-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 This is a joke, right? You don't actually believe that cryptographic hashes influence any of these social outcomes, do you?
E. On 2014.12.11 13.30, Natanael wrote: > Other examples in this spirit - you asked for a car with high > maximum speed. You said you don't care much about security ratings. > This gets forwarded to a data broker (look up the term) who sells > it to your insurance company - and you can't deny you said it! > Boom, your insurance costs just doubled. > > And as you mentioned, the dealership can get in trouble too. Many > companies that protect their brand have all kinds of contracts and > NDA's around MSRP with retailers, which among others means sale > prices can't be published. This allows them to set their own > margins and provide low prices for chosen retailers that advertise > them well, and higher prices for others. Having a provable > transcript of a conversation declaring the exact margins and terms > would lose that retailer their contract and would make negotiations > harder for the company, and their brand could likely get a hit. > > Discussing job options. While not having told your boss about your > plans to leave. Sometimes you have very good reasons to not let > them know a thing until after your new job position is secured. > > Dealing with bullies in general. So 98% of all schools (and > probably close to as many work places) will have somebody who'd > abuse the ability to prove the contents of the log. Imagine > somebody framing somebody by bulling them IRL using seemingly > innocent phrases told in a mean manner. This gets repeated without > that context in a chat. The angry response gets forwarded to some > authoritive person who'll interpret it as the recipient being the > one who initiated the fight. This isn't even slightly unlikely - if > they think it can be (ab)used, they'll try. This happens already > with everything from notes to trying to make people say something > bad as a teacher/boss/etc is approaching. Don't leave people > without other options online! > > Journalists have already been mentioned. This usecase alone is > enough for me to be willing to demand that this feature is included > by default everywhere. Journalists don't want to use specialized > tools that nobody else uses except when trying to figure out how to > securely contact a journalist. No, the default tools that everybody > use should be secure enough. An insider should be able to claim he > is being framed if the transcript gets published and the fingers > are pointed at him (see Snowden, Manning and others), and > deniability means it is nothing but word against word (or against > rumor) rather than undeniable proof. The mere fact that he used a > tool that supports deniability should not be worth considering as > evidence against him, something which only is possible if it is > commonplace already. > > One very very important thing to remember - deniability is not the > equivalent of seatbelts, unlike what Eleanor implies when saying > that the user has to prepare for it. > > No, it is more like crumple zones - when shit happens, it reduces > your risk of getting hurt, even though it doesn't guarantee > anything by itself, and you don't have to know it exists in > advance. - -- Ideas are my favorite toys. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iF4EAREIAAYFAlSJ55oACgkQQwkE2RkM0wrBbgD8DzaqvYaL49HzGRwd0944P2iT YZ0UxDzbIi/cxG9Zq1YA/1omz40hkS+quypb0Vq/PQ/dTZQo1VVIX+aQUIwYH5h6 =b7FX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
