Victor,
I spent a little time reviewing Ilyenkov's article "The Concept of the
Ideal" (available on MIA ), and the notes I published on xmca about it last
year. Below, I have copied paragraphs 66 - 90 from EVI's 142-paragraph
essay. I don't find your comments today about ideality and materiality
consistent with Ilyenkov's theory as I interpret it.
Even were I to somehow convince you of that, it still would not necessarily
make Bakhurst right, of course. I notice that one big problem with
Bakhurst's presentation in his chapter on the concept of the ideal is he
does not focus on or even mention how Ilyenkov's concept of the ideal is a
generalization of the labor theory of value to all human activity. In
fact, he does not mention the labor theory of value at all. As I think
about it, this avoidance of the most important argument by Ilyenkov
considerably weakens his presentation. But as I say, I don't think the
real issue is Bakhurst's comprehension of Ilyenkov's theory of the
ideal. I think the real issue is Ilyenkov's theory itself, whether it can
flow from the labor theory of value, and how does it apply.
As I see it, the key concept in this regard that Ilyenkov offers is that
just as Marx discovered how social relations can be "embodied" into things
in the form of commodities - through the incorporation of abstract labor
into the value-form - so too, Marxists can explain that social relations
are embodied in all cultural objects - through the incorporation of
meaningful cultural activity into the ideal form.
Ilyenkov explains that plain materialists and idealists alike make the
error of viewing the boundary between the material and the ideal as being
the world of the inside versus that of the outside of each individual human
head. In contrast, he argues that according to dialectical materialism,
ideality and materiality must be distinguished in terms of the composition
of each object - both the composition of the physical attributes, which of
course are the sources of its materiality, and the composition of its
social origins and social context, which are the sources of its ideality -
just as Marx analyzed the composition of the commodity. According to
Ilyenkov's theory, objects within the human cultural realm objectively
possess both materiality and ideality, just as commodities in a market
economy possess both concrete and abstract labor, possess both use-value
and exchange-value.
I think a close look at Ilyenkov is needed to proceed. Below are
paragraphs 66-90 (my numbering) from the 142-word essay. I realize this is
a lot of material, but it is a complex idea. Each paragraph is preceded by
some comments or headings by me. My annotations have an SG in them and are
preceded by "*****." The full article as at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm
Please note there are some scanning errors in this version and I strongly
suspect there are some translation errors in the printed edition, both of
which contribute much to making this already difficult article fairly
opaque to read. I annotated this important essay partially for my own
learning, and partially in the hope that it could become the basis of an
annotated edition of this essay at some point, which might help others
study and understand it.
- Steve
selections from Evald Ilyenkov "The Concept of the Ideal" (1977),
annotations by Steve Gabosch (SG):
___________________________________________________
66 - 69 Ideality in Use-Value and Exchange Value SG
*****[66. SG. Ideality in the form of exchange value consists in the fact
that a coat, for example, can be a form of expression of something quite
different, for example, linen. Their exchange values are mutually represented.
66
According to Marx, the ideality of the form of value consists not, of
course, in the fact that this form represents a mental phenomenon existing
only in the brain of the commodity-owner or theoretician, but in the fact
that the corporeal palpable form of the thing (for example, a coat) is only
a form of expression of quite a different ?thing? (linen, as a value) with
which it has nothing in common. The value of the linen is *represented*,
expressed, ?embodied? in the form of a coat, and the form of the coat is
the ?*ideal or represented* form? of the value of the linen.
*****[67. SG. EVI presents a well-read quote by Marx.]
67
?As a use-value, the linen is something palpably different from the coat;
as value, it is the same as the coat, and now has the appearance of a coat.
Thus the linen acquires a value-form different from its physical form. The
fact that it is value, is made manifest by its equality with the coat, just
as the sheep?s nature of a Christian is shown in his resemblance to the
Lamb of God.? [Capital, Vol. I, p. 58.]
*****[68. SG. This ideal or represented form of value is a completely
objective relationship.]
68
This is a completely objective relationship, within which the ?bodily form
of commodity B becomes the value-form of commodity A, or the body of
commodity B acts as a mirror to the value of commodity A?, [Capital, Vol.
I, p. 59.] the authorised representative of its ?value? nature, of the
?substance? which is ?embodied? both here and there.
*****[69. SG. The value-form is ?ideal,? it is something quite different
from the physical thing in which it is represented.]
69
This is why the form of value or value-form is *ideal*, that is to say, it
is something quite different from the palpable form of the thing in which
it is *represented*, expressed, ?embodied?, ?alienated?.
