> 1) Assertions that impersonation makes the signatures worthless This got a little mixed up with trust model discussions. My original point was quite specifically that for general day-to-day communication, signatures aren't useful, at least in their present form. I would at this point phrase it less strongly, and say that the tradeoff they offer in what they do, versus the complexity they introduce, isn't worth it. I still stand by that point.
> A bank that is hacked and customer bank details are disclosed is in trouble > but a bank that is hacked and has money stolen is in worse trouble and a > bank who loses its account data and cannot recover it from backups is a > ex-bank. > > All documents should be signed but only confidential documents need to be > or should be encrypted. From the perspective of enterprise users, this makes a lot of sense. But I'm not building enterprise software, and I don't know about the requirements they have: I'm working on a consumer-oriented implementation, for secure e-mail. I would really like to send confidential mail to my tax advisor. And from that point of view, signed-only mail add an order of magnitude in UI and ecosystem complexity, quite possibly a sufficient amount that my tax advisor (or their other customers, affecting me indirectly) doesn't want to bother with pgp at all. Compliance oriented enterprise applications are a valid use case. Secure communication to counter mass surveillance are a valid use case. Trying to fulfill the requirements of those in the same software and on equal footing sounds like a bad idea. - V _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
