what Mr Phillip Simbwa said..always nice to see people that know stuff like that..
On 7/20/12, Phillip Simbwa <[email protected]> wrote: > Oouch, i guess you prefer the "theoretical/hypothetical" stuff! Sorry > dude, am a practical guy. If you could set up something, then i would > show you a few things... > > But no worries chief. May be next time. > > We could may be close this thread before it spirals too far from where > it was meant to go. > > Cheers, > > On 7/20/12, [email protected] > <[email protected]> wrote: >> What? :) Hey Phillip, on whose live systems do you want to try out that >> crap? Forget that! I know the weaknesses in each of those lines of defense >> and am bound not to expose them. Sorry, am out of that business. >> >> >>> Hmmm, thats interesting. >>> >>> Do you run a network with any of the stuff you mentioned or do you >>> access to corporate client with all or a good part of the stuff you >>> mentioned? >>> >>> Reason I ask, is; for knowledge's sake (like you mentioned), i could >>> show up and we tease & poke that network and we see how both you and >>> me can stretch those controls to their limits. >>> And if your client is ok with us discussing our findings on a mailing >>> list like this one, everyone benefits. >>> >>> My charge: 2 litres of coke, Chips & chicken. (That's close to pro >>> bono, for an intensive pen testing exercise). What do you think? >>> >>> I just need your calendar to compare with mine and we find some free >>> time to see warrup! >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> >>> On 7/18/12, [email protected] >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> :) Hey Phillip, your attack (whether on the Bank or a corporate; wonder >>>> if >>>> attacking the corporate and not the Bank makes it any better evil) >>>> without >>>> those or other certain lines of defense being in place, will definitely >>>> succeed especially when coupled with social engineering techniques: (its >>>> clear that in the battle between cryptanalysts and cryptographers, the >>>> former always win: recall the knapsack algorithm, rc4/WEP, gsm security >>>> and the rest). There are so many techniques you can leverage for attack: >>>> from power/timing analysis to covert channels, to collusion, even the >>>> biometrics at nuc substations is subject to false accept rates (FAR), >>>> etc, >>>> etc. BTW in some countries, certain products are even installed at all >>>> ISPs so they can filter email looking for keywords that can serve as a >>>> basis for investigation. >>>> >>>> :)My interest in posing those lines of defense to you, was actually to >>>> try >>>> and explore possible weaknesses in them for the interested parties so we >>>> can go to the next lines of defense, had you replied directly to each >>>> question and not let others speak for you. Your mentioned bank may not >>>> be >>>> the only one with security problems, coz we have even read about bigger >>>> ones that have been hiding their debts, fixing inter-banking/overnight >>>> rates, and you never know the worst may come in when its realized that >>>> one >>>> of the leading global economies have (their reserve bank) been hiding >>>> and >>>> telling lies about their debt (and u know what, boom, another global >>>> credit crunch) >>>> >>>> Thanks. >>>> >>>>> Peter, don't sweat it. Its clear from the excerpts below that the >>>>> authors >>>>> didn't read everything i wrote or they just don't know what they are >>>>> talking about (could have just concentrated on googling counter >>>>> responses). >>>>> First i thought it was me but even after you clearly stating it that >>>>> the >>>>> victim IS NOT THE BANK; its still not clear enough for some people!!!! >>>>> (Sigh, sigh, cough, cough). >>>>> Alternatively, you could use gimp to do a nice picture of the attack >>>>> to >>>>> save yourself 1000 words (i think the message will be clearer then). >>>>> >>>>> But let me give it one more try. THE VICTIM IS A CORPORATE COMPANY NOT >>>>> THE >>>>> BANK. >>>>> >>>>> ++++++++++++++++ I remember point that out clearly +++++++++++++++++ >>>>> >>>>> My target is the local DNS server on the company LAN. I wouldn't sweat >>>>> it trying to knock out the bank unless when push comes to shove and >>>>> even so, it would be my very last option (am a lazy dude, with no jail >>>>> wish and love succeeding while sipping a soda). >>>>> >>>>> +++++++++++++ End +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Just a little secret though, I have run a similar attack before >>>>> (ofcourse >>>>> with the blessing of the client) to demonstrate something. And the only >>>>> difference was that i wasn't using the exploit that this thread stemmed >>>>> from. >>>>> >>>>> And yes -- i was only hypothesizing on a few things but mostly (esp. >>>>> the >>>>> tech stuff); stating facts! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ==================== Excerpts begin Here ============================== >>>>> >>>>>> But even then, are u sure, there is a Bank that will allow the use of >>>>>> unsecured DNS? You know something, you could be playing about with >>>>>> their >>>>>> honey pots..... Can you let an unknown host join the network, run in >>>>>> promiscuous mode, have access to other segments and services of the >>>>>> corporate network, etc? Some corporates even go the extent of saying >>>>>> for >>>>>> example (just an example): traffic from IBM should not pass through >>>>>> certain Microsoft routers even if they are the best path available, >>>>>> let >>>>>> alone that from Iraq passing via Pentagon routers... >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Goodness. If every bank in this part of the world has equally dismal >>>>>> security policies, I will seriously reconsider opening an account >>>>>> here. >>>>> >>>>>> Why is it like this? It is perfectly possible to achieve good security >>>>> with >>>>>> free software and free information. Why do some security admins insist >>>>>> on >>>>>> sucking at what they are doing? >>>>> >>>>>> Note that Phillip's attack and Davis's defence both are more-or-less >>>>>> conjecture at this point, Peter's anecdote notwithstanding. It is >>>>> perfectly >>>>>> possible that Phillip's attack would be doomed from the get-go; it is >>>>>> also >>>>>> perfectly possible that the security of the target (let's call it >>>>>> Hypothetical Bank or HB, so no external eyes are mistakenly led to >>>>>> believe >>>>>> we're actually planning something, eh) is lacking due to human >>>>>> oversight. >>>>>> There's really no way to tell for sure, short of a security audit or >>>>>> an >>>>>> actual intrusion attempt. >>>>> >>>>> =================== END OF EXCERPTS ================================= >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> - Phillip. >>>>> >>>>> 鄭occdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer >>>>> in >>>>> waht >>>>> oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the >>>>> frist >>>>> and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. >>>>> The rset can be a toatl mses and >>>>> you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed >>>>> ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers >>>>> it >>>>> out aynawy." >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> - Phillip. >>> >>> “Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in >>> waht >>> oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the >>> frist >>> and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. >>> The rset can be a toatl mses and >>> you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed >>> ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers it >>> out aynawy." >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > - Phillip. > > “Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at an Elingsh uinervtisy, it deosn't mttaer in waht > oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist > and lsat ltteer are in the rghit pclae. > The rset can be a toatl mses and > you can sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae we do not raed > ervey lteter by it slef but the wrod as a wlohe and the biran fguiers it > out aynawy." > _______________________________________________ > The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug > > Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] > Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ > Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug > To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug > > The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: > http://www.infocom.co.ug/ > > The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including > attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in > any way. _______________________________________________ The Uganda Linux User Group: http://linux.or.ug Send messages to this mailing list by addressing e-mails to: [email protected] Mailing list archives: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/ Mailing list settings: http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/lug To unsubscribe: http://kym.net/mailman/options/lug The Uganda LUG mailing list is generously hosted by INFOCOM: http://www.infocom.co.ug/ The above comments and data are owned by whoever posted them (including attachments if any). The mailing list host is not responsible for them in any way.
