Wilton once wrote that after massive U.S. bombing of Hanoi, during which he took part, he couldn't understand why the U.S. did not invade North Vietnam or make peace on U.S. terms since Hanoi would have agreed to a cease fire. Would the following likely be the reason?
Book is available at: http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=schaller&sts=t&tn=altered+states ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Altered States by Michael Schaller. Japan's economic ascendancy > in the 1960s (which happened in large part because it was a supplier to > America's > Vietnam War effort) made President Richard Nixon interested in establishing > ties > to China as a counterbalance to Japan. China's border wars with the Soviet > Union > in 1969 created an opening for the U.S. to make overtures to China. And > warmer relations > with China would make it easier to exit the Vietnam War. In the greatest of > ironies, > at the same time China began to fear the repercussions of an American loss in > Vietnam. > The rapprochement came in a cloud of intrigue: > "[In 1971], Nixon delivered twin shocks -- his July 15 announcement of a > planned > visit to China followed by his August 15 decision to cut the dollar loose > from > gold, impose an import surcharge, and force the upward valuation of the yen. > He > also threatened to impose textile quotas [on Japan] under the terms of the > Trading > with the Enemy Act.... > "Nixon's and Kissinger's interest in opening a dialogue with China reflected > deeper > changes in the cold war. On taking office, both men recognized that the > Soviet > Union had or would soon achieve a rough nuclear parity with the United > States. Instead > of a costly and probably futile effort to restore superiority, they sought to > moderate > Soviet behavior through economic and political incentives broadly labeled > 'détente.' > These included negotiated limits on strategic weapons, increased trade and > technology > transfer, and recognition that the Soviet Union had legitimate global > interests. > ... > "In March 1969, the protracted war of words between Moscow and Beijing > escalated > into a series of border skirmishes. This schism created an opportunity for > the > United States to play off the Communist rivals against each other, assuming > Washington > had some leverage with the People's Republic of China. Following the border > clashes, > Nixon and Kissinger concluded that improved ties with China might constrain > Soviet > behavior and impel both rivals to cooperate with the United States or risk > isolation. > ... > > "The leverage gained through triangular diplomacy with Moscow and Beijing > might > also hasten an end to the Vietnam War (through Soviet or Chinese pressure on > North > Vietnam), provide Washington with greater influence over Japan, and > facilitate > an orderly reduction of U.S. military power in Asia. > "Just as fear of Chinese expansion initially prompted American intervention > in > Vietnam, a desire to assist Chinese resistance to Soviet pressure increased > the > administration's determination to speed a settlement in Vietnam. In effect, > Nixon > began to apply his 'doctrine' of reduced involvement in Asia before, rather > than > after, 'victory' in Vietnam. As Kissinger elaborated, the 'China initiative > ... > restored perspective to our national policy.' It reduced 'Indochina to its > proper > scale -- a small peninsula on a major continent.' The 'drama' of opening ties > with > China would 'ease for the American people the pain that would inevitably > accompany > our withdrawal from Southeast Asia.' > "In an odd symmetry, ... Chinese leaders feared an assault by their former > ally. > Japan's growing wealth and assertiveness -- brought home by Sato's > affirmation > in 1969 of an interest in the security of South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- > raised > the added specter of a rearmed, expansive Japan. ... > "Because the retreat of American power [in the withdrawal of troops from > Vietnam] > coincided with a growing Soviet threat, Chinese strategists who previously > feared > a U.S. victory in Vietnam now agonized about the consequences of a defeat. > America's > retreat would leave China caught between the Soviet Union and Japan. As Nixon > and > Kissinger hoped, Mao's determination to protect China outweighed his disdain > for > capitalism, solidarity with Hanoi, mistrust of the United States, and drive > to regain > Taiwan. > "During 1969 and 1970, the administration signaled a desire to improve ties > with > China. ... On June 2, 1971, after almost two years of secret exchanges, Zhou > Enlai > invited Kissinger to come to China to arrange a presidential visit. Kissinger > described > the message as 'the most important communication that has come to an American > president > since the end of World War II.' ... > "Nixon the politician saw as much advantage in the China initiative as did > Nixon > the statesman. To make certain he received maximum credit for the > breakthrough, > the president prodded his staff to keep Kissinger under wraps and away from > journalists > when he returned from Beijing. Nixon not only kept news of the approach to > China > secret from the Department of State and America's allies before his public > announcement > on July 15, but wanted steps taken to ensure that no prominent Americans -- > and > certainly no Democratic politicians, such as Senator Edward Kennedy -- > traveled > to China before he did. He spoke of his pending trip as something 'good to > hit the > Democrats with at primary time.' The NATO allies and Japan would be told of > the > initiative by telephone, just before the president went public." > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________ http://www.okiebenz.com To search list archives http://www.okiebenz.com/archive/ To Unsubscribe or change delivery options go to: http://mail.okiebenz.com/mailman/listinfo/mercedes_okiebenz.com
