On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 10:47 -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > The authorities don't usually care about the content of communications. If > Alice is a dissident and they know she has talked to Bob then its twenty > years in the gulag for Bob regardless of what the messages say.
If it's all about metadata why do so many "authorities" criminalize or try hard to prevent end-to-end encryption? > [...] > But availability is still king and integrity is still queen. What those > people are risking their lives to do is to get the information out. That > is an availability concern. I consider getting information out to public circles orthogonal to enabling encrypted group or 1:1 communications. > [...] > RFC7435 is talking about preventing mass surveillance. And that is a > confidentiality problem. OpenPGP is not designed to prevent mass > surveillance, and there are few tools less suited to that task than > OpenPGP and S/MIME. Other than sending an email to the NSA saying 'look at > me', I can't think of anything more likely to label you as a risk than > sending encrypted messages in an unencrypted transport. Being the odd one who encrypts makes you stick out, sure. Which is why i think mail encryption needs to become more widespread. holger _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
