Below Carrol mentions _Goedel, Escher and Bach_ which I just picked up
again lately.
CB
^^^^^
[Marxism-Thaxis] Lewontin reviews Steven Rose's latest book
Charles Brown cbrown at michiganlegal.org
Mon Mar 21 09:04:45 MST 2005
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Ralph: This is a useful reference, thanks. I'll add this to my emergence
blog tonight.
It's not clear to me what if necessary for consciousness if not brains.
Perhpas he's still leaving open the possibility of artificial intelligence?
^^^^
CB: Yes, that word "emergence" rang a Thaxis bell.
Yes, the thread discussion is on artificial intelligence. Searle is a
leading figure arguing against the possibility of artificial intelligence.
Turing is a leading figure arguing for artificial intelligence as a
possibility.
I'll post some of the rest of the thread below:
Re: Lewontin reviews Steven Rose's latest book on the brain
On Wednesday 16 March 2005 12:04 pm, Charles Brown wrote:
> is there a reason why a network of computers cannot exhibit similar
> characteristics? (and now we can link this thread to jimD's godel
> one! ;-)).
>
> --ravi
>
> ^^^^^
> CB: So far, except in a Matrix fantasy, it takes extensive human mediation
> to plug computers into culture. It's like chimps can learn some language,
> but no chimps have learned sign language on their own initiative. There is
> lots of human intervention when chimps learn language.
>
> I can't state an abstract principle as to why a Matrix couldn't be
realized
> in real life.
>
i do not see it as the equivalent of matrix, where a virtual reality is
created and maintained. but if you are a materialist, a human is no
different
from a computer. we may have been programmed by nature while computers may
need programming by us. nonetheless, if a finite mass (the human population)
can exhibit certain traits, why not some other finite mass?
--ravi
^^^^^
CB: As I said, I can't think of an abstract principle excluding the
possibility you pose.
To me , the Matrix movie is kind of ambiguous on the issue of whether the
_computers_ have attained society and social being, reproductive,
regenerative self-perpetuative purposes. I suppose one of those characters
could be a sort of Wizard of Oz human running all the computer stuff from
behind the scenes. I really couldn't follow all that was supposed to be
happening. But I just grabbed at it for its currency in this discussion.
I guess the issue of biologicality , computers somehow duplicating
biological evolution , enters in
^^^^^^
Carrol Cox writes:
Charles, you haven't read Les Shaffer's post to the marxism list on this
topic.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Marxism] Re: [PEN-L] More Godel
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2005 12:41:57 -0500
From: Les Schaffer <schaffer at optonline.net>
Carrol Cox wrote:
>For critiques of Hofstadter's "computationalism," see
>
><http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/searle.html>
>
>and the other links given there. It is a discussion of the work of John
>Searle.
>
I am reading "The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence", edited by
Margaret Boden (Oxord U Press). It has Turing's orginal ideas in
non-technical form (Computing Machinery and Intelligence, A Turning,
1950) as well as Searle's rebuttal to strong AI (Minds, Brains, and
Programs). here's a snippet from the latter, reminds me _of our friend
D'Amasio:
"""
'Could a machine think?' My own view is that *only* a machine could
think, and indeed only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and
machines that had the same causal powers as brains. And that is the main
reason strong AI has had little to tell us about thinking, since it has
nothing to tell us about machines. By its own definition, it is about
programs, and programs are not machines. Whatever else intentionality
is, it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be as causally
dependent on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation,
photosynthesis, or any other biological phenomena. No one would suppose
that we could produce milk and sugar by running a computer simulation of
the formal sequences in lactation and photosynthesis, but where the mind
is concerned many people are willing to believe in such a miracle
because of a deep and abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a matter
of formal processes and is independent of quite specific material causes
in the way that milk and sugar are not.
"""
the compilation by Boden is good for people interested in the
philosphical background of AI, and also has some interesting history.
for example "Making a mind versus modelling the brain: artifical
intelligince back at a branch point", by Hubert and Stewart Dreyfus
traces a splitting in the research community starting in the 50's
between more formal based schemes and schemes based loosely on biology
(perceptrons). The article details how Minksy and colleagues at MIT
effectively shut/shot down the biology-based stuff for a long time. i
know several CS people who claim this held the field back for a long
time.
les schaffer
=======================================
The belief in the possibility of a "thinking computer" is a dualist --
i.e., an idealist -- conception for it assumes that "thinking" is
independent of the biological organism in which it occurs.
I found Hogstadter's _GEB_ (_Goedel, Escher and Bach_) a marvellous book,
and I still occasionally
browse in it. But strong AI is _not_ a materialist notion.
