Brandon Long wrote: > > I've considered an opposite DANE, where a server can know whether to > refuse an unencrypted connection. One could imagine an extension to > spf for example saying that only encrypted connections from these ips > are to be considered authed, or just abusing spf as for encryption > required as well. Spf is certainly used today for listing ips for > white listing and such, so it's not a stretch to use it for an SSL > everywhere usage. > > SMTP has been a lowest common denominator method of contact at all > costs, but the minimum bar is rising especially in this post snowden > world. >
Oh the Snowdon thing...?! Here's the thing... if I am concerned about encryption I'll encrypt the email itself. If I'm super paranoid about the contents getting out I'll encrypt the connection - and keep control of all servers in the path* All SMTP-AUTH sessions I do are encrypted and I refused any that are unencrypted or try to fall back... * If I am worried about transmission of the email above encrypting the email I'll use TLS, and ensure I own every server in the path and each will TLS... otherwise what's the point? I sent DH 2048, TLS 1.2 to Server A. Server A sends to outside of my network to Server B with TLS 1.0 (dh 1024, common key)... Server B is on the Internet and sends to Server C unencrypted because Server C doesn't even support any type of encryption.... Sure SMTP can have the lowest common denominator, but I thought the whole point of the protocol and extensions was: 1/ You want to ensure the email is not readable by a 3rd party you encrypt (PGP/SMIME) it.. 2/ You want to ensure credentials for SMTP-AUTH are not compromised you SSL3/TLS/TLSv1.2,DH=4096 the connection and what you don't do is: 3/ Encrypt the connection so no-one can see my email in transit.... because yeah sure all servers will always TLSv1.2.... -- Michelle Sullivan http://www.mhix.org/ _______________________________________________ mailop mailing list [email protected] http://chilli.nosignal.org/mailman/listinfo/mailop
