November 2008
The Atlantic

Airport security in America is a sham-"security theater" designed to 
make travelers feel better and catch stupid terrorists. Smart ones 
can get through security with fake boarding passes and all manner of 
prohibited items-as our correspondent did with ease.

by Jeffrey Goldberg
The Things He Carried

If I were a terrorist, and I'm not, but if I were a terrorist-a 
frosty, tough-like-Chuck-Norris terrorist, say a C-title jihadist 
with Hezbollah or, more likely, a donkey-work operative with the 
Judean People's Front-I would not do what I did in the bathroom of 
the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, which was to place 
myself in front of a sink in open view of the male American flying 
public and ostentatiously rip up a sheaf of counterfeit boarding 
passes that had been created for me by a frenetic and acerbic 
security expert named Bruce Schneier. He had made these boarding 
passes in his sophisticated underground forgery works, which consists 
of a Sony Vaio laptop and an HP LaserJet printer, in order to prove 
that the Transportation Security Administration, which is meant to 
protect American aviation from al-Qaeda, represents an egregious 
waste of tax dollars, dollars that could otherwise be used to catch 
terrorists before they arrive at the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
International Airport, by which time it is, generally speaking, too 
late.

I could have ripped up these counterfeit boarding passes in the 
privacy of a toilet stall, but I chose not to, partly because this 
was the renowned Senator Larry Craig Memorial Wide-Stance Bathroom, 
and since the commencement of the Global War on Terror this 
particular bathroom has been patrolled by security officials trying 
to protect it from gay sex, and partly because I wanted to see 
whether my fellow passengers would report me to the TSA for acting 
suspiciously in a public bathroom. No one did, thus thwarting, yet 
again, my plans to get arrested, or at least be the recipient of a 
thorough sweating by the FBI, for dubious behavior in a large 
American airport. Suspicious that the measures put in place after the 
attacks of September 11 to prevent further such attacks are almost 
entirely for show-security theater is the term of art-I have for some 
time now been testing, in modest ways, their effectiveness. Because 
the TSA's security regimen seems to be mainly thing-based-most of its 
44,500 airport officers are assigned to truffle through carry-on bags 
for things like guns, bombs, three-ounce tubes of anthrax, Crest 
toothpaste, nail clippers, Snapple, and so on-I focused my efforts on 
bringing bad things through security in many different airports, 
primarily my home airport, Washington's Reagan National, the one 
situated approximately 17 feet from the Pentagon, but also in Los 
Angeles, New York, Miami, Chicago, and at the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton 
International Airport (which is where I came closest to arousing at 
least a modest level of suspicion, receiving a symbolic pat-down-all 
frisks that avoid the sensitive regions are by definition 
symbolic-and one question about the presence of a Leatherman 
Multi-Tool in my pocket; said Leatherman was confiscated and is now, 
I hope, living with the loving family of a TSA employee). And because 
I have a fair amount of experience reporting on terrorists, and 
because terrorist groups produce large quantities of branded 
knickknacks, I've amassed an inspiring collection of al-Qaeda 
T-shirts, Islamic Jihad flags, Hezbollah videotapes, and inflatable 
Yasir Arafat dolls (really). All these things I've carried with me 
through airports across the country. I've also carried, at various 
times: pocketknives, matches from hotels in Beirut and Peshawar, dust 
masks, lengths of rope, cigarette lighters, nail clippers, 
eight-ounce tubes of toothpaste (in my front pocket), bottles of Fiji 
Water (which is foreign), and, of course, box cutters. I was selected 
for secondary screening four times-out of dozens of passages through 
security checkpoints-during this extended experiment. At one 
screening, I was relieved of a pair of nail clippers; during another, 
a can of shaving cream.

During one secondary inspection, at O'Hare International Airport in 
Chicago, I was wearing under my shirt a spectacular, only-in-America 
device called a "Beerbelly," a neoprene sling that holds a 
polyurethane bladder and drinking tube. The Beerbelly, designed 
originally to sneak alcohol-up to 80 ounces-into football games, can 
quite obviously be used to sneak up to 80 ounces of liquid through 
airport security. (The company that manufactures the Beerbelly also 
makes something called a "Winerack," a bra that holds up to 25 ounces 
of booze and is recommended, according to the company's Web site, for 
PTA meetings.) My Beerbelly, which fit comfortably over my beer 
belly, contained two cans' worth of Bud Light at the time of the 
inspection. It went undetected. The eight-ounce bottle of water in my 
carry-on bag, however, was seized by the federal government.

On another occasion, at LaGuardia, in New York, the 
transportation-security officer in charge of my secondary screening 
emptied my carry-on bag of nearly everything it contained, including 
a yellow, three-foot-by-four-foot Hezbollah flag, purchased at a 
Hezbollah gift shop in south Lebanon. The flag features, as its 
charming main image, an upraised fist clutching an AK-47 automatic 
rifle. Atop the rifle is a line of Arabic writing that reads Then 
surely the party of God are they who will be triumphant. The officer 
took the flag and spread it out on the inspection table. She finished 
her inspection, gave me back my flag, and told me I could go. I said, 
"That's a Hezbollah flag." She said, "Uh-huh." Not "Uh-huh, I've been 
trained to recognize the symbols of anti-American terror groups, but 
after careful inspection of your physical person, your behavior, and 
your last name, I've come to the conclusion that you are not a Bekaa 
Valley-trained threat to the United States commercial aviation 
system," but "Uh-huh, I'm going on break, why are you talking to me?"

...

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811/airport-security

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