Thanks Hari. Outstanding article of your btw, I don't think I saw it before. And there's obviously very little disagreement there. I guess it is several formulations just near the end of your article concerning the issues we're discussing, that I disagree with. Some comments:
"I also have difficulty in seeing how the victory in Syria over Assad, can be treated somewhat in isolation. Maybe that is *not* what you are saying. But if so - then how does the apparent current simultaneous victory of Israel and the USA over Gaza and Lebanon - fit together with the HTS victory in Syria?" I thought I tried to answer this. Briefly, the relation is that Hezbollah was engaged in popular resistance in southern Lebanon, where it exists, after all, and doing what is supposed to be its raison d'etre, resisting Israel, and so was not in a position to be engaged in counterrevolution in Syria at the time. In other words, popular resistance in southern Lebanon = popular resistance in Syria facilitated. We support Hezbollah resisting Israel in southern Lebanon, don't we? As for the discourse of Hezbollah's *defeat* by Israel enabling the Syrian victory over Assad, I don't think this makes much sense; victory or defeat seem to me besides the point. The Hezbollah/Iranian contribution to the Assadist counterrevolution was essentially manpower. Hezbollah was certainly defeated by Israel, but it was not in any sense "destroyed," in fact its cadres on the ground were successful in keeping Israel's land invasion at bay. But the essence of Hezbollah's defeat was that the ceasefire signed moves Hezbollah above the Litani River, and moves the Lebanese army to the Israeli border. I can't understand why it is not clear to everyone that this means the end of any "axis of resistance" even in the most positive sense of the hyped term: Hezbollah no longer controls the border, so what would be the point of Iran sending more advanced weapons there? Besides, Israel supposedly destroyed about 50% of Hezbollah's missile arsenal, so what happened to the other 50% (we were told there were "150,000 missiles aimed at Israel", which we saw little of). They were not used, because their purpose was not to defend Lebanon or even Hezbollah (and still less, to aid Palestine), but simply as Iran's forward defence. Iran didn;t want to waste them. Therefore the destruction of part of Hezbollah's arsenal is irrelevant to the Hezbollah's ability to aid Assad because (a) half the arsenal is still there and was never used and (b) none of this arsenal was ever used in Syria and simply would not be, that is not its purpose. In any case, Hezbollah made it clear that it would not be sending forces to save Assad's arse again (comically, the commented "Syria has enough troops to defend itself" ...), and why would they, given that Assad had not lifted a finger to aid Hezboollah in its hour of need, in fact had sabotaged it. As for the Iranians, there were thousands of Iranian fighters in Syria at the time, and thousands more Iran-backed Shia from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran basically ordered them to withdraw. They did not fight at all. The Iranian leadership commented that they cannot fight for a regime which does not fight for itself - an obvious statement of the complete futility of attempting to save a hollow regime. But it is more than that - Iran also declared Assad a "liability" and was aware of his intelligence collaboration with Israel in its bombing of Iranian assets in Syria, and decided it was not going to fight for the regime. As for the rebel advance beginning on November 27, the same day as the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire, that is precisely the point: despite being under constant bombing attack by the Assad regime ever since October 7, the Syrian rebels in Idlib, led by HTS, did not activate their operation to “deter” this “aggression” (Operation Deter Aggression was its name for a reason) before the Lebanon ceasefire *precisely so as to not help Israel against Hezbollah* (despite their low opinion of Hezbollah). Once Hezbollah had signed the agreement to implement UN Resolution 1701, requiring Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and be replaced there by the Lebanese army, the Syrian rebels made the decision to not longer continue putting off their own struggle against genocide in order to not harm another struggle which had now ended. "If that is right - without a socialist perspective, they are bound to have to 'come to terms' with one or other of the hosts of the imperialists currently descending upon Syria to have tea and cakes with Ahmed al-Sharaa. At least that is