70 - 73 Is It Consciousness and Will That Is Being Represented? SG
*****[70.1 SG. What is being represented? Will? No. And now EVI makes
another of his central most important crucial essential points in this
article.
*****[70.2 SG. What is being represented is a definite *social
relationship between people* which before their eyes takes the form of a
*relationship between things*.
70
What is this ?other?, this difference, which is expressed or represented
here? People?s consciousness? Their will? By no means. On the contrary,
both will and consciousness are determined by this objective ideal form,
and the thing that it expresses, ?represents? is a definite social
relationship between people which in their eyes assumes the fantastic form
of a relationship between things.
*****[71. SG. In commodity exchange, people?s activity is materially
established in the form of a relationship between things. This occurs
regardless of conscious knowledge it is happening.
71
In other words, what is ?represented? here *as a thing is* the form of
people?s activity, the form of life activity which they perform together,
which has taken shape ?behind the back of consciousness? and is materially
established in the form of the relationship between things described above.
*****[72. SG. The appearance of the value of one thing in the physicality
of another alone creates ideality.
72
This and only this creates the ideality of such a ?thing?, its
sensuous-supersensuous character.
*****[73. SG. Here is where the ideal form stands in direct opposition to
individual consciousness as an external thing, not as itself, but in the
form of another equally palpable thing that expresses something different
from either thing. What is represented in these two things (the coat and
the linen in Marx?s example) is human labor, the transformation of nature
by social humanity.]
73
Here ideal form actually does stand in opposition to individual
consciousness and individual will as the *form of the external thing*
(remember Kant?s talers) and is necessarily perceived precisely as the form
of the external thing, not its palpable form, but as the form of another
equally palpable thing that it represents, expresses, embodies, differing,
however, from the palpable corporeality of both things and having nothing
in common with their sensuously perceptible physical nature. What is
embodied and ?represented? here is a definite form of labour, a definite
form of human objective activity, that is to say, the transformation of
nature by social man.
74 - 79 The Answer To the Riddle of Ideality SG
*****[74. SG. EVI drives the point home. According to Marx, ideality is
nothing else but social human activity represented in the thing.]
74
It is here that we find the answer to the riddle of ?ideality?. Ideality,
according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity
represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity
represented *as a thing*, as an object.
*****[75. SG. Ideality is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of
nature by social human life activity. All things involved in the social
process acquire this stamp ? this ideality.
75
?Ideality? is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by
social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing
in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social
process acquire a new ?form of existence? that is not included in their
physical nature and differs from it completely their ideal form.
*****[76. SG. Where no people are socially producing or reproducing
material life, where none are working collectively, there is no
ideality. However, this does not mean ideality is a product of conscious
will. To the contrary, conscious will is a product of ideality.
76
So, there can be no talk of ?ideality? where there are no people socially
producing and reproducing their material life, that is to say, individuals
working collectively and, therefore, necessarily possessing consciousness
and will. But this does not mean that the ?ideality of things? is a product
of their *conscious will*, that it is ?immanent in the consciousness? and
exists only in the consciousness. Quite the reverse, the individual?s
consciousness and will are functions of the ideality of things, their
comprehended, *conscious ideality*.
*****[77.1 SG. Ideality is purely social in origin. It is human activity
outside itself, it is the activity of a person outside that person.
*****[77.2 SG. Here, then, is the key to the whole mystery. This is the
real basis for all kinds of idealistic constructions and conceptions both
of man and of a world beyond man. EVI points out problems with trying to
?fix? idealist constructions, which will slip away.
77
Ideality, thus, has a purely social nature and origin. It is the form of a
thing, but it is outside this thing, and in the activity of man, as a *form
of this activity*. Or conversely, it is the form of a person?s activity but
outside this person, *as a form of the thing*. Here, then, is the key to
the whole mystery that has provided a real basis for all kinds of
idealistic constructions and conceptions both of man and of a world beyond
man, from Plato to Carnap and Popper. ?Ideality? constantly escapes, slips
away from the metaphysically single-valued theoretical fixation. As soon as
it is fixed as the ?form of the thing? it begins to tease the theoretician
with its ?immateriality?, its ?functional? character and appears only as a
form of ?pure activity?. On the other hand, as soon as one attempts to fix
it ?as such?, as purified of all the traces of palpable corporeality, it
turns out that this attempt is fundamentally doomed to failure, that after
such a purification there will be nothing but phantasmal emptiness, an
indefinable vacuum.
*****[78. SG. It is absurd, as Hegel knew, to speak of activity that is
not realized in something definite, even if it us just words. Activity
that has no embodiment is better understood as inactivity.]
