I think that the Board can do all the things that Karl would like it to be able to do, although there might be a lot of howls. But personally I find the scenario disturbing. A Board of 18 that can do anything arbitrarily? Who will do the right thing because they elected at large? Who will merrily ignore or thwart the considered advice of the organizations formed to give it advice? Because, without reference to the content of their advice, it must be ignored, because constituencies are a Bad Idea and all ideas issuing therefrom are Evil? Am I missing something? What if the SOs give good advice? I know that at times it seems unlikely, but just suppose it happened... Antony >-----Original Message----- >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Karl >Auerbach >Sent: Monday, June 21, 1999 9:41 PM >To: IFWP Mailing List >Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: [IFWP] Re: The Sims-Auerbach Correspondence > > > >> I believe Karl does not question the Board's right right to evaluate >> and/or override an SO proposal. As I understand him, he is concerned >> that the At-large, currently the only potential home for the >> individual, cannot propose policy itself. > >I actually like the notion that the board has full plenary powers to >amend, ignore, or reject an SO proposal on any arbitrary grounds and that >the board has full plenary power to initiate and adopt any policy it finds >appropriate, even if impinges on the area nominally covered by an SO. > >So I'm pleased by the new interpretation. > > >I am concerned that there is no vehicle through which non-commercial and >individuals can participate in the definition of policy regarding domain >names, IP address allocation, or protocol parameters. > >And when I say "participate" I mean "meaningfully participate" -- simply >observing is not adequate. Rather I mean "partipate on par with all other >interests" in all facets of policymaking -- initiation, creation, and >approval. > > >> If the DNSO declined to propose adding a TLD for the new nation of >> Cabellia (hey, this is my scenario here), Karl's interpretation of the >> bylaws is that the At-large may not independently introduce such a >> proposal. > >> VI.2.c acknowledges that policy proposals may be introduced from >> non-SO sources; > >> "(c) The Board shall refer proposals for substantive policies not >> received from a Supporting Organization to the Supporting >> Organization, if any, with primary responsibility for the area to >> which the proposal relates for initial consideration and >> recommendation to the Board." > >Well, here's where my concern starts to come to the fore -- if the board >has full plenary power to deal with policy, then it has the power to >initiate and adopt policy initiatives on its own without ever going to an >SO. > >And if that is true, and it is true according to this morning's >interpretation, (else the board would still be a slave to and subservient >to the SO's) then there is nothing to stop the board from adopting the >proposal for Cabellia no matter from what source that proposal may arise >and adopt it without reference to any SO. > >Yet, that means that VI.2.c's requirement to refer proposals to SO's is >vacuous -- the board can chose to ignore this by-law provision at the >board's whim. > >So we have a conflict -- one provision gives the board unfettered freedom >to do what it wants despite SO's (per this morning's interpretation), and >other provisions impose limits on the board's powers vis-a-vis the SO's. > >So there is is inconsistent langauge in the by-laws. Which prevails? > >>From the history of ICANN, it was pretty clear to me that the intention >was for the board to be limited vis-a-vis the SOs. I didn't like that, >but such was the political results of last summer and autumn's debates. > >And now we have a statement that says that all of that is not the case, >that the board, in order to meet its fiduciary responsibilities, must >retain ultimate control (something with which I most strongly agree), and >hence the board must have full authority to override any institutional >obsticle, including ignoring SO decisions or bypassing the SO process >entirely. > >I very much approve of placing the responsibility for Internet policy >squarely on the shoulders of the board members. > >Exercise of that responsibility empowers the board members to engage in >the merits of policy proposals from SOs. Thus, for example, the board now >clearly has the power to override, amend, or repeal any policy that arises >from the PSO regarding the assignment of protocol parameters. > > --karl-- > > >
