Ralph, Why are you saying all this stuff about humanity is doomed and there will never be communism? It contradicts the efforts you have made as an auto-didact and to make liberatory material available to other people. True if we want to get from where we are now to communism we will need a well-debated and intelligent programme for communism. For the beginnings of this try googling the Democratic Socialist Alliance and reading the pieces by Phil Sharpe. Cheer up doom may never happen, Phil Walden
-----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ralph Dumain Sent: 29 September 2007 08:56 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [email protected] Subject: *** SPAM *** Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] [marxistphilosophy] Presentations to the Fifth International Marx Congress Re: "Scientific method: logical representation vis à vis dialectical reproduction (i.e., the consciousness dominated by alienation for believing itself an abstractly free one vis à vis the consciousness that advances in its freedom by being aware of its alienation)" I have never been able to understand Juan's views over the past decade or more. For the moment I'll just point out passages that puzzle me. >Capitals needs concerning scientific cognition >face a contradiction. To increase >relative surplus value by means of the system of >machinery, capital is compelled to submit all >production and consumption to science. >Nevertheless, insofar as scientific cognition is >simply a concrete form of the production of >surplus value, science must reproduce the >alienation of human consciousness in capital. At >the same time it has to be an objective consciousness, it >needs to be a consciousness that looks upon >itself in a non-objective way by accepting the >appearance of being an abstractly free >consciousness. For this reason, it is about a science that >needs to appear as if the foundations of its >objectivity were rooted outside itself This >foundation must appear to arise from a pure >abstractly free subjectivity, . . . I think I do understand thus far (could be a critique of Popper, Dawkins, et al), but: >as if it were based on philosophy, and more >specifically, on a philosophy based on the >appearance of free individuality inherent in the circulation of commodities. I don't understand how science is based on philosophy, or that it is commonly held by scientists that science is based on philosophy. >Scientific theory, namely logical >representation, is this contradiction resolved. >Scientific theory represents real concatenations >by taking the forms where the necessity has >been already realized needs have already been >fulfilled -which is to say, the concrete forms- >as if they were not, at the same time, forms >that carry within themselves a necessity to be >realized -which is to say, abstract forms. It >thus defines real forms as unable to move by >themselves. From this point of view, they can >only be linked by an external relationship. It is >here that logic comes into play. >Placed as incapable of moving by themselves, >real forms are represented as forms that >affirm themselves through the appearance of >being abstract immediate affirmations. >Consequently, consciousness could be affirmed as >a free one or it could be affirmed as an >alienated one. However, it is logically >impossible for alienated consciousness to affirm itself >through its own negation under the concrete form of free consciousness. I can't make a bit of sense out of this. >In fact, the appearance of being an immediate >abstract affirmation corresponds to the >actual quantitative determination considered in >itself. Scientific theory subscribes to the logic >that is genuinely necessary for mathematical >cognition and represents it as the objective >necessity that relates qualitatively the >abstract immediate affirmations to which all real forms >have been previously reduced. Mathematical logic >is thus represented as formal logic. Based >on this premise, scientific theory represents >the real abstract determinations by the >relationships of measure between their concrete >forms. This representation allows the subject >to govern actions upon real forms consciously: >although the real necessity at stake is not truly >known, it is nevertheless possible to act upon >the magnitude of the real forms, thus >transforming their quantity until this >corresponds to that of a qualitatively different form. Its >quality itself has thus been transformed.4 I don't understand this either. Are we talking about physics envy here? A purely quantitative notion of scientific theory? How does mathematical logic relate to theories in physics? >Scientific theory revolutionizes once and again >human control on natural forces, based >on transforming quantitative differences into >qualitative differences with objective >knowledge. Its development seems to have no >limit other than the conscious control over all >the processes that concern human life. >Therefore, scientific theory would appear to be the >necessary form taken by the conscious >organization of the human process of social >metabolism. Yet, scientific theory itself has >already discovered that this is like trying to walk >through quicksand. >As its initial premise is to represent real >concrete forms as abstract immediate >affirmations, the real necessity that determines >them can only go into logical representation by >being reduced to the greater or lesser degree >that the repetition of the existence of the real >concrete form in question could present.6 Can't make sense out of this either. >Therefore, however the hypothetically postulated >determination has been verified by comparing the >foreseen results with the real ones in all the >cases of similar appearance taken into >consideration, this fact does not allow one to be >logically certain about the unavoidable >extension of the regularity to the singular case now >faced, whose