78
And indeed, as Hegel understood so well, it is absurd to speak of
,activity? that is not realised in anything definite, is not ?embodied? in
something corporeal, if only in words, speech, language. If such ?activity?
exists, it cannot be in reality but only in *possibility, only*
potentially, and, therefore, not as activity but as its opposite, as
*inactivity*, as the absence of activity.
*****[79. SG. This leads Hegel to believe that the ?spirit? as the ideal
must oppose itself to an object, something different from itself.]
79
So, according to Hegel, the ?spirit?, as something ideal, as something
opposed to the world of corporeally established forms, cannot ?reflect? at
all (i.e., become aware of the forms of its own structure) unless it
preliminarily opposes ?itself to itself?, as an ,object?, a thing that
differs from itself.
80 - 85 Marx's Development of Hegel's Concept of Ideality SG
*****[80. SG. Marx uses the analogy of the mirror and the need of humans
to recognize themselves in others to explain the value-form of commodities.]
80
When speaking of value-form as the ideal form of a thing, Marx by no means
accidentally uses the comparison of the mirror: ?In a sort of way, it is
with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a
looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtean philosopher, to whom ?I am I?
is sufficient, man first sees and recognises himself in other men. Peter
only establishes his own identity as a man by first comparing himself with
Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his
Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo.?
[Capital, Vol. I, p. 59.]
*****[81.1 SG. EVI continues to describe the parallel between Marx?s
theory of the ?ideality? of the value-form and Hegel?s understanding of
?ideality.?
*****[81.2 SG. In my opinion, the next sentence may contain EVI?s
clearest alternative title for this article, and perhaps a more explicit
formulation of his theory. He says that Hegel?s ideality takes into
account the dialectics of the emergence of the collective self-awareness of
the human race. This phrase collective self-awareness may be worth setting
aside for further examination. Is Ilyenkov?s Concept of the Ideal the
basis for a Marxist Theory of Collective Self-Awareness?
*****[81.3 SG. Hegel?s ?spirit? must first turn into an object - first,
in the form of the word, then in the forms of all cultural
artifacts. Hegel realized that ideality can only be known through an
analysis of its embodiments.
81
Here Marx plainly indicates the parallel between his theory of the
?ideality? of the value-form and Hegel?s understanding of ?ideality?, which
takes into account the dialectics of the emergence of the collective
self-awareness of the human race. Yes, Hegel understood the situation far
more broadly and profoundly than the ?Fichtean philosopher?; he established
the fact that ?spirit?, before it could examine itself, must shed its
unblemished purity and phantasmal nature, and must itself turn *into an
object* and in the form of this object oppose itself to itself. At first in
the form of the Word, in the form of verbal ?embodiment?, and then in the
form of instruments of labour, statues, machines, guns, churches,
factories, constitutions and states, in the form of the grandiose
?inorganic body of man?, in the form of the sensuously perceptible body of
civilisation which for him serves only as a glass in which he can examine
himself, his ?other being?, and know through this examination his own ?pure
ideality?, understanding himself as ?pure activity?. Hegel realised full
well that ideality as ?pure activity? is not directly given and cannot be
given ?as such?, immediately in all its purity and undisturbed perfection;
it can be known only through analysis of its ?embodiments?, through its
reflection in the glass of palpable reality, in the glass of the system of
things (their forms and relationships) created by the activity of ?pure
spirit?. By their fruits ye shall know them-and not otherwise.
*****[82. SG. According to Hegel ideal forms are realized in some
material, or they remain unknown to the active spirit. To examine these
ideal forms they must become ?reified,? turned into forms and relations of
things. Only this way can ideality exist.
82
The ideal forms of the world are, according to Hegel, forms of activity
*realised* in some material. If they are not realised in some palpable
material, they remain invisible and unknown for the active spirit itself,
the spirit cannot become aware of them. In order to examine them they must
be ?reified?, that is, turned into the forms and relations of *things*.
Only in this case does ideality exist, does it possess *present* being;
only as a reified and reifiable form of activity, a form of activity that
has become and is becoming the form of an object, a palpable thing outside
consciousness, and in no case as a transcendental-psychological pattern of
consciousness, not as the internal pattern of the ?self?, distinguishing
itself from itself within itself, as it turned out with the ?Fichtean
philosopher?.
*****[83. SG. In the form of individual consciousness, ideality cannot
become real. It becomes real in the course of its reification (treating
ideas as real objects, fetishism), objectification (transforming human
activity into a real object), deobjectification (transforming natural
objects into humanized objects), alienation (estrangement) and the
sublation (supersession, synthesis, overcoming) of alienation. EVI
emphasizes that these concepts, compared with those of Kant and Fichte,
were far superior for embracing human social development.
