On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 12:00 PM MERIP <[email protected]> wrote:
> View this email in your browser > <https://mailchi.mp/89d5cbffb4d1/merip-comment-the-fall-of-asad?e=086111b704> > > *Middle East Research and Information Project* > *Critical coverage of the Middle East since 1971* > *MERIP Comment: The Fall of Asad* > > Featuring Reinoud Leenders, Samer Abboud, Sinem Adar, Sean Lee, and Razan > Ghazzawi > > *This past weekend saw the flight of Syrian leader Bashar al-Asad from > Syria to Moscow as armed groups from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, joined by groups > from nearby Daraa, stormed into Damascus and overran the Syrian Arab Army > in stunning fashion. Asad’s flight brought to an end 54 years of rule by > his family, and 62 years of Baathist rule. Having covered the Syrian civil > war, and the struggle for dignity for ordinary Syrians for decades, we > turned in the past week to our frequent contributors, editors and comrades > with expertise on Syria to get their view of the situation for an > installment of MERIP Comment. * > > *An expanded roundtable will appear in the next week that will address > more of the latest developments. In the meantime, we hope you find this > informative, and we hope you’ll join us in keeping our eyes on Syria. * > > *In solidarity,* > > James Ryan > Executive Director > *Question: A lot of the instant analysis of the collapse of the Asad > regime has focused on the geopolitical ramifications, what it means for > Iran, Russia, Israel or the US. What do you think is the most important > thing missing from the conversation?* > > *Reinoud Leenders, King's College, London, MERIP Editorial Committee * > > In the predominant, grand geopolitical theorizing about what the fall of > the Asad regime means for external actors and the region, Syria and Syrians > are strikingly absent. This is certainly the case when it comes to framing > the complex dynamics that led to its collapse in the first place: Turkey is > argued to have been behind HTS’ offensive, but what has been HTS’ view on > its relations with Turkey and might it have played Turkey to get the latter > to actively or tacitly support its military campaign in Aleppo and then > march on to Damascus? The western media have failed to raise the question. > > Significant commentary has focused on what the collapse of the Asad regime > has meant for the “Axis of Resistance,” but we know very little about how > HTS, other Syrian political players and indeed Syrians more generally > regard Iran, Lebanese Hizbullah and the Iraqi militias or Hashd al-Sha’bi. > What explanations do Syrians who experienced pro-Iranian and Iraqi militias > first-hand give for the fact that they didn’t come to the regime’s rescue? > Are the atrocities they committed in Syria predominantly shaping Syrians’ > views on how their country should relate to them in the future? Or do other > factors and considerations come in here as well, like empathy with > Palestinians as they continue to be subjected to genocide in Gaza, or > pragmatic inclinations acknowledging that a new Syria cannot afford to lose > itself in hostility against its Arab neighbors and Iran? Of course, such > considerations can all be relevant at the same time. How Syrians may > reconcile them, are struggling to do so or arriving at different > conclusions should be of primary focus. > > *Samer Abboud, Villanova University, MERIP Contributor* > > There is very little nuance in the coverage of who the Syrian rebels are > and what the competitive political landscape looks like in Syria now that > the regime has fallen. The rebels are often referred to as either some > mysteriously cohesive group or as under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham > (HTS). In fact, several different armed factions took part in the > operations and there was an apparent lack of coordination amid the total > collapse and withdrawal of regime forces. > > Over the course of the conflict several armed fighters and groups were > forcibly displaced to Idlib province where they reassembled into different > factions. Some operated in areas under the control of HTS and others under > the protective umbrella of Turkey under the structure of the Syrian > National Army (SNA). Perhaps the only thing uniting these different > factions was a desire to overthrow the Assad regime. Inside of > HTS-controlled areas of Idlib, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) had > been the de facto authority since 2017. In a sign of what may come in > Syria’s immediate transition future, Syria’s Prime Minister officially > declared his intention to transfer power to the SSG’s Prime Minister, > Mohammed al-Bashir. It is possible the SSG model of governance will be > transplanted to Damascus and serve as the template for what transition (and > maybe post-transition) Syria looks like for many of the armed groups. > Whether or not the SSG officials seek to expand the