realization still remains pending. >Therefore, theories cannot be verified >previously to the action based on them. >Scientific theory seeks for the solution to this impasse >by turning the problem upside down: although >theories cannot be verified, at least their >potential falsity can be proved. Nevertheless, >even the certainty about the falsity of a theory >dos not solve the problem of having acquired effective knowledge on the actual >determination. This appears to be the germ of a critique of Popper. While the notion of falsifiablity appears to be commonly accepted among the scientific community, I don't see much evidence of a detailed interest in Popper's ideas or for that matter any concern whatever about certainty, which is the philosopher's anxiety. >Hence, scientific theory itself arrives at a >logically unavoidable conclusion: given the >external nature of logical representation with >respect to the real needs that we aim to >appropriate in thought, it is impossible to be >certain about an objective knowledge before >acting. Certainty is an impossibility, but nobody cares except philosophers, who are not scientists. >The theoretical stream that directly flows from >modern Positivism accepts these >limitations to the scope of scientific theory >-that arise from the externality of the logical >necessity with respect to the real necessity >that is represented- beyond any doubt. It starts with >Poppers self-complacent whining about >rationally criticizing what cannot be rationally >justified nor proved to have any real content,8 >goes on with Feyerabends degraded >everything goes,9 and ends up with Rortys >open contentment with his objective truth not >for its correspondence with reality but because >the widest possible intersubjective agreement >has been achieved.10 Thus, objective scientific >truth becomes any assertion that the >community of scientists solidarily declares to >be such. Why this privilege? Because, it is said, >inasmuch as scientists pursue no interest other >than knowledge itself, they are the most pure >expression of free human subjectivity. Of >course, free consciousness is not an abstract natural >attribute but the historic specific social >relation in which the consciousness alienated as an >attribute of capital takes shape. Popper would criticize the whole tradition as "justificationism", and in this they are correct. Yet they seem to be driven by an inverted concern with the same issues, not realizing the impotence of philosophy in directly engaging the concrete development of science or the objectivity of its institutions. >What alternatives offers us the Marxist >theoretical stream, that is to say, the one whose >critical position is grounded in taking Marxs >texts as the model for logical representation? To >begin with, we find the critical scientific >theory that counts on overcoming the impotence of >theory to reach the certainty concerning its >truth thanks to the presumed superior selfconsistency >of its dialectical logic: while formal logic can only represent the results of >determination in general, dialectical logic >represents this determination in itself. I can't see dialectical logic doing this at all. I presume Juan means the dialectic of Marx's capital, not dialectical materialism as found in Soviet philosophy and elsewhere. Yet I don't see a concrete connection between the dialectic of capital and physical scientific theories. Questions regarding the options for Marxist theory are adumbrated. Then this: >Marxist theory does not know if its own >impotency must horrify or fascinate it. In both >cases it goes on by considering itself free from >the hopeless problem of verification. In the >first case, because it has decided that its >truth criteria reside in its moral foundations, in the >elevated aims that guide it.16 That is to say, >it presents itself necessarily constructed on the >basis of a philosophy. We come thus face to face >with the ideological negation of scientific >cognition, i.e., philosophy, placed as the >necessary departing point of the scientific cognition >of reality. In the second case, this scientific >theory directly declares any question concerning >the truth or falsity of a theory to be >meaningless. It starts by resolving that scientific cognition >only deals with the mental forms through which >it represents reality, but not with the real >forms themselves. Hence, it declares eliminated >by nature the necessity to confront the reality >of the theoretical construction. From here on, >it believes enough with declaring itself the >working class revolutionary doctrine, to sustain its cognitive superiority.17 This sure sounds like Soviet Marxism, Trotskyism, and all other forms of politically codified Marxist theory. But I doubt all Marxists independent of these schools and parties would agree to this. Juan then criticizes the doctrine of verification by practice. Out of all these problems comes this conclusion: >In a nutshell, the point is that scientific >theories cannot go beyond interpreting reality >in different ways.24 They are but ideologies. >However powerful an action based upon a theory >may be in its mission to transform reality, it >is in itself the denial of the action which >thoroughly cognizes its own necessity beyond any >appearance, insofar as it is based upon an >interpretation. This makes not a lick of sense to me. >No wonder theoreticians themselves end up condemning scientific knowledge, >as a consequence of its logical method itself, >to the field of exhausted utopias, of >emancipating grand narratives;25 or, worse, to >the field of the attempts of totalitarian >domination, aimed at oppressing human freedom. I've no doubt this bankruptcy exists. But actually this goes on in an ideological realm beyond what scientific theories do, at least in the natural sciences. >The contradiction is obvious. Any interpretation >of a real determination is in itself the >denial of