83
As the internal pattern of the activity of *consciousness*, as a pattern
?immanent in the consciousness?, ideality can have only an illusory, only a
phantasmal existence. It becomes real only in the course of its
reification, objectification (and deobjectification), alienation and the
sublation of alienation. How much more reasonable and realistic this
interpretation was, compared with that of Kant and Fichte, is self-evident.
It embraced the actual dialectics of people?s developing
?self-consciousness?, it embraced the actual phases and metamorphoses in
whose succession alone the ?ideality? of the world exists.
*****[84. SG. EVI points out that this is why Marx joined Hegel and not
Kant or Fichte with regard to terminology.]
84
It is for this reason that Marx joins Hegel in respect of terminology, and
not Kant or Fichte, who tried to solve the problem of ?ideality? (i.e.,
activity) while remaining ?inside consciousness?, without venturing into
the external sensuously perceptible corporeal world, the world of the
palpable forms and relations of things.
*****[85. SG. The Hegelian use of the term ideality refers to the entire
range of the physically embodied activity of social humankind.]
85
This Hegelian definition of the term ?ideality? took in the whole range of
phenomena within which the ?ideal?, understood as *the corporeally embodied
form of the activity of social* man, really exists.
86 - 89 Fathoming the Miracles of the Commodity SG
*****[86. SG. Commodities, money, and words, for example, are wholly
?material,? but their acquire their meaning from the ?ideal,? from ?spirit.?
86
Without an understanding of this circumstance it would be totally
impossible to fathom the miracles performed before man?s eyes by the
COMMODITY, the commodity form of the product, particularly in its money
form, in the form of the notorious ?real talers?, ?real rubles?, or ?real
dollars?, things which, as soon as we have the slightest theoretical
understanding of them, immediately turn out to be not ?real? at all, but
?ideal? through and through, things whose category quite unambiguously
includes *words*, the units of *language*, and many other ?things?. Things
which, while being wholly ?material?, palpable formations, acquire all
their ?meaning? (function and role) from ?spirit? and even owe to it their
specific bodily existence .... Outside spirit and without it there cannot
even be words, there is merely a vibration of the air.
*****[87. SG. This secret of the ideality of ?things? was first revealed
by Marx in his analysis of the value form.]
87
The mysteriousness of this category of ?things?, the secret of their
?ideality?, their sensuous-supersensuous character was first revealed by
Marx in the course of his analysis of the commodity (value) form of the
product.
*****[88. SG. Marx characterizes the commodity form as an ideal
form. This form has nothing in common with the actual body in which it is
represented (realized).
88
Marx characterises the commodity form as an IDEAL form, i.e., as a form
that has absolutely nothing in common with the real palpable form of the
body in which it is represented (i.e., expressed, materialised, reified,
alienated, realised), and by means of which it ?exists?, possesses ?present
being?.
*****[89. SG. A commodity is ideal because it does not include any of the
substance of the body in which it is represented. Likewise, the physical
thing in which it is represented includes none of the original commodity?s
materiality. There is no boot polish in a gold coin, and no gold in boot
polish. But certain amounts of each are considered to have equal
value. To add a few lines of my own, how can gold and boot polish be
equal? How can they mirror the other? They can do so because they are
mirroring not themselves, but a social relationship that they each
represent, in this case, a quantity of human labor. What kind of mirror is
this that can perform such a feat? This is the mirror of ideality, which
allows social relationships to be represented in things. Returning to
EVI?s line of discussion, this act of representation can take place outside
the head of the seller and buyer. Everyone can spend money without knowing
what money is.]
89
It is ?ideal? because it does not include a single atom of the substance of
the body in which it is represented, because it is the form of quite
*another body*. And this other body is present here not bodily, materially
(?bodily? it is at quite a different point in space), but only once again
?ideally?, and here there is not a single atom of its substance. Chemical
analysis of a gold coin will not reveal a single molecule of boot-polish,
and vice versa. Nevertheless, a gold coin represents (expresses) the value
of a hundred tins of boot-polish precisely by its weight and gleam. And, of
course, this act of representation is performed not in the consciousness of
the seller of boot-polish, but outside his consciousness in any ?sense? of
this word, outside his head, in the space of the market, and without his
having even the slightest suspicion of the mysterious nature of the money
form and the essence of the price of boot-polish.... Everyone can spend
money without knowing what money is.
