linux-security-module  

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• • [PATCH 02/22] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
• [PATCH 0/3] Introduce credential record David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 2/3] CRED: Split the task security data and move part of it into struct cred Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct Trond Myklebust
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct Trond Myklebust
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct Al Viro
  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] CRED: Move the effective capabilities into the cred struct David Howells
• [PATCH RFC] capabilities: properly use task_capability_lock Serge E. Hallyn
• [PATCH] selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Yuichi Nakamura
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance James Morris
• [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [RFC] Can we somehow avoid infinite execve() loop? penguin-kernel
• [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Yuichi Nakamura
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Yuichi Nakamura
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Yuichi Nakamura
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC]selinux: Improving SELinux read/write performance Yuichi Nakamura
• Module Loading Hook? Michael Walle
  • Re: Module Loading Hook? Kazuki Omo(Company)
• [PATCH][RFC] V3 Remove SELinux dependencies from linux-audit via LSM Casey Schaufler
• SELinux security and passed file descriptors David Howells
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors Stephen Smalley
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors David Howells
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors Stephen Smalley
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors Casey Schaufler
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors Mikel L. Matthews
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors Al Viro
  • Re: SELinux security and passed file descriptors James Antill
• Re: [PATCH] Version2 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Thomas Bleher
  • Re: [PATCH] Version2 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Version2 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Version2 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
• [2.6 patch] remove securebits Adrian Bunk
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Adrian Bunk
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Adrian Bunk
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Adrian Bunk
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits Serge E. Hallyn
• [TOMOYO 00/15] TOMOYO Linux - MAC based on process invocation histroy Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 01/15] Allow use of namespace_sem from LSM module. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 02/15] Kconfig and Makefile for TOMOYO Linux. Kentaro Takeda
  • Re: [TOMOYO 02/15] Kconfig and Makefile for TOMOYO Linux. Jiri Kosina
  • [TOMOYO 03/15] Data structures and prototypes definition. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 04/15] Memory and pathname management functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 06/15] Domain transition handler functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 07/15] Auditing interface. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 08/15] File access control functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 09/15] Argv[0] access control functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 10/15] Networking access control functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 11/15] Namespace manipulation control functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 12/15] Signal transmission control functions. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 13/15] LSM adapter for TOMOYO. Kentaro Takeda
  • [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Kentaro Takeda
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Pavel Machek
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Toshiharu Harada
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Greg KH
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [TOMOYO 14/15] Conditional permission support. Tetsuo Handa
  • [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Kentaro Takeda
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Paul Moore
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Paul Moore
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Paul Moore
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Paul Moore
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Tetsuo Handa
  • Re: [TOMOYO 15/15] LSM expansion for TOMOYO Linux. Paul Moore
• [PATCH] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [PATCH] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
  • [PATCH] V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH] V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Serge E. Hallyn
• Adding a security parameter to VFS functions David Howells
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Casey Schaufler
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions David Howells
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Andreas Gruenbacher
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Andreas Gruenbacher
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Linus Torvalds
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Kyle Moffett
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Al Viro
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions Andreas Gruenbacher
  • Re: Adding a security parameter to VFS functions David Howells
• [PATCH RFC] V2 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap Andrew Morgan
• Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Arjan van de Ven
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Keith Owens
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Crispin Cowan
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Joshua Brindle
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Pavel Machek
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Miguel Ojeda
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Valdis . Kletnieks
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Kyle Moffett
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Pavel Machek
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Pavel Machek
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Jan Engelhardt
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Andi Kleen
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Andi Kleen
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Andi Kleen
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Keith Owens
  • Re: [PATCH] Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Casey Schaufler
• Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Permit filesystem local caching [try #3] Stephen Smalley
• Re: [PATCH 09/16] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden [try #3] Casey Schaufler
• Re: [PATCH 11/14] CacheFiles: Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained [try #2] Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH 11/14] CacheFiles: Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained [try #2] David Howells
• Fwd: Re: Upstreaming shared LSM interfaces Casey Schaufler
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: don't ensure we break with 64-bit caps Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: don't ensure we break with 64-bit caps Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: don't ensure we break with 64-bit caps Andrew Morgan
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: don't ensure we break with 64-bit caps Serge E. Hallyn
• Re: file capabilities: clear fcaps on inode change (v3) Serge E. Hallyn
  • Re: file capabilities: clear fcaps on inode change (v3) James Morris

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