kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
 }
 
+static bool apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+                                               struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+       struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+       if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
+               if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(vmcs12->apic_access_addr))
+                       /*TODO: Also verify bits beyond physical address width 
are 0*/
+                       return false;
+
+               /*
+                * Translate L1 physical address to host physical
+                * address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
+                * physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
+                * to it so we can release it later.
+                */
+               if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) /* shouldn't happen */
+                       nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
+               vmx->nested.apic_access_page =
+                       nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
+       }
+
+       if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
+               if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) /* shouldn't happen */
+                       nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
+               vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
+                       nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
+
+               /*
+                * Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor does
+                * but it's basically the only possibility we have.
+                * We could still enter the guest if CR8 load exits are
+                * enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and virtualize APIC
+                * access is disabled; in this case the processor would never
+                * use the TPR shadow and we could simply clear the bit from
+                * the execution control.  But such a configuration is useless,
+                * so let's keep the code simple.
+                */
+               if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
+                       return false;
+       }
+       return true;
+}
+
 static void vmx_start_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
        u64 preemption_timeout = get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vmx_preemption_timer_value;
@@ -7984,16 +8028,6 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct 
vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 
                if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) {
                        /*
-                        * Translate L1 physical address to host physical
-                        * address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
-                        * physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
-                        * to it so we can release it later.
-                        */
-                       if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) /* shouldn't happen */
-                               
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
-                       vmx->nested.apic_access_page =
-                               nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
-                       /*
                         * If translation failed, no matter: This feature asks
                         * to exit when accessing the given address, and if it
                         * can never be accessed, this feature won't do
@@ -8040,30 +8074,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct 
vmcs12 *vmcs12)
        exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
 
        if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
-               if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
-                       nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
-               vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
-                  nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
-               if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
-                       exec_control &=
-                               ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
-               else
-                       vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
+               vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
                                page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page));
-
-               /*
-                * Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor does
-                * but it's basically the only possibility we have.
-                * We could still enter the guest if CR8 load exits are
-                * enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and virtualize APIC
-                * access is disabled; in this case the processor would never
-                * use the TPR shadow and we could simply clear the bit from
-                * the execution control.  But such a configuration is useless,
-                * so let's keep the code simple.
-                */
-               if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
-                       nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, 
VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
-
                vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
        } else if (vm_need_tpr_shadow(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
                vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
@@ -8230,9 +8242,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool 
launch)
                return 1;
        }
 
-       if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
-                       !PAGE_ALIGNED(vmcs12->apic_access_addr)) {
-               /*TODO: Also verify bits beyond physical address width are 0*/
+       if (!apic_access_and_virtual_page_valid(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
                nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
                return 1;
        }
-- 
1.9.1

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