October 7, 2008 9:30 AM PDT

Government report: Data mining doesn't work well

By Declan McCullagh
News.com

http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10059987-38.html?tag=newsEditorsPicksArea.0


The most extensive government report to date on whether terrorists can be 
identified through data mining has yielded an important conclusion: It 
doesn't really work.

A National Research Council report, years in the making and scheduled to be 
released Tuesday, concludes that automated identification of terrorists 
through data mining or any other mechanism "is neither feasible as an 
objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts." 
Inevitable false positives will result in "ordinary, law-abiding citizens 
and businesses" being incorrectly flagged as suspects.

The whopping 352-page report, called "Protecting Individual Privacy in the 
Struggle Against Terrorists," amounts to at least a partial repudiation of 
the Defense Department's controversial data-mining program called Total 
Information Awareness, which was limited by Congress in 2003.

But the ambition of the report's authors is far broader than just 
revisiting the problems of the TIA program and its successors. Instead, 
they aim to produce a scholarly evaluation of the current technologies that 
exist for data mining, their effectiveness, and how government agencies 
should use them to limit false positives--of the sort that can result in 
situations like heavily-armed SWAT teams raiding someone's home and 
shooting their dogs based on the false belief that they were part of a drug 
ring.

The report was written by a committee whose members include William Perry, 
a professor at Stanford University; Charles Vest, the former president of 
MIT; W. Earl Boebert, a retired senior scientist at Sandia National 
Laboratories; Cynthia Dwork of Microsoft Research; R. Gil Kerlikowske, 
Seattle's police chief; and Daryl Pregibon, a research scientist at Google.

They admit that far more Americans live their lives online, using 
everything from VoIP phones to Facebook to RFID tags in automobiles, than a 
decade ago, and the databases created by those activities are tempting 
targets for federal agencies. And they draw a distinction between 
subject-based data mining (starting with one individual and looking for 
connections) compared with pattern-based data mining (looking for anomalous 
activities that could show illegal activities).

But the authors conclude the type of data mining that government 
bureaucrats would like to do--perhaps inspired by watching too many 
episodes of the Fox series 24--can't work. "If it were possible to 
automatically find the digital tracks of terrorists and automatically 
monitor only the communications of terrorists, public policy choices in 
this domain would be much simpler. But it is not possible to do so."

A summary of the recommendations:

     * U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic 
process to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with 
U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or 
unclassified, for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be 
deployed, and periodically thereafter.

     * Periodically after a program has been operationally deployed, and in 
particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy 
makers should (carefully review) the program before allowing it to continue 
operations or to proceed to the next phase.

     * To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and 
development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be 
conducted with synthetic population data... At all stages of a phased 
deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the 
full safeguards of the framework.

     * Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. 
government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the 
operations of that program, a part of which would entail a practice of 
using the same data mining technologies to "mine the miners and track the 
trackers."

     * Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any 
individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.

     * The U.S. government should periodically review the nation's laws, 
policies, and procedures that protect individuals' private information for 
relevance and effectiveness in light of changing technologies and 
circumstances. In particular, Congress should re-examine existing law to 
consider how privacy should be protected in the context of 
information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.

By itself, of course, this is merely a report with non-binding 
recommendations that Congress and the executive branch could ignore. But 
NRC reports are not radical treatises written by an advocacy group; they 
tend to represent a working consensus of technologists and lawyers.

The great encryption debate of the 1990s was one example. The NRC's 
so-called CRISIS report on encryption in 1996 concluded export 
controls--that treated software like Web browsers and PGP as 
munitions--were a failure and should be relaxed. That eventually happened 
two years later.


=================================================
George Antunes                    Voice (713) 743-3923
Associate Professor               Fax   (713) 743-3927
Political Science                    Internet: antunes at uh dot edu
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77204-3011         

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