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Begin forwarded message: > From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]> > Date: October 1, 2020 at 1:09:47 PM EDT > To: [email protected] > Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]> > Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]: Zellers on Macgregor, 'Margin of Victory: > Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War' > Reply-To: [email protected] > > Douglas Macgregor. Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the > Face of Modern War. Annapolis Naval Institute Press, 2016. Maps, > figures, tables. xvi + 268 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN > 978-1-61251-996-8. > > Reviewed by Bruce Zellers (Greenhills School) > Published on H-War (October, 2020) > Commissioned by Margaret Sankey > > While retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor sees this work as an essay on > behalf of military preparedness, many readers will see it as two > slightly different books within the same cover. The first offers > straightforward, relatively brief accounts of five twentieth-century > battles that many readers will know little about; the final chapter, > on the other hand, is a critique of contemporary American defense > policy and an argument for preparing for the next big war. > Macgregor's theme appears early. He writes that "this book argues > that the United States ... does not have to march into hell, as many > of the great powers whose stories are recounted in this book did." He > tells readers that "each chapter is a clarion call for the United > States to recognize that wars are decided in the decades before they > begin" (p. 1). He also notes, quite correctly, that "strategy, > technology, and military organization continually interact ... in the > broader context of national culture, history, and human capital to > produce success or failure" (p. 4). These topics undoubtedly deserve > our careful consideration, but they constitute a large agenda for a > relatively thin volume. > > The word "eccentric" best describes the longest portion of the book. > The subtitle tells us that Macgregor is going to explore "five > battles that changed the face of modern war"; Robert Citino of the > Army War College reinforces this in the foreword, noting that each > battle "was a turning point in the history of the twentieth century" > (p. xi). Such characterizations are hard to justify. The Battle of > Mons, for instance, brought the defeat of a few thousand British > regulars engaged against the Germans for a few hours in August > 1914--it presented no real innovations and certainly was not a > turning point in the Great War. The Battle of Shanghai in 1937 and > the defeat of Germany's Army Group Center in 1944 did not change the > course of World War II. The Yom Kippur War in 1973, perhaps better > known than the first three, did not resolve the Arab-Israeli > confrontation. Finally, we are presented with the tale of a single > American regiment in the First Gulf War; this seems odd in the > context, until we realize that the author participated in it. All > five stories possess intrinsic interest; each is effectively told. > However, they do not match the book's big claims; none of these > battles was game-changing. Readers wanting an introduction to truly > decisive twentieth-century battles should look to Drew Middleton's > _Crossroads of Modern Warfare: Sixteen Twentieth-Century Battles That > Shaped Contemporary History_ (1973). Middleton presents sixteen truly > key engagements: here is the Battle of the Marne rather than Mons, > Midway, Stalingrad, and later Dien Bien Phu and Tet. These have a far > better claim to the term "decisive." And Middleton writes with verve. > > The larger analysis of social and political settings is cursory, > limited by space and by sources. For instance, we learn that Sir > Richard Haldane, British secretary of state for war prior to 1914, > had made efforts prior to World War I to convert the army to "a more > lethal professional military establishment" influenced less by an > officer class of "gifted amateurs," but the book tells us little > about what was actually done, nor does it plumb the larger > sociocultural question we are expecting (pp. 9, 11). Oddly, at the > outbreak of the war, many of Haldane's plans were jettisoned. The > same pattern of limited discussion and limited analysis appears in > all five battle stories; there are some interesting details (the > German reliance on horses even in 1944?) but hardly deep, detailed > cultural analysis. Two additional sources might have improved this > situation. It is surprising that Alan Millett and Williamson Murray's > three-volume _Military Effectiveness_ (2010) is not in the > bibliography, since the essays look at many relevant issues, > including the question of national political effectiveness. The > absence of Peter Paret's _The Makers of Modern Strategy from > Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age_ (1986) is similarly noteworthy. > > The last chapter on the margin of victory brings the author's main > concerns into focus. Macgregor is convinced that a nation-endangering > "war of decision is coming" (pp. 3, 193). The task, as he sees it, is > to develop a "new margin of victory" (p. 194). However, there are > many impediments to creating this "margin." He complains that the > current officer corps is not up to the task; past errors, especially > in the Middle East, have gone unacknowledged. In addition, American > political and military leaders are "too confident of ... [their] > military superiority and ... [too] contemptuous" of the military > capabilities of other nations (p. 189). He argues that current > defense policy is burdened by wasteful spending and "excessive > redundancy in capability," both driven by intra-service competition > (p. 192). The army, his own service, especially worries him. He > states that we need "powerful forces in being," and this "ground > maneuver force" must have a "mix of capabilities" and must have the > ability to be "deploy[ed] quickly and be strategically decisive in > joint operations" (pp. 179, 185). "Light" marine forces cannot > fulfill this mission (pp. 190-91). Thus, what he takes to be the > current policy of "shrinking the ... mobile armored force" and > reducing the capability of "expeditionary" forces is deeply > problematic (pp. 191, 180). So is our propensity to deploy troops in > "purely local conflicts" or on ideological crusades; instead, the one > truly critical mission is to prevent "any bloc or empire from > dominating the great Eur-Asian landmass" (pp. 177-78). Russia and > China are the existential threats and should be the focus of our > concerns. > > Interestingly, Macgregor says little about the potential impact of > newer technologies on this future battlefield. Could precision > weapons and artificial intelligence make "expeditionary forces" and > "armored forces" helpless and useless? Could the decisive encounter > be over in minutes, when our power grid and financial system are shut > down--simultaneously? The most curious feature of his final > chapter--and its most problematic quality--is the underlying > conviction that the next war will duplicate World War II: masses of > men and machines maneuvering, on the steppes of western Russia. This > scenario may entertain digital war gamers, but it smacks of that > oldest of military fallacies: preparing intellectually and materially > to refight the last war. Or, perhaps in this case, his last battle: > Desert Storm. > > Citation: Bruce Zellers. Review of Macgregor, Douglas, _Margin of > Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War_. H-War, > H-Net Reviews. October, 2020. > URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54538 > > This work is licensed under a Creative Commons > Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States > License. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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