Susan Hogarth wrote: BH) one has the right -- nay, obligation -- to kill innocents if doing so is sure to result in a non-trivial reduction in the number of innocents killed. (BH
BH) What I'm saying is that the Trolley Problem constitutes an existence proof for the logical possibility of the moral obligation to initiate force, and that yes, this obligation hinges on having some knowledge about the likely consequences of initiating that force as compared to not doing so. (BH SH) Previously you used 'sure', and now you use 'likely'. Can you be more specific? (SH I've specifically described circumstances in which the available confidence level would meet my epistemological standard. For those same circumstances, you first said you "might" make the same choice as me, and then later rejected the possibility. So I'll get more specific when you make a final call on the TP. However, if you're looking for an algorithm that can be mechanically applied so as to ring a bell and print out a definitive answer to any ethical dilemma, I don't claim to have one. Do you? (Or do you deny the existence of ethical dilemmas, just as you deny the coherence of the concept of a "necessary evil"?) SH) can you please explain what is the difference between a 'trivial' and 'nontrivial' number of innocents? (SH GH) I'll illustrate it. In a version of the Trolley Problem where one million and one innocents are going to die unless I personally cause the death of one million other innocents, then I wouldn't throw the switch. (GH SH) Can you explain rather than illustrate? (SH The basic idea is that my decision wouldn't be strictly determined by the mathematics of the number of innocents on each side of the equation. This example makes clear that I don't consider to be completely irrelevant the clean-hands consideration that you apparently consider to be dispositive. SH) I asked on what basis you think such an analysis could be made. (SH The answer was the next two sentences: "We each have the individual right to have our life and liberty be protected, we each have the individual right to due process, etc. Such rights are hollow if everyone is absolutely exempt from all force initiation, since that would allow the strong to systematically exploit the weak in a way that we know can be sharply mitigated through minarchism." You didn't substantively address this, or indeed any of the empirical analysis that followed it.