Carrol
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/index.html>
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/dictindex.html>
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/index.html>
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/submit.html>
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/phil_links.html>
<mailto:celiasmith at uwaterloo.ca>
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/help.html>
Searle, John - (b. 1932, Denver, CO; Ph.D. philosophy, Oxford; currently
Professor of Philosophy, UC Berkeley.) In philosophy of mind, Searle is
known for his critique of computationalism, his theory of intentionality,
and his work on the problem of consciousness. See Chinese room
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/chineseroom.html> ;
intentionality
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/intentionality.html> ;
intention-in- action; aspectual shape
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/aspectualshape.html> ; prior
intention; The Background
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/thebackground.html> .
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/images/greenish.jpg>
[Critique of Computationalism and Strong AI
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/searle.html#critique> ][The
Theory of Intentionality
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/searle.html#intentionality>
][The Theory of Consciousness
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/searle.html#consciousness>
][References
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/searle.html#references> ]
Searle took his Ph.D. in philosophy at Oxford, where he studied under John
Austin and later became Lecturer in Philosophy at Christ Church from
1957-1959. Subsequently he went to UC Berkeley, where he became Professor of
Philosophy. Searle's early work was in speech act theory, culminating in
(1969) and (1979). He is credited with having elaborated the theory of
speech acts associated with Austin, and with having introduced into the
theory original elements of his own, most notably regarding the role played
by speakers' and receivers' intentions in constituting the meaning of speech
acts. Consistent with the focus on intentionality, his interest turned to
philosophy of mind, where his major work can be seen as consisting in three
main efforts: a critique of computationalism and strong Artificial
Intelligence (AI); the development of a theory of intentionality; and the
formulation of a naturalized theory of consciousness.
The Critique of Computationalism and Strong AI
The best known example of Searle's critique of computationalism and strong
AI is his Chinese Room Argument (see separate entry). The main thrust of
this thought experiment was to show that the syntactic manipulation of
formal symbols does not by itself constitute a semantics. The implications
for computationalism and strong AI were held to be the following: first,
computationalism fails because the formal syntax of a computer program has
been shown not to be intrinsically semantic, and second, strong AI fails
because a system's behaving as if it had mental states is insufficient to
establish that it does in fact have these states. Interestingly, Searle's
assertion that syntax is insufficient to establish semantics predates the
Chinese Room Argument and in fact represents one of the main objections to
the generative grammar program that he voiced back in the early 1970s (e.g.,
1972).
More recently (1997), Searle has argued that the Chinese Room Argument
granted too much to computationalism. As he sees it now, the argument
wrongly took as unproblematic the assumption that computer programs are
syntactic or symbolic in the first place. Instead, he argues that there is
no fact intrinsic to the physics of computers that make their operations
syntactic or symbolic; rather, the ascription of syntax or symbolic
operations to a computer program is a matter of human interpretation.
The Theory of Intentionality
Intentionality played an important role in Searle's philosophy going back as
far as his early work in speech act theory. In (1983), he formulated a
comprehensive theory of intentionality. (See also separate entry for
intentionality.)
In (1983) Searle analyzes the intentional state as consisting of a
representative content in a psychological mode. Although many representative
contents consist in an entire proposition, many do not, and it is not
necessary that they do. Searle also analyzes intentional states in terms of
their directions of fit (which can be world-to-mind, mind-to-world, or null)
and directions of causation (which can be mind-to-world or world-to-mind).
(For further discussion of directions of fit and causation see separate
entries on intention-in-action and prior intention.)
An important feature of Searle's theory of intentionality is something he
calls The Background. The Background is theorized to be a set of skills,
capacities, and presuppositions that, while being nonrepresentational, makes
all representation possible. (For further discussion of The Background see
separate entry.)
The Theory of Consciousness
Searle's theory of consciousness is given major exposition in (1992) as well
as in the essays collected in (1997).
The first basic principle grounding Searle's theory of consciousness is that
consciousness is irreducible. For Searle, consciousness is essentially a
first-person, subjective phenomenon, and thus talk of conscious states
cannot be reduced or eliminated in favor of third-person, objective talk
about neural events. Any such attempt at reduction, Searle argues, simply
misses the essential features of conscious states -- that is, their
subjective qualities. (See also entry on aspectual shape.)
The second basic principle is that consciousness is as much an ordinary
biological phenomenon as is digestion. It is from this principle that Searle
derives an argument for a non-dualist, causal approach to the problem of
consciousness. According to Searle, brain processes at the neural level
cause conscious states; accordingly, conscious states just are features of
the neurobiological substrate. Searle further argues that if consciousness
is to be considered a feature or effect of brain processes, we must be clear
to understand that it is not an effect separate from and posterior to the
brain processes causing it. For Searle, this view of cause and effect is
misleading when applied to consciousness because it unavoidably leads to
dualism, which is untenable. Instead, Searle argues that the relation
between consciousness and its causal brain processes involves a kind of
non-event causation such as would explain the fact that gravity (a
non-event) causes an object to exert pressure on an underlying surface.