governing coalition > during the transition is an important question. In the past, demands > against the SSG by other armed groups led to their expulsion by HTS. > Previous attempts to unite the SSG with the SDF and the Syrian Interim > Government (SIG) failed. What does this mean for the negotiation of Syria’s > transition? The stakes today are very high and it is important to > understand that there is indeed a competitive political landscape and that > the various actors making demands on each other have both a history of > conflict and experience in governing. > > Here is perhaps where the geopolitical question has more relevance to the > domestic situation in Syria. Israel has greatly expanded its occupation > zone by occupying the strategic Mt. Hermel while bombing more than 300 > Syrian public institutions and military sites since Asad fell. Turkey, > Iran, and Russia all claimed to have contacted various factions inside of > Syria. These interventions will certainly aggravate the tensions in the > coming transition. > > *Sinem Adar, SWP Berlin, MERIP Contributor* > > The fall of the Asad regime, triggered by a major offensive on November 27 > by rebel groups led by HTS upends a widely held belief among many so-called > Middle East experts in the durability of authoritarian regimes in the > region. The swift collapse of Asad’s rule highlights the inherent fragility > of such regimes, despite years of seeming consolidation. The widespread > celebrations among Syrians, both within the country and abroad, reflect a > deep yearning for a new political and social reality. > > This pivotal moment calls for careful consideration of regime change that > goes far beyond the geopolitical implications of Asad’s downfall. Unlike > the chaotic aftermaths seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, Syria’s > transition thus far appears relatively orderly, with local actors taking > the lead. However, uncertainty about the future is inevitable. Three key > factors will shape Syria’s political transformation and merit close > attention: (1) dynamics and interplay among armed groups over territorial > control, resources and means of violence; (2) reconstruction of state > institutions; and (3) revitalization of civil society centered on > principles of transitional justice. > > *Sean Lee, American University in Cairo, MERIP Contributor* > > The geopolitical context structures the opportunities and constraints > under which actors in Syria are able to operate, however focusing > exclusively on geopolitics can obscure important developments on the > ground. A geopolitical lens also risks framing states as unified actors > when the reality is more complex. A better understanding of Syria’s many > regions is crucial. The de facto fragmentation of Syria over the last > decade has led to divergent paths for the country’s regions, reflecting not > only whether and to what extent they were controlled by the Asad regime, > but also what kinds of opposition emerged. Despite being the same color on > maps illustrating “who controls what in Syria > <https://merip.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e18284b99bf49578897672d9a&id=4acc8dc7d5&e=086111b704>” > from last month, the situations of, for example, Suwayda, Deir ez-Zor, and > Latakia have all been pretty different. Likewise, the experience of Syrians > in Idlib has not been the same as those in, say, Afrin or Qamishli. My > sense is that there is little appetite for centralized despotic rule > amongst the majority of ordinary Syrians - much depends on whether the new > system will allow for the diverse political aspirations of Syrian society. > In short, while the machinations in Damascus and its relationship to the > regions are important, we should not lose sight of what is happening in the > rest of the country. > > *Razan Ghazzawi, Oregon State University, MERIP Contributor* > > Missing from the conversation is Syria and the people themselves, or how > to guarantee a democratic future in Syria that upholds human rights > conventions, where citizens, migrants and refugees, and stateless people > are all treated equally. The main concern for many Syrians is securing a > peaceful, transparent and democratic transition to power until presidential > and parliamentary elections are held under UN supervision. This means the > current and coming phases should be independent of military influences, > including those from HTS. > > This is a critical time to build trust within communities ruptured by the > war and sectarian policies of the Assad regime, which strengthened > divisions along ethnic and religious lines. The danger of sectarianism and > Arab-Kurdish mistrust speaks to the extent to which the Asad regime > succeeded in delivering a message built around fear and demonization of the > other. > *SUPPORT MERIP:* > This time of year is critical for our fundraising efforts as we plan for > the coming year. 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