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Not sure if Andrew Pollack is misreading Paul Mason, but to me, Paul Mason made sense. Here is my own take on it. I do understand why the Greeks want to stay in the Eurozone. The Euro has strong symbolic value for the unity of the European people. The possibility to travel without having to go through customs and without having to go to the currency exchange window is a great unifying experience for the ordinary person. (1) What was the point of the Referendum? I think the referendum should be taken at face value. Tsipras needed to know whether the Greek masses were willing to accept the conditions of the Institutions. This would make a difference for further negotiations. I don't think he expected to lose, but he assumed that there was a good probability he might lose. He needed the referendum exactly because he did not know whether the answer would be yes or no. In case of a yes vote, others would continue the negotiations. I think the no vote was an expression of confidence, that the Greeks knew that their government was doing the best they could to fulfill their electoral mandate. (2) Why did Varoufakis resign? Again I think the official story is basically correct. After the resounding no vote, Tsipras expected that the Institutions would see themselves forced to make more concessions. And as an ice breaker, Tsipras sacrificed Varoufakis in order to get the negotiations going again. Not because Varoufakis did something wrong, but because Varoufakis knew too much; he embarrassed the negotiators on the other side by being the better economist. Varoufakis showed to the whole world that the negotiaions were not about economics but about power. His latest Guardian op-ed http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/10/germany-greek-pain-debt-relief-grexit is another proof of a much more penetrating insight into the process and history than available from the other negotiators. (3) Now the important thing is the reaction of the Institutions to the Referendum and to Tsipras's good-will gesture of withdrawing Varoufakis. Their reaction was: nothing. Not a single conciliatory gesture, instead they insisted on the deadlock before the referendum and said "it is up to the Greeks." This ultimate intransigence showed their disdain for democracy and also showed that they did not want Greece in the Euro zone any more. Perhaps Merkel had maneuvered herself into a position where she was not able to make concessions any more, or perhaps---Varoufakis is not the only one to say this about Schauble---Schauble had not been negotiating in good faith, he wanted the negotiations to fail. (4) What did Tsipras do when he, and everybody else, saw the true position of the Institutions? He saw the expulsion of Greece coming and he did not want it blamed on Syriza. He did not have the mandate to leave the Euro, and I think it is also strategically wrong for socialists to voluntarily leave the Euro or the EU, they should push the envelope and do as much as they can do inside the Euro and EU. Therefore he made an offer giving the Institutions all they wanted, in order to see if under these conditions the Institutions would grant Greece a reduction or re-structuring of the debt in such a way that this austerity would have at least a chance of success. (5) Did Tsipras's gambit pay off? Der Spiegel, which until yesterday preached how the collapse of the Greek economy is the fault of the Greeks, who were demanding too much, is suddenly full of revelations how much pressure the US was exerting on Merkel to give the Greeks a break. This give Merkel a face-saving way out: she does not have to "cave" to the "lazy Greeks" but she has to respect the will of the US. So I think there is a good chance Greece will stay in the Euro, but this is not at all certain. Here are the two possibilities as I see them: If Greece remains in the Eurozone at the cost of further austerity measures, then this is the loss of one skirmish but not of the war. Syriza tried to get the best outcome possible while respecting the will of the voters to stay within the Eurozone. Syriza did not betray the voters. They tried everything possible to carry out the mandate of the voters and were defeated because the enemy was stronger or more ruthless than they, and because their own mandate, eliminating austerity while staying in the Eurozone, was somewhat contradictory. And the struggle continues. Despite the fact that they were forced to accede to austerity demands in the end, their honorable and courageous battle and their respect for democracy will encourage the voters in Spain, Ireland and elsewhere to vote for their own left parties. If the Institutions do not accept Syriza's offer, then it will be clear to all that Greece did not leave the Eurozone voluntarily but was kicked out. This will create unity in Greece for the trying times ahead, and it will make it easier for Syriza, if Greece is forced to go through such a painful adjustment process, to see to it that the new economy they are building will have elements of socialism in it. In my estimation, this will not happen this time, but the Greek experience will teach the left parties everywhere that it is not premature to make experiments and gain experiences in cooperative production, municipal energy utilities, etc. Hans G Ehrbar _________________________________________________________ Full posting guidelines at: http://www.marxmail.org/sub.htm Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
