Kent Crispin a �crit: > Here's another very concrete, time-bounded example: NSI's contract > with the USG runs out in about two years. Some reasonable time > before that ICANN may *very well* want policy determinations on a > number of issues. This is precisely what must not be permitted to be left to a Names Council that isn't responsible to the membership. This is, in a nutshell, the best example and argument for denying all independent action to the Names Council. > In fact, timely action could be the norm, rather than the exception, > when you think about it -- the Internet changes quickly. It may have to be slowed down a little, so that its direction be one that is good for the majority of its users and not just good for the Names Council. > Consequently, I think that the ability to put time constraints, and > the ability to forward non-consensus recommendations to ICANN, > should be a fundamental facility of the decision proces. You are obviously wrong, or it should be obvious to anyone who values consensus and the democratic process, and who believes that democratic institutions are the best for responding to the needs of the majority. This tendency to authoritarianism is the dangerous and obnoxious thing that has entered into the DNSO.org with the insidious incursion of corporatism, in the form of the INTA, the ICC, and the ITAA, into what was previously a consensual process. This corporate hierarchy, indifferent to the public, oblivious of the membership, seeing it as in opposition and as something to be avoided, must not be allowed to be institutionalized in the structure of the DNSO. It is my considered opinion, after much reflection, that, if the DNSO.org and its corporate supporters, who wrote the Washington or BMW draft, insist that the Names Council be permitted independent policy-making, the Paris draft coalition should refuse to meld their draft with that of the DNSO.org and instead convince ICANN of the necessity of approving the Paris draft as the principled basis for the DNSO.
