Best regards,
Andrew Stewart

Begin forwarded message:

> From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <[email protected]>
> Date: April 29, 2021 at 8:37:46 AM EDT
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: H-Net Staff <[email protected]>
> Subject: H-Net Review [H-War]:  Sambaluk on Ladwig III, 'The Forgotten Front: 
> Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency'
> Reply-To: [email protected]
> 
> Walter C. Ladwig III.  The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client 
> Relationships in Counterinsurgency.  Cambridge  Cambridge University 
> Press, 2017.  xv + 346 pp.  $34.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-316-62180-6; 
> $105.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-107-17077-3.
> 
> Reviewed by Nicholas Sambaluk (Air University)
> Published on H-War (April, 2021)
> Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
> 
> An academic study using theoretical terms and concepts, _The 
> Forgotten Front _is foremost a work written in hopes of guiding the 
> decision-makers of powerful states. Through a powerful trio of case 
> studies, author Walter C. Ladwig III underscores the point that 
> although patron states and their smaller clients can share a common 
> enemy during a counterinsurgency effort, few goals may be held in 
> common. For that reason, historical cases suggest that patrons should 
> ensure that the assistance they provide be contingent on the client's 
> performance in areas valued by the providing patron.
> 
> Frequently, the patron may identify such areas as anti-corruption 
> efforts or economic initiatives that are galling or even 
> counterproductive from the standpoint of the client regime. Indeed, 
> at least in the shorter term, such initiatives can undercut the 
> regime's power and implicitly its capability against an insurgent's 
> challenge. Ladwig makes clear, however, that the patron is well 
> advised to support a client _country_ rather than a client _regime_, 
> as support for the latter can easily morph into an obligation to 
> either support an unfettered strongman (whose policies may engender 
> enduring antipathy and rebellion from the population) or else abandon 
> the entire effort toward the client state. Ladwig's study of South 
> Vietnam from 1957 to 1963 illustrates this dilemma, and the author 
> observes that promises (especially those made by figures like 
> President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, at the time vice 
> president) toward South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem massively 
> eroded the apparent credibility of US threats to make aid contingent 
> on the regime's reform efforts.
> 
> In contrast, US aid to the newly independent Filipino government 
> during its struggle against communist Huk forces in the late 1940s 
> and early 1950s was much more predicated on the Filipino government
> and military acting in accordance with US advice. The 
> counterinsurgency conflict remained a stubborn one, but the 
> Philippines ultimately prevailed and the United States had supported 
> the country rather than invest entirely in one particular political 
> figure. Across multiple cases, the pattern reflects that the client's 
> dependence on foreign assistance is (predictably) correlated to the 
> degree of leverage that is attainable by the patron. 
> 
> US involvement in El Salvador from 1979 to 1992 occupies a middle 
> ground for Ladwig, between the relative success in the Philippines 
> and the catastrophe in South Vietnam. Conditionality of aid was 
> practiced but not consistently, and Ladwig points to the 
> correspondingly mixed results as a more than coincidental outcome.
> 
> The work is both useful and readable, and Ladwig admirably addresses 
> definitional and theoretical areas (which might otherwise have proved 
> thorny) in an early and clear manner. The book is all the stronger 
> for that. The tone throughout the book is serious, but for a 
> footnote's subtle and playful reference to Notre Dame University as
> the alma mater of El Salvadoran reform politician Jose Duarte. Since 
> the analysis is very much from the perspective of the patron and 
> deals with what patron states should or should not do in their 
> support of counterinsurgency campaigns in third-party countries, the 
> book does perhaps unintentionally cast less-than-cooperative client 
> leaders as implicitly petulant and short-sighted. As a consequence, 
> _The Forgotten Front_ forms an interesting reply to such works as Odd 
> Arne Westad's _The Global Cold War_ (2007), which highlights the 
> agency of minor states during the Cold War. Ladwig's reliance on US 
> archival materials helps make the project much more practical to 
> undertake, but it also helps guarantee what is primarily a patron's 
> perspective of the client rather than a third-party appraisal of 
> patron-client relationships.
> 
> That, however, is not a serious problem since the book provides 
> advice for patrons and is intended in that vein. Allusions to more 
> modern cases, beyond the Cold War, and the acknowledgment that 
> certain dynamics may be substantially altered by the emergence of a 
> post-Cold War geopolitical landscape indicate that the people 
> designing aid policy for client states form a key intended audience 
> for this book. Thus the work closes with five prescriptive points: to 
> anticipate that relations with the client will not be cordial, to 
> ensure that conditions are set and that they are clear and measurable 
> as well as realistic, to be prepared for opposition within the 
> patron's own decision-making circles, and to encourage local 
> reformers in the client state. As if the message were not already 
> strongly enough made, the closing words remove all doubt: "sometimes 
> being a good ally means being a stern friend" (p. 313). 
> 
> Citation: Nicholas Sambaluk. Review of Ladwig III, Walter C., _The 
> Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency_. 
> H-War, H-Net Reviews. April, 2021.
> URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55950
> 
> This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
> Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States 
> License.
> 
> 


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