the only interpretation I can see at this time. If that is the case, surely the most likely winner amongst the suitors is the USA (and Israel - in the Middle East right now, you cannot think of one without the other in my view, and I suspect in yours too)." Well, I agree with the premise but not the conclusion. Of course, it may be hard to think of the US without Israel, but if you apply that too religiously, you would have to decide that any country that has no relations with Israel is an enemy of the US? Take Turkey. Most people think that Turkey is the dominant influence in Syria at the moment, and I would add Qatar was also the first state visit to Syria. Neither Turkey or Qatar have relations with Israel, but both have strong relations with Hamas. Meanwhile, the states with open relations with Israel - especially Egypt and the UAE - were also the closest to the Assad regime, and supported it to the end, and have been the most cautious with the new regime. Israel itself of course has launched a huge attack on the new Syria and calls the new government "a gang of terrorists." Saudi Arabia stands exactly in between the Turkey-Qatar axis and the Egypt-UAE axis on the issues of both Israel and Assad; it had restored with Assad, opened embassies and sent ambassadors and was crucial in getting Assad to the Arab League summit in Riyadh; but now it has also recognised reality quicker than its hard reactionary allies. Now Saudi Arabia will be the first state visit by the new government. In my opinion, it is doing this precisely in order to balance the heavy Turkish influence. The heavy Turkish influence is actually very anti-Israel (and Israeli leaders are rather unanimous that it is a bad thing), but it is also extremely problematic on the Kurdish issue; al-Sharaa has now officially met the SDF to open negotiations. Meanwhile, he was made important outreach statements to both Iran and Russia - rather surprisingly positive ones to Russia actually. Also, his third state visitor after Turkey and Qatar was from Iran-backed Iraqi regime! What is happening? It is clear to me that they are trying to play off everyone against everyone. Bourgeois? Yeh, obviously. Grovellers to imperialism? Only if you decide they are grovelling to literally everyone. I may be wrong, but I see a much smarter bourgeois nationalist strategy here. On Wed, Jan 1, 2025 at 4:24 AM hari kumar via groups.io <hari6.kumar= gmail....@groups.io> wrote: > Hello Michael: > Thanks for the longer explanation of your disagreement with Ali. > So by my point (ii) you mean the following: > Kumar: "ii) Ali - "Like Iraq and Libya, where the US has a lock on the > oil, Syria will now become a shared American–Turkish colony. . . Now, > Assad’s ousting has created a different type of vacuum – likely to be > filled by NATO’s Turkey and the US via the ‘ex-al-Qaida’ Hayat Tahrir > al-Sham (the rebranding of its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani as a freedom > fighter after his stint in a US prison in Iraq is par for the course), as > well as Israel. The latter’s contribution was enormous, having disabled > Hezbollah and wrecked Beirut. . . Geostrategically, it is a triumph for > Washington and Israel." > > Just a couple of comments: > > (i) *The main area on which my views overlap with those of Ali* > So as I said just now, to Sartesian's comment - I was and remain focused > on the view that "Syria will now become a shared American–Turkish colony". > > *(ii) Belittling of the HTS guerrilla war* > But more I think to the point of your reply - is that whatever > *belittling* of the guerrilla movement Tariq Ali does, is explicitly *not* > what I support. > I think the article I wrote I still believe is correct in its take on the > HTS. ( > https://mlrg.online/politics/theses-on-the-2024-re-emergence-of-the-syrian-anti-assad-revolution/ > ) > Namely the view that - just as in Tunisia a united front with honest > Muslim fundamentalists - this is entirely correct. That the HTS fought > the Russians to a stale-mate and were never defeated: > > "#38. While the Assad regime hung on with the support of both the Iranian > Hezbollah Shi’ia forces and the Russian Putinite army, it never could > eliminate the Northern based fundamentalists around: > “Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo and Hama, with a small additional presence in Homs > and the Qalamoun Mountains bordering Lebanon. During the outbreak of > inter-factional conflict in northern Syria in late 2013, which gained > intensity in January 2014, the majority of these groups (except Usud > al-Khilafah) remained either independent or tacitly loyal to Jabhat > al-Nusra.” > (Lister 2014 Ibid ) > #39. Effectively the Russian and Iranian intervention, and their massive > military support to Assad – had stale-mated and halted the anti-Assad > movement – but not defeated it." "Re-emergence etc... Ibid). > > I also point out that the HTS has different wings - some are more > pragmatic and some are more fundamentalist (#35; #37 ); and I also discuss > the attempted re-moulding of the HTS along the lines of an anti-sectarian > governing body in Idlib (#43 ) and attempts to reach out to the Druze very > recently (#47). > > *(iii) Does any praise for removal of Assad stand in contradiction to > pointing out the gains of USA and Israel?