Some clarifications are in order:
(1) "I agree with Engels (and Marx) that nature is dialectical." Marx and
Engels did not make exactly the same claims about nature.
(2) "this classical Marxist claim is first and foremost an ontological
statement about the nature of reality": historically, historical
materialism came first, albeit as an outgrowth of engagement with Hegelian
philosophy. What was later called 'dialectical materialism' came
later. Still later, histomat was declared an application of diamat. So
the question is: what is the reality whose nature was characterized by Marx
and Engels (prior to his independent work we've been debating)? The
reality was society, and not the domain of natural science. True, Marx
wrote about Epicurus, but he was really dealing with philosophical, not
natural-scientific concepts.
(3) "the logical development of the materialist dialectic itself flows from
nature to society to thought." Well, reality, as we understand it
scientifically, flows historically and hence ontologically from nature to
society to thought. But such an assertion about the 'logical development
of the materialist dialectic' lacks conceptual clarity for all the reasons
I've been arguing. Your argument seems to be based on something like this:
if thought issues out of society which issues out of nature, then for
thought to be dialectical, society must be dialectical, and for that nature
must be dialectical. Here of course I'm using "nature" to mean "Nature"
minus the human or other self-conscious intelligent species. Well, if
nature can issue forth more developed, "dialectical" entities, then this
must be accounted for in nature. The problem though is what we mean by
claiming physio-chemical processes in and by themselves to be dialectical
or to follow dialectical laws.
(4) sociopolitical conditions for emergence of dialectical materialist
world view: there are indeed social preconditions for the emergence of this
world view. Marx adumbrates them for example in the 1844 mss. It helps to
be clear about the relation between the 'dialectical materialist' and
'proletarian communist' world view. The relationship is not merely a
partisan one; it has to do with the role of intellectuals in the division
of labor, and thus the division of society--and the self--into two
non-communicating but interdependent components. This is where Marx starts
in 1844, which is somewhat different from where the 'dialectics of nature'
starts. Praxis, the subject-object relation, social theory--this is where
the old materialism fails. (Marx makes some remarks which, based on the
specific text alone, don't seem terribly clear--his association of the old
materialism with individualism. By this does he imply French
materialism? Another topic for discussion.)
ADDENDUM: I also want to point out that a critical social analysis of
Soviet philosophy has to explain more than it usually does. I need to
review Pannekoek's critique here, not because I completely buy into it but
because I think we need to account for what Soviet philosophy could and
could not accomplish and why. The way that Marxism was configured in
underdeveloped countries has a lot to do with the nonsense promulgated by
Stalinists and Maoists in third world countries, with the caveat that the
same ideas were promulgated in the developed world and among Trotskyists as
well. However, as Soviet philosophy became more professionalized in the
post-Stalin era, it had some things to say that could not be said in the
capitalist philosophical world, though these accomplishments themselves
were marred by the dogmatic despotically imposed on the
intelligentsia. Still, we need to ask how such despotism could
necessitate, foster, or permit the formulation and discussion of certain
questions in certain ways not happening elsewhere. Take Lektorsky's
SUBJECT OBJECT COGNITION as an example.
At 06:26 PM 5/24/2005 -0700, Steve Gabosch wrote:
On 5/23/2005 Ralph Dumain wrote:
The basic flaw in the kindergarten arguments to which we are accustomed
lies in a simple minded triangulation of formal logic, 'dialectical
logic', and empirical examples. But, I argue, what makes dialectics
'dialectical' is a categorial overview of conceptual structures on a
systemic scale--the structural interrelationships of systems of concepts
and their interpretation.
I appreciate Ralph's recent thoughts, and Charles's responses. For my
part, I agree with Engels (and Marx) that nature is dialectical. As I see
it, this classical Marxist claim is first and foremost an ontological
statement about the nature of reality, and must be seen in terms of a
*materialist* dialectical worldview. From this foundational worldview,
the epistemological problem of how to develop dialectical knowledge
(concepts, etc.) follows, and in turn, dialectical logic and other forms
of conscious dialectical knowledge become possible to discover and
analyze. In other words, the logical development of the materialist
dialectic itself flows from nature to society to thought. Historically,
humanity and its known thinkers have discovered important wisdoms about
our dialectical material world, society and minds, here and there, many
times over, but it was not until Marx, Engels, the modern proletarian
communist movement and the modern proletariat entered history - and the
end of class society could become a possibility - that dialectical
materialism could emerge as a worldview. This worldview has certainly
been dogmatized and reduced to trivialities in the hands of some,
especially those who wielded so-called "Marxist" governments as weapons
of repression and purge, greatly heating up personal and political
tension around these philosophical questions to this day. Even just
Marxist terminology can evoke strong feelings, such as my (for some,
provocative) association of "dialectical materialism" with "proletarian
communism." And of course, bourgeois society has heaped enormous
distortional derision on Marxist ideas of all types since the beginning of
Marxian communism. It takes serious effort to navigate these obstacles
and learn and comprehend Marxist theory at all, let alone form an
intelligent opinion about whether nature is "dialectical" or what being
dialectical at all means. I think the point is well taken - but still
possible to overstate - that even the most advanced philosophical and
scientific work on the materialist dialectic is still rudimentary. So
much work lies ahead. My take on emergentism is that it has great
potential to enhance and advance the effort to unify philosophy and
science on dialectical, materialist and socialist principles. To
reiterate my basic take on dialectics: I think beginning with the concept
that nature is dialectical, as Marx and Engels did, is the right place to
start, because it places one squarely in the dialectical materialist and
proletarian communist worldview.
- Steve Gabosch
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