the knowledge of that determination >that has transcended every appearance; the >interpretation of ones own need is the denial >of its complete objective cognition. But the >general conscious organization of social life >entails that the objective knowledge held by each >of the members of society about his/her >determinations as such, transcending every >appearance, becomes the general social relation. >Therefore, as much as scientific cognition is >condemned to interpretation, so the general >conscious organization of social life is condemned >to impossibility. In other words, as much as >scientific theory is the final form of scientific >cognition, so socialism/communism is condemned >to impossibility. Even the most blatantly >apologetic cretinism of capitalism has nothing >further to request: from the mouths of the true >representatives of scientific method comes the >utterance that this very same method declares >that the end of history has been reached, that the future is already here. This is an abbreviated argument. The "end of history" idea is a specific ideological trend; regardless of the general claims made by all kinds of ideologists on the possibility of a scientifi understanding of society or the nature of same, or the political options that are viable and desirable. >In addition, as scientific knowledge has been >reduced to an ideological conception >whose specificity lies in its repressive and >authoritarian power, antiscientific irrationality and >fragmented sight begin to earn praise as the >liberating resistance that desire opposes to >oppressing knowledge28. Theoretical >representation opposes the very denial of totally free >action -i.e., the free interpretation of >reality29- to the transforming power of totally free action >i.e., of the action that is aware of its own >determinations beyond any appearance- as the >consummation of human freedom. In scientific >theory, ideology manifests itself in the form of >its opposite, namely, scientific method. Understood up the business about awareness beyond appearance. The point about scientific method is obscure. >The critique of scientific theory has no way of >taking shape in the formulation of a >new logical paradigm. In other words, the >critique of the current universally dominant science >does not take shape in the construction of a new >theory, but in the production of a new form >of objective cognition that supersedes >scientific theory itself. Thus, it is not about conceiving >a new representation of reality, condemned by >its sole condition as a form of representation to >follow a constructive necessity alien to the real one, to follow a logic. Again, the question is whether the natural sciences are included in the scope of what "scientific theory" refers to. If so, the objective outlined appears to be nonsense. >The production of the scientific consciousness >of the working class concerning its own >historic potential is not a mere scientific >matter. It is a necessary specific moment of the >political action of the working class within in >class struggle. As long as the scientific >consciousness of the working class remains the >prisoner of the same method that operates as >the scientific consciousness of the simple >production of relative surplus value -namely, of >logical representation- it lacks the capacity to >uncover that, in the capitalist mode of >production, freedom is the concrete form of alienation. The point about "logical representation" makes no sense to me. >Moreover, insofar as this advance necessarily entails the advance in its >liberation from the rule of the bourgeoisie, it >appears to be the practical confirmation that the >theories it uses to rule its action are the >product of a purely free consciousness. Nevertheless, >the same production of relative surplus value >forces forward the continued development of >conscious control on social labor. This drives >the conscious action of the working class >towards overcoming any limitation that could be >imposed on that control by stopping short at >an appearance. Sooner or later in this process, >the working class finds out that it is impossible >to continue advancing without uncovering its own >free consciousness as the necessary >concrete form of its alienation as an attribute >of capital. It can only take this step by >appropriating its own determination which it >achieves by reproducing their necessity in >thought. That is, when its action concerning the >conscious organization of social labor needs >to leave behind it the exteriority of logical >representation to govern itself through the >reproduction of the concrete in thought. I almost understand this, but again, the point about logical representation and the conceptual reproduction of the concrete is obscure. >At the point when we intend to appropriate in >thought the necessity of our action, we >are faced with the object of this action as it >actually is for us in that moment: something >external. We therefore are faced with our object >in its immediate exteriority. We overcome >the appearance of this immediate exteriority as >we advance through the abstract forms of our >object. The analysis pertinent to scientific >theory separates the abstract forms according to >their degree of repetition, therefore stopping >at their exteriority. On the contrary, the analysis >that is going to support the reproduction of the >real necessity in thought separates the concrete >form that we face from the necessity that it >carries within itself as the other-one whose >realization determines it. That is to say, it >takes shape by discovering the abstract form (and as >such, a necessity to be realized) within its >concrete form (and as such, a necessity already >realized). Given this form, the analysis cannot >cease until it reaches the real form that does not >carry in itself an other-one from which its >necessity arises, but which is, by itself and not by >an other-self, the