On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 6:53 AM, Tom Ritter <[email protected]> wrote: > I think you should point out that we're talking about asyncronous > protocols. Comparing syncronous HS-based chat protocols with > asyncronous email-like store-and-forward protocols is apples and > oranges.
We're sort of talking about turning asynchronous, email-like protocols *into* synchronous protocols. Which I'm skeptical about. >> So a store-and-forward system with many users sharing the same mailbox >> server seems better. This is how Pond works > > I thought Pond let/encouraged you to run your own mailbox? Dunno about "encouraged". The constant traffic pattern between recipient and mailbox helps obscure the relationship between senders and recipients. If every recipient had a unique mailbox then that would be ineffective, and Pond's relationship-hiding would depend only on Tor. > And that if > you don't run your own, the server learns whether or not you are > retrieving mail you recieve? Yup. Though in the scheme of things, that seems like a lesser leak? > Contrasted to Pynchon Gate which works similarly, but 'better' - your > mailbox does sit aside many others' mailboxes guarenteed, but the > nodes you connect to to download data from don't learn if you're > recieving or even checking your mail thanks to PIR. (This gets you > closer to Alt.Anonymous for the recipient, except the nymserver knows > if your nym is recieving mail.) Agreed that's better, if you could find multiple independent parties to run it. > I was always a bit bemused by people's desire to run > Mixmaster/Mixminion nodes (mostly Mixmaster) over Tor Hidden Services. > It always seemed like this absurd bandaid: "Getting MITM-proof > StartTLS in SMTP servers is hard: Let's just use Hidden Services!" > > But at the same time, I understand why. HS provides some built-in > features that make them attractive. Just like using TLS gets you > confidentiality for free, using HS gets you: > 1 Authenticity (with no CAs!) on the link > 2 Confidentiality of the link > 3 Free and Easy NAT Travsersal, allowing anyone to run a server > (Especially for Country-Wide NAT) > 4 Some Anonymity for Client > 5 An attempt at Anonymity for Server > 6 'Decentralized Prescence' - login.oscar.aol.com doesn't know if a > server is online, one must poll and reveal the connection attempt, to > determine prescence [...] > > Choosing Hidden Services as a Transport Layer makes sense, if only for > #1-3. Getting 4-6 for free is even better. The problem is really if > people are relying on, or advertising 4-6. It's going to be hard to communicate that. If you tell people they're using a fancy Tor feature so they can run a "hidden" thing that doesn't reveal data to a server, they're not going to think: "oh, that's analogous to TLS transport encryption". They're going to think: this is awesome, I'm invisible! Trevor _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
