> I believe Karl does not question the Board's right right to evaluate
> and/or override an SO proposal. As I understand him, he is concerned
> that the At-large, currently the only potential home for the
> individual, cannot propose policy itself.
I actually like the notion that the board has full plenary powers to
amend, ignore, or reject an SO proposal on any arbitrary grounds and that
the board has full plenary power to initiate and adopt any policy it finds
appropriate, even if impinges on the area nominally covered by an SO.
So I'm pleased by the new interpretation.
I am concerned that there is no vehicle through which non-commercial and
individuals can participate in the definition of policy regarding domain
names, IP address allocation, or protocol parameters.
And when I say "participate" I mean "meaningfully participate" -- simply
observing is not adequate. Rather I mean "partipate on par with all other
interests" in all facets of policymaking -- initiation, creation, and
approval.
> If the DNSO declined to propose adding a TLD for the new nation of
> Cabellia (hey, this is my scenario here), Karl's interpretation of the
> bylaws is that the At-large may not independently introduce such a
> proposal.
> VI.2.c acknowledges that policy proposals may be introduced from
> non-SO sources;
> "(c) The Board shall refer proposals for substantive policies not
> received from a Supporting Organization to the Supporting
> Organization, if any, with primary responsibility for the area to
> which the proposal relates for initial consideration and
> recommendation to the Board."
Well, here's where my concern starts to come to the fore -- if the board
has full plenary power to deal with policy, then it has the power to
initiate and adopt policy initiatives on its own without ever going to an
SO.
And if that is true, and it is true according to this morning's
interpretation, (else the board would still be a slave to and subservient
to the SO's) then there is nothing to stop the board from adopting the
proposal for Cabellia no matter from what source that proposal may arise
and adopt it without reference to any SO.
Yet, that means that VI.2.c's requirement to refer proposals to SO's is
vacuous -- the board can chose to ignore this by-law provision at the
board's whim.
So we have a conflict -- one provision gives the board unfettered freedom
to do what it wants despite SO's (per this morning's interpretation), and
other provisions impose limits on the board's powers vis-a-vis the SO's.
So there is is inconsistent langauge in the by-laws. Which prevails?
>From the history of ICANN, it was pretty clear to me that the intention
was for the board to be limited vis-a-vis the SOs. I didn't like that,
but such was the political results of last summer and autumn's debates.
And now we have a statement that says that all of that is not the case,
that the board, in order to meet its fiduciary responsibilities, must
retain ultimate control (something with which I most strongly agree), and
hence the board must have full authority to override any institutional
obsticle, including ignoring SO decisions or bypassing the SO process
entirely.
I very much approve of placing the responsibility for Internet policy
squarely on the shoulders of the board members.
Exercise of that responsibility empowers the board members to engage in
the merits of policy proposals from SOs. Thus, for example, the board now
clearly has the power to override, amend, or repeal any policy that arises
from the PSO regarding the assignment of protocol parameters.
--karl--