need to negate itself as >abstract existence in order to affirm itself as concrete >existence. That is to say, until we face matter simply as such. >The return towards the concrete forms following >the analysis that has come to a halt in >the externality of the abstract forms >unavoidably takes shape in the addition of the nonrepeating >-and consequently previously excluded- forms to >the representation. This process >lacks any necessity to follow other than the >purely constructive one dictated by its logic. >Hence, the inevitable externality of its result >with regard to the real necessity that the action >aims to realize. On the contrary, the >reproduction of reality in thought advances by following >the development of the necessity that the >simplest abstract form carries within itself. As soon >as this abstract form realizes its necessity, >i.e., it affirms itself as an abstract form, it negates >itself as such an abstract form in order to >affirm itself as a realized necessity, i.e., as a >concrete form. But this concrete form >immediately negates itself as such, by affirming itself >as a form that carries in itself a necessity to >be realized, i.e., as a new abstract form. Thus, we >follow in thought our real object as it unfolds >its development. This reproduction of the >development of real necessity by means of >thought is unable to get to its end before reaching a >form whose necessity as a potent power takes our >transforming action -determined as an >action that has needed to follow this path all >along in order to become a conscious action- as >its necessary form of realizing itself. That is, >the reproduction in question is unable to get to >its end until our action can discover its own >concrete form as a conscious action, i.e., can >discover itself, as the necessary concrete form >of the realization of the real potential at stake. >Due to the form of its method the ideal >reproduction of reality is determined as dialectical >cognition. >Science, i.e., the production of the objective >consciousness, is thus carried out in a >concrete form that immediately corresponds to >its content: it has no room for necessities other >than those purely inherent to its object. >Therefore, when it is developed by the alienated >subject, it unavoidably faces the latter with >the evidence of his/her own alienation, whichever >the appearance of abstract free subjectivity >he/she has started from. Hence, the development >of scientific cognition as the way of governing >the transformation of present society into that >of freely associated individuals is the critique of scientific theory. If someone can decipher this, please explain it to me. >The apparent separation between cognition and >practice stems from the nature of the >historical stage of humanitys development in >which the regulation of the process of social >metabolism by means of thought - the >specifically human regulation of the process of social >metabolism - is alienated, turning itself into a >concrete form of the autonomous regulation of >this process by the production of value. Only in >this historical stage can scientific cognition >appear denying its true immediate condition as >the necessary form taken by the regulation of >conscious action. Moreover, scientific cognition >can even appear as the very denying of >action, as its abstract opposite, in other >words, as theoretical cognition. In the very form of its >method, that is, as dialectical cognition, the >reproduction of ones own necessity by means of >ones thought immediately shows itself excluding >all appearance of externality in relation to >the action that it sustains. It shows itself, >therefore, as what it is: the regulation of such action, >that is to say, a specific portion of this >action and, consequently, this action itself. Scientific >research thus overcomes all appearance of being >the abstract opposite of practice, to affirm >itself as practical criticism. Theoretical cognition as such only appears with the division of mental and manual labor, though documentation of its possibility can be found among "primitive: peoples as well. But all cognition from the beginning is alienated in not knowing itself or objective nature or its own institutions transparently, as evidenced by superstition, sympathetic magic, taboos, etc. I deny that scientific cognition could possibly be equated to the regulation of conscious action, as if theory and practice could ever fully coincide, though theoretical cognition obviously is not detached from action as some form of pure contemplation. This whole argument is obscure, or ab obscure way of restating obvious truths. >Given its primary determination, the production >of dialectical consciousness initially >has to take the form of a political action of >the working class immediately aimed at this selfsame >production. Hence -from the viewpoint of capital >ideologists, obliged to conceive of any >form of scientific production as a process of >logical representation- the production of >dialectical consciousness seems to begin as a >process of abstract theoretical production. >Nevertheless, dialectical consciousness can only >count on a single object in order to advance, >even to take the first step in its development, >namely, the action of the working class in its >struggle against the capitalist class in order >to express the immediate necessities of social >capital. Therefore, the concrete object from >which the development of dialectical >consciousness must needs start in order to >produce itself, makes this same immediate end >inseparable from the true end of dialectical >consciousness in present-day society: the general >conscious organization of the action of the >working class in the class struggle through which >the capitalist mode of production annihilates >itself in its own development. Far from being an >abstract theoretical production, the production >of dialectical