90 The Ideal Is Objective SG
*****[90. SG. A fluent speaker can have trouble with their own language
when they try to understand the relationship between sign and
meaning. Linguistic studies could place them in the position of the
centipede who was unwise enough to ask himself which foot he steps off
on. The difficulty of understanding ideality consists in the fact that
ideal forms, like the value-form, the form of thought, or syntactical form,
turn into something objective, completely independent of anyone?s
consciousness, and occur outside the head ? although not without its
participation. The ideal is objective.]
90
For this very reason the person who confidently uses his native language to
express the most subtle and complex circumstances of life finds himself in
a very difficult position if he takes it into his head to acquire
consciousness of the relationship between the ?sign? and the ?meaning?. The
consciousness which he may derive from linguistic studies in the present
state of the science of linguistics is more likely to place him in the
position of the centipede who was unwise enough to ask himself which foot
he steps off on. And the whole difficulty which has caused so much bother
to philosophy as well lies in the fact that ?ideal forms?, like the
value-form, the form of thought or syntactical form, have always arisen,
taken shape and developed, turned into something objective, completely
independent of anyone?s consciousness, in the course of processes that
occur not at all in the ?head?, but most definitely outside it although
not without its participation.
________________________________________________________
<end of selection from essay>
<end of my post>
________________________________________________________
At 02:43 PM 6/15/2005 +0200, Victor wrote:
Nice work!
That's just it. Bakhurst confuses the ideal as objectification of practice
in consciousness with the material artefact it images. In truth, he also
managed to confuse me as well.
Anyway the ideal as objectification of practice is just that imaged or
imagined object that Marx describes as the conscious objective of physical
sensual labour activity. Marx and certainly Hegel do not describe this
objectified practice as a material object, it is the socially originated
and endorsed, authorized, sanctioned etc. etc. object of labour as it is
manifest in consciousness. The material representation of the ideal is in
conventional symbolic forms that have no material resemblance either to
the objectified practice, the practice objectified, or to the material
products of that practice.
It is not the artifacts that represent the activity to which they owe
their existence as artifacts but the it is the ideal artefact (in
consciousness) that provides the "paragon" by which the labourer measures
the effectiveness of his work. The material artefact certainly has
significance to those who recognize its correspondence in form and
substance to the imagined ideal, but it cannot ever approach the abstract
"perfection" of the imagined ideal. Remember Pygmalion either Shaw's or
the "Rain in Spain" version. The environment of significance that educates
is not that of the material artefacts themselves, but that of the
discourse (regarded here broadly) between people. It is through this
discourse mediated of course by language that the ideal becomes
a consciousness common to the community.
Bakhurst's peculiar rendering of the ideal as the material artefact is
certainly an original idea. It's reification with a
vengeance. Reification that not even the most committed objective
idealist dares do. The Hegelians and Neopositivists are quite content to
argue that human consciousness is determined by ideality and that human
knowledge begins and ends with the customs (understood by them as
concepts) of the tribe. Bakhurst has declared that material reality is
ideality or, in other words that custom and only custom determines
objective reality. What I don't fully understand yet is why Bakhurst
agonizes over Ilyenkov's materialism. After all, if ideality is material
reality, then being an idealist is being a materialist! I suspect that
he's not fully convinced by his own arguments, but maybe you have a better
insight.
By the way, I'm rewriting the paper I sent you. I've restricted to
interpreting how Ilyenkov integrates the ideal into Historical
Materialist theory and I think you'll recognize his work in this paper.
Thanks for the help.
Oudeyis
----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Gabosch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx
and thethinkers he inspired" <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 4:30
Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
Hi Victor,
Interestingly, footnote one in a paper by Lantolf and Thorne that is
getting discussed on the xmca list - the paper is at
<http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/JuneJuly05/LantolfThorne2005.pdf>Introduction,
in Sociocultural Theory and the Genesis of Second Language Development -
has a relevant quote from Bakhurst on the very topic you raise and we are
discussing, the relationship of material (natural) objects and ideality.
It is from page 183 in Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy
(1991).
from Lantolf and Thorne:
footnote 1 "David Bakhurst characterizes the production of objective
culture this way: [BTW, the quoted Bakhurst sentence begins: "To sum up,
Ilyenkov holds that ..." -sg] '. by acting on natural objects, human
beings invest them with a significance or "ideal form" that elevates them
to a new "plane of existence." Objects owe their ideality to their
incorporation into the aim-oriented life activity of a human community,
to their *use*. The notion of significance is glossed in terms of the
concept of representation: Artifacts represent the activity to which they
owe their existence as artifacts.' (1991: 183)."
- Steve
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