An old friend sent this around, it might be internet BS but he does know
a lot of people who know a lot of people with military/intel/aviation
backgrounds, so I tend to think it is probably closer to true than not.
But YMMV.
--R
For how many years did we hear some of this in CRM? From a friend
of an old Pan Am friend. I heard a lot of the same stuff from a
personal friend who just left one of the Japanese carriers and
another who works for Singapore. For what it's worth......
*Subject: Fw: [retup] Low-down on Korean pilots*
----- hi
enjoy your flight on Asiana..
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the --400, I
got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing
subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and
surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of
the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression
from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One
big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given
super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster.
Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of
the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way,
after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and
found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of
the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years
and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant,
it's a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us
expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a
web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think
this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or
two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and
everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions,
what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example;
I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to
initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the
briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were
coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master
Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first
few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff.
Then, all of a sudden they all "got it" and continued the
takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten
out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of
fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a
decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were
basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and
the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or
face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired
Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one
center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we
had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at
Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia,
or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia.
Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so
they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces
ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the
number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were
fired because they tried to enforce "normal" standards of
performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to
master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach
with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding
when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach
struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this
Asiana crew, it didnt' compute that you needed to be a 1000' AGL
at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But,
after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my
name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn't pass
someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually
busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me
built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it
turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief
Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on
my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my
Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a
fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when
I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15
mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for
all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two
turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When
he finally got his nerve up, he requested "Radar Vectors" to
final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and
I would have cleared him to the IAF and then "Cleared for the
approach" and he could have selected "Exit Hold" and been on his
way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to
final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to
"Extend the FAF" and he couldn't understand why it would not
intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV.
He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured
out that his active waypoint was "Hold at XYZ." Every time he
punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like
it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed
(by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of
about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT
paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with
a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised
there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the
same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are
taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of
expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more
likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best
trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went
to school in the USA) who flew C-141's in the USAF. When he got
out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when
I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course,
he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few
years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with
trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce
some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired
after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by
their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on
Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time,
in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of
the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that
information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind
landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never
did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few
clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational
system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school
as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning
and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER
challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily
emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or
very subtly. You just can't change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact
that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It's
actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly.
Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don't
trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of
Inchon into North Korea. But, they don't get the kids who grew
up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around
airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then
to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I
had better experience with them than with the ex-Military
pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval
Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light
airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16
pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly
the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight
hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and
free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are
still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy!
But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and
the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers
that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or
Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with
their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250'
after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one
minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally
disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800' after the gear was down, flaps
extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it
in to land. Again, how much real "flight time" or real
experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747,
it's the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored
in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in
CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
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