consciousness, i.e., the conscious >organization of ones action by reproducing its >necessity in thought, is always, given the unity >of its form and content, a product of the >concrete political practices of the working class. I think this is what is customarily stated as the unity of theory and practice. Too bad it has never existed. >Consequently, there is no way for the collective >laborer to include within itself the separation >between the organization and the fulfillment -in >a restricted sense- of each action; in other >words, there is no way for the collective >laborer to include within itself the separation >between the knowledge of the necessity of the >action and the execution of the action itself. In >brief, the action governed by the form of >dialectical cognition is the actual abolition of the >separation between intellectual labor and manual labor. It's a shame that such a state of affairs exists only as an abstraction itself. There is no evidence that the abolition of this separation is going to come about, not to mention no analysis of concrete conditions that would suggest the human race will survive long enough so that it remains even a remote possibility. > From Marx on, any process of cognition of this > kind concerning social forms over >which we need to act in a revolutionary manner >is, in what is thus determined as its general >part, a recognition process from the social >point of view. Still, we can very well say that it is >not about reading Capital; nor even about >studying it. The point is to face capitals real forms >by ourselves to ideally reproduce them, with the >potency we acquire by having at our >disposition their ideal reproduction developed >in Capital. Actually, the development by >oneself of this task is the only critical way to >recognize the original specificity of Marxs >procedure concerning scientific method. Any >other way implies an attempt to unfold the real >necessity that is present here in a mode >external to it; therefore, it implies to represent this >necessity. And what is this really saying that is useful to face capital's real forms? Juan goes on to cite Marx's notion of method in the general introduction to the Grundrisse, and comments: >Nevertheless, Marx does not get to develop the >specific difference between this >scientific cognition that ideally reproduces the >real necessity and theoretical cognition, that >only represents it. In other words, he does not >get to face this ideal reproduction as the critique >- the supersession - of scientific theory >itself. This happens to the extent that he refers to his >own scientific works and discoveries as being of >a theoretical nature. Certainly, in Marxs >time scientific theory had not yet got to unfold >its ideological determination as an apologetics >of capitalism, no longer for its potency but, >for its lack of potency to transform nature in full >cognition of cause; that is to say, scientific >theory did not yet need to boast about its own >limits to consecrate the impossibility of the >conscious regulation of social life. Marx was then >able to advance for the first time in the ideal >reproduction of the real forms of capitalist >society until discovering its historical >character, without confronting the necessity of making >explicit the specific difference between that >reproduction and theoretical representation, >inasmuch as this difference embodies in the form >itself of one and the other cognition process. >Still, the sole materialization of this advance >violently pushes scientific theory towards the >exhaustion of its capacity for self-criticism in >the complacency with respect to its own >impotence. Today, the organization of the >conscious revolutionary action of the working class >immediately presents the form of the critique of scientific theory. This is intriguing, but remains a mystery without further elaboration. Here, finally, is the explication of the logic of Marx's Capital, which presumably solves the dilemma: >Let us briefly unfold the point once more. >Reality, matter, has the self-affirming by >means of self-negation - the necessity of >self-determining, contradiction - as its general form. >Hence, each natural concrete form (and >therefore, each natural form specifically developed as >a social one) is the realized necessity of its >abstract forms in their becoming, from the simplest >one (matter as such), to one that negates itself >as such concrete form (realized necessity) >affirming itself as a potency (a necessity to be >realized). Cognition is the way in which a >subject regulates the realization of its own >potency as the necessary concrete form of realizing >a potency inherent in its environment, by >appropriating these two potencies in their virtuality >as purely such potencies. The subject of the >cognition by means of ideas always starts by >facing its object as something external to >itself as such subject. Under its simplest form, this >cognition reaches the necessity of the subjects >own action just insofar as this one virtually >manifests itself to the subjects mind as an >immediate link between the mutual necessity of >the subject and the object. Consequently, such >form of cognition does not go beyond the very >exteriority of the subject and of its object. It >is determined, thus, as immediate ideal cognition. >This cognition develops into cognition by means >of thought when the subject goes beyond the >immediate concrete forms to discover their >necessity as realizations of their abstract forms. >Nevertheless, on performing this advance, the >subject comes up, first of all, against the >exteriority of the abstract forms themselves; >that is to say, the subject starts by ideally facing >the abstract forms in what these forms have of >realized necessity, under their appearance as >purely concrete forms. From which, the >appropriation of a real necessity in thought takes its >most primitive specific form by ideally