On 11/18/26 9:12 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: > This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it > can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest. > > aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a > transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM > invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without > releasing plaintext before its tag is checked. > > Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar, > Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments > of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived > with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at > KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a > last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments > can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The > segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and > KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came. > A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its > secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it.
Please use Cobblestone-128 or Cobblestone-256 instead. https://c2sp.org/chunked-encryption has the spec, and you can check against the implementation in pyca/cryptography or (for Cobblestone-128) the Go package filippo.io/cobblestone. This assumes your CPU has AES and GCM instructions; if not, you should see about using one that does or work with a cryptographer to standardize an alternative that doesn't need them. Nonstandard constructions like this one are to be avoided. -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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