On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: >> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: >>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can >>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 >>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that >>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation. >> >> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, >> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace >> to extract the secret authentication key. >> >> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined >> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday >> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless >> the key is ephemeral. >> >> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting >> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API >> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the >> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't >> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, >> and the API can't enforce that limit. >> >> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. >> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them >> at random for each encryption without any problems. >> >> - XAES-256-GCM >> - XChaCha20-Poly1305 >> - AEGIS-256 >> >> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally >> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is >> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions. > > The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular > relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type. > > At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down > the potential user base. > > The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use > trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem > that only this patch set can presumebly sort out. > > And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much > the break down of what is wrong here. > > If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that > it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really. > > These are the main topics what I would focus on.
This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem. The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you have bigger problems. -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
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