placing >by itself in a causal relation the real forms >(abstract and concrete ones) starting from the >way they present themselves to it; that is, by >mentally conceiving links among the real forms >on the basis of their exteriority; and, >therefore, independently from their necessity. >Cognition becomes a mental construction that >follows a causality alien to the real one: the >ideal representation of reality. Logic is the >scientific general form of this mental >necessity. The appropriation in thought of the real forms >in their virtuality transcends the exteriority >of these forms by ideally accompanying them in >the unfolding of their real necessity. In this >way, scientific cognition mentally reproduces their >real concatenations, thus taking the form of an >ideal reproduction of reality. This cognition >has no way of proceeding other than by making >each real concrete form account for the >necessity that it carries in itself as an >already realized one, and each abstract real form, for the >development of the necessity to be realized which it is. This doesn't tell us more than Marx did, and is in fact rather vague. >Reality simply is the self-affirming by means of >self-negation. Dialectical cognition, >dialectics, is the method for virtually >appropriating this contradiction that reality is, by >following its development with our thought. Seen >the other way round, dialectics does not >belong in reality but in human cognition of >reality; or, rather, it belongs in reality, in matter, >in what this one takes its specific form of >human cognition. This same condition applies to >logic. Still, while the former can only take >shape following the development of the necessity >of a concrete real form, the latter necessarily >has to take an autonomous incarnation as a >condition for representing any concrete real >form. Hence, any attempt to call the ideal >reproduction of reality a logic, even runs into >a formal impossibility: the absence of an >independent body of ideal relations able to >receive such a name. To pretend that logic remains >effective in the ideal reproduction of reality, >it is necessary to abstract it from its formal and >historical determinations, turning it into a pure abstraction. What logic is held to be is not clear. Perhaps Juan is denying the possibility of a dialectical logic as another kind of formal logic, in the manner of dialectical materialism or perhaps other attempts to formalize dialectical logic (Kosok, etc.). As for the various forms of formal logic that exist, how these relate to empirical reality and what their claims actually are is another matter. The language used here is so immersed in Hegelianism that the very definition of the word "logic" is going to be elusive to others not immersed in this discourse. >The certainty about the need of a logic to >appropriate reality in thought inevitably >implies that the real forms are taken as if they >were incapable of being the realization of their >own necessity, as if life were to be insufflated >to them by the cognition process itself. >Representations, whether on an idealist or a >materialist basis, cannot avoid carrying in >themselves this appearance. Let us look at it a >little closer. To assert the need of a logical >necessity to apprehend in thought any real form >means, by itself, to assert that this real form >has no necessity of its own to be mentally >followed: being there a real necessity, why should >we appeal to a mental one instead of just >following it through its development, with our >thought? Hence, real forms appear as being >unable to relate, to move, by themselves at the >beginning of the representation process. But >they emerge from this process overflowing with >relations. I can't make any sense of this. >Hegel just sticks to this appearance up to its >end. He gives logic as its content, that >is, as the content of the abstractly ideal >necessity, the general form of the development in >thought of the real necessity, placed not as the >ideal reproduction of matter but as the >development of the real necessity itself. >Dialectics is thus inverted, appearing as the >development of the Idea placed as the real >subject that engenders matter. On doing so, Hegel >pushed representation beyond its limits. The >real necessity was laid there with its strength >unchained, ready to be called into action. >Naturally, standing dialectics on its feet after such >inversion has nothing to do with entering >matter where Hegel writes idea and vice versa. I believe this is a familiar criticism. Juan describes Marx's next steps beyond this. But . . . >It happens that Marx has not gone yet beyond the >boundaries of philosophy; so much so, that he still identifies the abolition of >the proletariat with the realization of philosophy34. Well, Marx is still within the problematic of the Young Hegelians; positing a schematic relation which of course is still yet philosophical. >But, immediately after in the same year, >1844, Marx faces for the first time the economic >determinations of capital as the alienated >general social relation of present-day humanity. >On doing it, he discovers for the first time in >history the real necessity of philosophy as a >concrete form of alienated consciousness and >how Hegel has developed it to its end. >Consequently, Marx does no longer criticizes logic for >being a general ideal necessity that displaces a >peculiar ideal necessity. He criticizes logic for >being an ideal necessity itself that displaces >the real necessity that has to be followed in >thought to rule ones conscious transforming >action. That is, he criticizes logic for its very >essence as a discursive reason that represents >the real reason in thought, as the necessary form >in which alienated thought takes shape: We see from the Marx quote that follows is that logic means Hegel's logic, which is what nobody today means by logic. The exposition of Marx's criticism is