Jon Zittrain wrote:
Take #1 on the membership solution: make it an open membership; peopleI disagree. To the extent some interests are not represented in the membership, they may (but, not necessarily will) be disappointed with the results. But, the system can, if properly designed, work well for those interested enough to participate. If the system is designed correctly, there will be no capture by one of those interests to the exclusion of other participants. On the other hand, a poorly designed electoral mechanism can result in capture even if everyone in the world is a voting member.
join; that's the electorate; they elect; end of story. If this appeals to
you there's no such thing as a "captured" electorate, because it simply is
what it is.
There's no gold standard against which to compare it to see ifThere is no gold standard for Sukiyaki nor home grown tomatoes, but we know when something tastes bad or produces unfair results.
it's "right" or "wrong."
Possible problem on take #1 generated from the question, "Who is meant toPlease put that in stone.
be heard through the at-large membership?":
p1/ The decisions ICANN might make bear on a large number of people and
institutions. All have interests that ought to be represented or at least
accounted for.
But, are we designing an electoral system to accomplish that objective? Or, is it merely getting lip service?
The purpose of the at-large electorate is to representAnd, perhaps, those in a minority which is not represented in the SO of their interest.
those whose interests aren't "specific" enough to be accounted for in the
elections that take place for the SO half of the board.
(Otherwise, whyOr, from a general membership using your electoral system (which I agree would result in a range of interests represented).
not just elect the whole board from the three SO's and be done with it?)
Agreed. However, there may also be little reason for them to join.
p2/ Despite p1, ..People who might be affected by ICANN policies may have no interest in joining, or even a sense why they should join.
From this, at least two possible conclusions:That doesn't seem acceptable in the context of a public interest body created to manage a community asset if there is a negative impact on the public's interest.c1a/ No problem. So long as people had a chance to join and chose not
to, they deserve whatever results from the process they ignore.
c1b/ Problem: those with a very direct and structured interest (andThat is debatable. With only three representatives from each SO, there may be a lot of interests which feel short changed in the SOs.
probably well represented within the SO structures)
will simply populateHowever, they would be there as individuals outside the structures of the SOs. The general membership offers a different mechanism for obtaining diversity and participation. In a bi-cameral system of government, both the House and Senate (or whatever) are elected by the same electorate.
the at-large electorate as well.
They'll elect people responsive to them,That is the goal of representative government, and should not to be sacrificed at the alter of lesser gods.
and the goal of having broad representation from Internet users at-largeLike geographic diversity, this may not be as meaningful a star as others which might be used to steer our ship. And, how does ICANN propose to accomplish it? What would be sacrificed to accomplish that purpose? Would those interested enough to participate have to give up the right to elect representatives?
will be a practical fiction bracketed only by the point that "they could
have joined."
Wouldn't that turn our governance on its head? Do you suggest that we afford representation for those who don't participate at the expense of those who do?
It's the second conclusion that makes one worry about comparing an "actual"And, least meaningful.
electorate to a reference of the population intended to be represented by
it. In my note to Eric I used international representation since it's the
easiest to measure demographically:
suppose three months after the at-largeIt is nothing, in of itself. It does not tell us anything about what the elected board would do since a full range of interests can be found in each division of the globe. If there are no ICANN members from Myramar, you wouldn't insist that we have a board member from that country.
electorate was made available to join, 90% of its members all hail from the
U.S., and 90% of those from Washington, DC. To me that's a materialization
of the risk in c1b above; to you--is it just the breaks?
Lets prioritize our aspirations and put emphasis on the more significant issues. Lets not design our organization for those who do not want to be members nor sacrifice responsive representation in order to "balance" the board according to five hugh, arbitrary and meaningless divisions of the globe.
That's theAbsolutely, as regards who is to vote and what electoral system we choose. What are our other choices? Not having a membership elections?
electorate, so let's go with it?
...
For those who say that aAn open and dynamic membership tends to self-heal as soon as the defect causes problems for the otherwise apathetic or unorganized, especially if there is a system of proportional representation.. If the "governance" causes them pain, they will flock to the polls to change the situation.
particular group--CORE, say--has "captured" the DNSO process, is that the
same kind of "capture" as the Turks with TIME, or the backoffice people
with AIP?
Someone once said that democracy is the worst form of government except for the alternatives. Every system has drawbacks. Democracy has the least..
We are about to compound a perceived defect in representation by institutionalizing capture through an electoral system which effectively disenfranchises many who do have significant interests and do participate. And, there is no reason to believe the "great unwashed" will enjoy any better representation in the end.
What do you think of THAT?
