On Wed, 2017-10-18 at 16:39 +0200, carlo von lynX wrote: > The trick is to make the cover traffic actually useful for > end-users.. ideally by making *all* of their everyday > operations a part of the cover traffic.
We've no reason to expect this to be possible right now, not literally anyways. Anything called cover traffic should contributes to the formal analysis of the anonymity properties, but useful traffic obeys non-uniform distributions. I do think one could tune regular non-anonymous traffic to contribute as much as possible to obfuscating anonymous traffic. We do not know what that means right now either, but presumably the words "differential privacy" appear. I think this sounds plausible for peer-to-peer network maintenance traffic, but only with massive layering violations in the protocol stack, which sound controversial and far off right now. I'm not too hopeful about file sharing traffic contributing much real analyzable anonymity, but.. There are weaker defenses that do not defeat powerful adversaries, but may stimy weaker ones : Can VoIP, streaming, and file sharing traffic be made indistinguishable assuming all nodes are "spherical cows" who engage in similar quantities of all rolls in all traffic types? Can flows between mix network routers be hidden inside these flows? There are even political moves that help like defending carrier grade NATs : https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/are-you-sharing-same-ip-address-criminal-law-enforcement-call-for-end-of-carrier-grade-nat-cgn-to-increase-accountability-online Or inventing new NAT behaviors that simultaneously benefit ISPs while making logging harder. Jeff
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