In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Nov 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2020-11-18 34296 MILLENICOM 2017-04-28 2020-11-29 58224 TCI 2018-10-22 2020-11-10 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2020-11-29 24835 RAYA 2020-08-04 2020-11-27 204958 KTS 2020-11-30 2020-11-30 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2020 using open resolver tests: ASN Name Last-Detected 15924 BORUSANTELEKOM 2020-11-30 199826 IQSTC-IQ 2020-11-30 201713 gaziantepdc 2020-11-30 208570 spark-iq 2020-11-30 50710 EarthLink 2020-11-30 51074 MABNA 2020-11-27 50057 Parvaz-System 2020-11-27 202055 QematAlwasat 2020-11-26 197882 Tarin 2020-11-26 206854 lesunco 2020-11-23 206893 iq-stormnetworksiq 2020-11-14 57689 RASHED-ALRASHED 2020-11-14 Further information for these tests is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/ornog.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem Please send any feedback or suggestions to [email protected] _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list [email protected] http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog
