First see my reply to Steve Gabosch. I would also suggest that your
conclusion requires clarification:
Of course, this unifrom worldview as
an epistemological claim has something to do with class ineterests.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Marxism is subject distortions. But
how far can
this distortion can go? If the laws of dialectics are objective, then it is
not wrong to suppose that they bring themselves permanently to the fore. In
other words, there are limits to this distortion.
In my previous response I related the class interests and epistemological
claims to the socialization of intellectuals in the division of labor. I
would say that class interests most often get expressed indirectly, and the
'class interests' of intellectuals in the realm of their intellectual work
that is not explicitly about class interests has to do with their mode of
socialization and self-preservation. Otherwise I am reluctant to equate
class interests with epistemology in a directly partisan way, since most
intellectuals are actually unaware and completely clueless about their
presuppositions, and are themselves in most cases helpless victims rather
than perpetrators of their tacit assumptions. You know, I deal with these
people in Washington and I can't stand them, but the majority of them are
too clueless to be held culpable; it would be like holding soap opera
addicts culpable for their substandard tastes and lack of critical
acumen. I mean, you can get mad at them for being stupid, but they don't
know any better.
I don't understand your claims about the objectivity of dialectical laws
asserting themselves in the end. Greater clarity is needed here.
At 01:53 AM 5/25/2005 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steve Gabosch wrote:
"I appreciate Ralph's recent thoughts, and Charles's responses. For my
part, I agree with Engels (and Marx) that nature is dialectical. As I see
it, this classical Marxist claim is first and foremost an ontological
statement about the nature of reality, and must be seen in terms of a
*materialist* dialectical worldview. From this foundational worldview, the
epistemological problem of how to develop dialectical knowledge (concepts,
etc.) follows, and in turn, dialectical logic and other forms of conscious
dialectical knowledge become possible to discover and analyze. In other
words, the logical development of the materialist dialectic itself flows
from nature to society to thought. Historically, humanity and its known
thinkers have discovered important wisdoms about our dialectical material
world, society and minds, here and there, many times over, but it was not
until Marx, Engels, the modern proletarian communist movement and the
modern proletariat entered history - and the end of class society could
become a possibility - that dialectical materialism could emerge as a
worldview. This worldview has certainly been dogmatized and reduced to
trivialities in the hands of some, especially those who wielded so-called
"Marxist" governments as weapons of repression and purge, greatly heating
up personal and political tension around these philosophical questions to
this day. Even just Marxist terminology can evoke strong feelings, such as
my (for some, provocative) association of "dialectical materialism" with
"proletarian communism." And of course, bourgeois society has heaped
enormous distortional derision on Marxist ideas of all types since the
beginning of Marxian communism. It takes serious effort to navigate these
obstacles and learn and comprehend Marxist theory at all, let alone form an
intelligent opinion about whether nature is "dialectical" or what being
dialectical at all means. I think the point is well taken - but still
possible to overstate - that even the most advanced philosophical and
scientific work on the materialist dialectic is still rudimentary. So much
work lies ahead. My take on emergentism is that it has great potential to
enhance and advance the effort to unify philosophy and science on
dialectical, materialist and socialist principles. To reiterate my basic
take on dialectics: I think beginning with the concept that nature is
dialectical, as Marx and Engels did, is the right place to start, because
it places one squarely in the dialectical materialist and proletarian
communist worldview."
I agree with every single sentence. I think without this ontological claim
that the laws of dialectics are universal, working in different forms in
nature, society and thought there can hardly any uniform worldview. One
needs just
to consider all the difficulties of Barkely, Kant and Hegel to come to this
conclusion. B had to bring en external force called god into play to be able
to suppose that there is an order in nature. K left out the idea of
uniformity
in nature. H equated nature to thought. Of course, this unifrom worldview as
an epistemological claim has something to do with class ineterests.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Marxism is subject distortions. But
how far can
this distortion can go? If the laws of dialectics are objective, then it is
not wrong to suppose that they bring themselves permanently to the fore. In
other words, there are limits to this distortion.
regards
dogan
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