reasonably clear and familiar to most of us. >To say it once more, the >question is not to give rise to a new logic, but >to free science from it. Precisely what Marx has >done. The claim for a logic in Capital is a >contradiction in terms. This is something that Marx >himself remarks in his comments on Wagner. And, >by the way, for the same reason there is >not a single invocation in Marx to a dialectical >logic, nor to a logic in general, there is not to >dialectical materialism, to historical >materialism or to other such categories either, that can >only be used to conceive the real materiality >and the real history as the corresponding >abstractions. OK, I agree with this. It might be a shocker to others, but I get what this is about. >Nevertheless, according to Marxism everything >comes down to inverting dialectics >again just by turning into a common place the >representation of its development accomplished >by Marx as its opposite, as if it were the development of a dialectical logic. >Engels points out how Marx made clear he was not >a Marxist.38 Considering what they >call themselves, we must assume that Marxists >can only see in Marxs assertion an expression >of insincere modesty, or of his sense of humor, >as Althusser wants to.39 It happens that, >opposite to Marx, they really are Marxists. As >its very name shows, Marxism is the >conception of the reproduction in thought of the >specificity of present-day society - originally >developed by Marx - as a representation of this >specificity; and, hence, the representation of >dialectical cognition as a conception of the >world, as a system of thought. In brief, it is the >degradation of the integral cognition of ones >own necessity to an interpretation of reality >and, therefore, to an ideology. I'm sure Juan is correct here, though he seems to have tortured himself needlessly to get to this point. Marx's work is not doing philosophy, nor does it have philosophical foundations in the obvious sense, though one can find philosophical orientation in it. But actually, this applies to all real science. There is an inherent gap between science and philosophy. The so-called social sciences, however, are all problematic, because what it is they actually accomplish when they come up with useful results is always in dispute, and therefore there is an inextricable link between social science and philosophy, though they are not strictly identical. >The stage is reached where the point is turned into interpreting >the world by interpreting Marx in different >ways. It is not surprising then, that even though >Marxism is always willing to point out the >historical nature of capitalism and its concrete >forms, the idea that scientific theory is one of >these never crosses its mind. It is unable to >recognize that, as it is a form of >consciousness, scientific method is a social relation and, as >such, a historically specific form. As we have >already seen, it happens that in scientific theory, >ideology takes the form of its opposite, of scientific method. This is an unclear and questionable assertion. Are we talking about the scientific method of social theory and the social sciences, the scientific method of the natural sciences, the methods of the natural sciences illegitimately aped by the social sciences? What do we expect of scientific theories in various domains of investigation? >Thus, like any other scientific theory about >present-day social forms, Marxism shows >its own necessity insofar as a concrete form of >alienated consciousness by representing itself >as the abstract negation of alienated >consciousness, as an abstractly free consciousness. But >here it is where dialectic materialist logic >shows the raison dêtre for its specificity, for >representing the simplest real determination, >the self-affirming through self-negation, as the >unity of two immediate affirmations mutually >opposed and, therefore, for representing the >existence of the concrete forms as abstractly >opposed to their own determination. Marxism >does not represent itself just as an abstract >free consciousness, but, by invoking dialectical >logic, it represents itself as the abstract free >consciousness placed by itself as the opposite pole >of the consciousness alienated in capital. >Marxism does not see itself as being the opposite of >alienated consciousness for recognizing itself >as a form of existence of capital; on the >contrary, it sees itself as the absolute >realized negation of capital, as a social form whose >necessity is external to capital. Extremely hard to decipher but interesting. There are consequences to the alienated consciousness of oppressive conditions: >As a result, the revolutionary realization of >socialism/communism does no longer >appear as what it is, as the realization of the >historical necessity of the general regulation of >the present-day process of social metabolism >(and therefore, as the ruling itself of this process >in action), as the realization of the >historically own necessity of todays general social >relation. On the contrary, the working class >revolutionary action sees its necessity degraded >to the realization of right, justice, or >equality as opposed to capitalist unnatural injustice >and exploitation;40 to the realization of the >dialectics of ethicity;41 to the increase of an >internal self-determination or self-morality;42 >to the fact that the mere antagonistic >relationship that exists between the exploiters >and the exploited in class struggle engenders an >abstract accumulation of experience;43 to the >autonomy achieved by class struggle with >respect to its determination as the necessary >concrete form of the socialization of private >labor;44 to the autonomy achieved by the >working class consciousness with respect to >capital, be this -in relative terms- by means of >the production of a revolutionary doctrine,45 >or by means of its self-valorization;46 to the >democratization