Searle has put the point another way by describing consciousness as an
emergent property of brain processes in the same sense that water's
liquidity is an emergent property of the behavior of H2O molecules.
It should be noted that Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that
brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point
out that while it appears to be the case that certain brain functions are be
sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of
neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that they are
necessary for producing consciousness.
Daniel Barbiero <mailto:barbiero at enigma.com>
<http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/images/greenish.jpg>
References
[John Searle <http://www.cudenver.edu/~mryder/itc_data/cogsci.html#searle> ]
Baumgartner, Peter & Payr, Sabine, ed. (1995). Speaking minds. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. [bookstore
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/atod.html> ]
Harman, G., ed. (1982). On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays. Amherst, MA,
University of Massachusetts Press. [bookstore
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/etoh.html> ]
Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. New
York, Cambridge University Press. [bookstore
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/qtot.html> ]
Searle, J. (1972). Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics. In Harman (1982).
[bookstore <http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/etoh.html> ]
Searle, J. (1979). Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech
Acts. New York, Cambridge University Press. [bookstore
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/qtot.html> ]
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences.
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. New
York, Cambridge University Press. [bookstore
<http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/qtot.html> ]
Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[bookstore <http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/qtot.html> ]
Searle, J. (1997). The Mystery of Consciousness. New York, New York Review
Press. [bookstore <http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/bookstore/qtot.html> ]
Last updated: May 11, 2004
Chinese room -An argument forwarded by John Searle intended to show that the
mind is not a computer and how the Turing Test is inadequate. See artificial
intelligence, Turing Test, Searle.
[Introduction][Replies][References]
Introduction
Searle first formulated this problem in his paper Minds, brains and programs
published in 1980. Ever since, it has been a mainstay of debate over the
possibility of what Searle called 'strong artificial intelligence'.
Supporters of strong artificial intelligence believe that a correctly
programmed computer isn't simply a simulation or model of a mind, it
actually would count as a mind. That is, it understands, has cognitive
states, and can think. Searle's argument (or more precisely, thought
experiment) against this position, the Chinese room argument, goes as
follows:
Suppose that, many years from now, we have constructed a computer which
behaves as if it understands Chinese. In other words, the computer takes
Chinese symbols as input, consults a large look-up table (as all computers
can be described as doing), and then produces other Chinese symbols as
output. Suppose that this computer performs this task so convincingly that
it easily passes the Turing Test. In other words, it convinces a human
Chinese speaker that it is a Chinese speaker. All the questions the human
asks are responded to appropriately, such that the Chinese speaker is
convinced that he or she is talking to another Chinese speaker. The
conclusion proponents of strong AI would like to draw is that the computer
understands Chinese, just as the person does.
Now, Searle asks us to suppose that he is sitting inside the computer. In
other words, he is in a small room in which he receives Chinese symbols,
looks them up on look-up table, and returns the Chinese symbols that are
indicated by the table. Searle notes, of course, that he doesn't understand
a word of Chinese. Furthermore, his lack of understanding goes to show, he
argues, that computers don't understand Chinese either, because they are in
the same situation as he is. They are mindless manipulators of symbols, just
as he is - and they don't understand what they're 'saying', just as he
doesn't.
Replies
The two most popular replies to this argument (both of which Searle (1980)
considers) are the 'systems reply' and the 'robot reply'. Briefly, the
systems reply is simply that though Searle himself doesn't understand
Chinese in the thought experiment, it is perfectly correct to say that
Searle plus look-up table understand Chinese. In other words, the entire
computer would understand Chinese, though perhaps the central processor or
any other part might not. It is the entire system that matters for
attributing understanding. In response, Searle claims that if we simply
imagine the person in the Chinese room to memorize the look-up table, we
have produced a counter example to this reply.
The robot reply is similar in spirit. The robot reply notes that the reason
we don't want to attribute understanding to the room, or a computer as
described by Searle is that the system doesn't interact properly with the
environment. This is also a reason to think the Turing Test is not adequate
for attributing thinking or understanding. If, however, we fixed this
problem - i.e. we put the computer in a robot body that could interact with
the environment, perceive things, move around, etc. - we would then be in a
position to attribute understanding properly. In reply, Searle notes that
proponents of this reply have partially given up the tenet of AI that
cognition is symbol manipulation. More seriously, he proposes that he could
be in a Chinese robot, just as easily as a Chinese room, and that he still
wouldn't understand Chinese.
Chris Eliasmith
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