Susan Hogarth wrote: BH) We each have the individual right to have our life and liberty be protected, we each have the individual right to due process, etc. (BH
SH) I'm not sure what you mean by 'right ... to be protected', or a right to 'due process' - (SH For an example of the standard minarchist claim about the fundamental duty of the state to protect life and liberty, see Mises in Liberalism <http://www.mises.org/liberal.asp> ch. 1, section 8: "Liberalism is therefore far from disputing the necessity of a machinery of state, a system of law, and a government. It is a grave misunderstanding to associate it in any way with the idea of anarchism. For the liberal, the state is an absolute necessity, since the most important tasks are incumbent upon it: the protection not only of private property, but also of peace, for in the absence of the latter the full benefits of private property cannot be reaped." And ch. 1, section 11: "As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks." For an example of the standard criticism of the lack of procedural standards in anarcholibertarianism, see The Anarcho-Libertarian Utopia - A Critique <http://www.fahayek.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=693&Itemid =1> . SH) and neither seems self-evident to me. (SH Not all things that are right are also self-evident. BH) I've never heard of a single case in the entire history of organized crime across hundreds of cities in scores of nations over multiple decades in which the unregulated market for protection behaved as predicted by anarcholibertarian theory. (BH SH) I've never seen an unregulated market. (SH And you never will, since by "unregulated" you apparently mean one in which there is no significant level of force initiation. But it's trivial for anarchists to make tautological claims about how protection markets will work under those fantastical and imaginary circumstances. I stated very clearly what I meant by "unregulated", when I said that every single episode in which there wasn't a monopoly on force-initiation over a region becomes a test case for anarcholibertarianism]. Despite the literally hundreds of such test cases, the only purported successes advanced for the theory involve a few thousand pre-industrial farmers sprinkled sparsely across medieval Iceland and the frontier of colonial Pennsylvania. In contrast to how even bastard forms of minarchism have been so spectacularly successful compared to all other significant social experiments, the track record of anarcholibertarianism is simply embarrassing. It would be untenable to deny that history provides many examples of situations in which there was no functioning monopoly on force-initiation over a significant region for a significant period of time, for any non-embarrassing standard of significance. SH) Of course, I have seen plenty of -regulated- markets, and they do pretty much behave as predicted by anarcholibertarian theory. (SH All of those are also predictive successes of minarchist theory, too. I note you did not assert the negation of my claim that "even bastard forms of minarchism have been spectacularly successful compared to all other significant social experiments". BH) one has the right -- nay, obligation -- to kill innocents if doing so is sure to result in a non-trivial reduction in the number of innocents killed. (BH SH) Ah. So if you knew the future, it would be your obligation to change it? Or do you define 'sure' in some way other than 'certain knowledge'? (SH (Note that one cannot "change" the future, but rather only influence it. For details, see this section of my book: http://humanknowledge.net/Thoughts.html#Time) What I'm saying is that the Trolley Problem constitutes an existence proof for the logical possibility of the moral obligation to initiate force, and that yes, this obligation hinges on having some knowledge about the likely consequences of initiating that force as compared to not doing so. SH) can you please explain what is the difference between a 'trivial' and 'nontrivial' number of innocents? (SH I'll illustrate it. In a version of the Trolley Problem where one million and one innocents are going to die unless I personally cause the death of one million other innocents, then I wouldn't throw the switch.