* > What I am having some difficulty with, is a possible dismissal that the > final and much fought for success of the HTS in booting out Assad could be > quite consistent also, with the HTS having benefitted from: > -The Israeli recent and on-going campaigns - Gaza obliteration; the > attacks on Lebanon; the supine-ness of Iran and making it less willing to > take on a fighting role inside Syria; > - The Turkish cooperation and the coordinated attack by the SNA on the > N.E.Portion of Syria. > > Indeed, it would seem to me, to deny their military 'intelligence' > [Intelligence here in the sense of planning and common-sense rather than > 'spying' and what-not] of the HTS - if they did *not* take advantage of > these events. > > It is not the same in my view, as saying they are proxy agents. > > *(iv) The medium to long term weight of Syria under the HTS vis-a-vis the > inter-imperial contradiction * > I also have difficulty in seeing how the victory in Syria over Assad, can > be treated somewhat in isolation. Maybe that is *not* what you are > saying. But if so - then how does the apparent current simultaneous victory > of Israel and the USA over Gaza and Lebanon - fit together with the HTS > victory in Syria? > > If the HTS is *not* a socialist force - what are they? If they are a type > of national-movement only, I think they are likely to be an aspiring > bourgeoisie. If that is right - without a socialist perspective, they are > bound to have to 'come to terms' with one or other of the hosts of the > imperialists currently descending upon Syria to have tea and cakes with > Ahmed al-Sharaa. At least that is the only interpretation I can see at this > time. If that is the case, surely the most likely winner amongst the > suitors is the USA (and Israel - in the Middle East right now, you cannot > think of one without the other in my view, and I suspect in yours too). > > (iv) You ask if I had seen your article - of the 19th December, 2024. I > had cited one of yours from the 24th December in the *preface*, as > follows: > "Because of its location in the Middle East, Syria will now bear the > post-Gaza brunt of the inter-imperialist collision. Syria had already felt > this inter-imperialist collision in the first phase of the Syrian > ‘Revolution‘ war up to 2016, as the Putinite air force and mercenaries > entered Syria. Those forces came to the aid of Bashar Assad. In doing so > Russia’s obtained its berths on the Mediterranean. Regardless, the Russian > intervention interrupted the social revolution. Although Russia has exited > the Syrian stage, it will try to retain its port at Tartous in Syria – > while extending its presence in Libya (Michael Karadjis, 24 December 2024; > at https://theirantiimperialismandours.com)." > > and I think the one you had noted, is mentioned in point #62. > "#62. For the best detailed summary of Israel’s attacks on Syria now – and > the lack of any attacks on the Assadite regime until Israel began to attack > Gaza – Michael Karadjis’s blog carries a text with definitive data and > interpretation. (Michael Karadjis, “Israel’s massive attack on free Syria: > Background and motivations”; 19 December; Their Anti-imperialism and Ours > at: > https://theirantiimperialismandours.com/2024/12/19/israels-massive-attack-on-free-syria-background-and-motivations/ > > Regards, H > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#34349): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/34349 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/110333291/21656 -=-=- POSTING RULES & NOTES #1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message. #2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly & permanently archived. #3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern. #4 Do not exceed five posts a day. -=-=- Group Owner: marxmail+ow...@groups.io Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/13617172/21656/1316126222/xyzzy [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