of capitalism through the >apparent standoff between an abstractly free >consciousness and an abstractly alienated >consciousness by means of market socialism;47 >to the production of a working class >consciousness able to develop itself by itself >beyond the exhaustion of the development of >productive forces;48 to the need to avoid >barbarism vis-à-vis the mechanical impossibility of >capital reproduction;49 to the resistance of the >laboring surplus population in its desperate >struggle to survive. In brief, the working >class revolutionary action sees its necessity >degraded to a collection of abstractions that >cannot but ideologically reflect the alienation of >human potencies as capitals potencies, but that >are represented as being so naturally eternal >that the society freed from all alienation could >only be realized through them. And there is no indication of any kind that the working class of the world will rise to the necessary consciousness or the realization of the communism that it must necessarily accompany. And in fact no one knows how communism could be realized or what it could possibly look like or how we could get to it from where the world stands today. >Opposite to this naturalization of an abstractly >free consciousness, the point is the >conscious organization of the revolutionary >action of the working class through which capital >realizes its necessity of annihilating itself >into the general conscious organization of human >life. Therefore, the point is to produce an >alienated consciousness that is aware of its own alienation or, in other words, to produce an alienated consciousness, indeed, but one that is only such insofar as it is the negation of the negation of free consciousness. The advance in the production of this consciousness is the concrete political task of the working class that expresses its general historical interests. Moreover, this production is, in itself, the process of the determination of the forms that correspond to the organization of the political party of the working class that directly bears the power of the capitalist mode of production to overcome itself. As Marx shows, the point is not to interpret the world. The point is that the transformation of the world in question is the development of the conscious organization of the process of social metabolism, and, therefore, the supersession of interpretation itself. Above all, the scientific critique of scientific theory is the development of the organicity of the working class revolutionary action. Right, but none of this is going to come about. It's a fantasy. Instead, we will see a continuary of the fragmentary and self-destructive actions of all social classes until intelligent life on this planet is obliterated. At 01:40 AM 9/29/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >I would like to present to the List my papers for the Congress: > >A) The historical determination of the capitalist mode of production >and of the working class as the revolutionary subject, vis à vis the >current fragmentation of the workers productive subjectivity > >Abstract: >Capitalism is the development of human subjectivity attained by >transforming the powers of free individual labor into those of social >labor consciously organized by the collective laborer who privately >performs it. The working class faces its own product, the ability to >organize production scientifically, as an alienated power. With its >free consciousness embodying alienation, the working class takes >the contradiction inherent in the socialization of private labor >beyond its limits, until revolutionarily organizing labor as a direct >social power. Any fragmentation within the universality of the >working class reasserts the private character of labor, thus >procrastinating the supersession of capitalism. > >Link: >http://www.cicpint.org/cicp/congreso%20marx%20int/Juan%20Inigo >_Presentation%20english.pdf > > >B) Scientific method: logical representation vis à vis dialectical >reproduction (i.e., the consciousness dominated by alienation for >believing itself an abstractly free one vis à vis the consciousness >that advances in its freedom by being aware of its alienation) > >Abstract: >Even Marxists conceive logical representation as the natural form >of scientific method. According to it, the interpretation of reality >constitutes the absolute limit of objective knowledge. Freedom thus >seems to consist in free interpretation. Nevertheless freedom is not >a natural determination but a social relation inherent in the >capitalist mode of production. Within this determination, free >consciousness is the form taken by the consciousness alienated >in capital. Opposed to logical representation, from Marx on, >dialectical cognition becomes the form of consciousness of the >working class able to incarnate the revolutionary powers with which >capital determines the latter. It does so for being the form of >alienated consciousness that is aware of its own alienation and >rules it towards its supersession. > >Link: >http://www.cicpint.org/cicp/congreso%20marx%20int/Juan%20Inigo >_Presentation%20english_etudes%20marxistes.pdf > >Saludos > >Juan Inigo >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > >Yahoo! Groups Links > ><*> To visit your group on the web, go to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/marxistphilosophy/ > ><*> Your email settings: > Individual Email | Traditional > ><*> To change settings online go to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/marxistphilosophy/join > (Yahoo! ID required) > ><*> To change settings via email: > mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ><*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > ><*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list [email protected] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list [email protected] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
