Dummy / decoy / fill / chaff traffic itself alone seems insufficient. If a global passive adversary GPA can inject their own traffic pattern into the net, and recognize it at some other useful vantage point, such as an exit or "hidden" destination, or intermediate hop towards a full disclosure... including if the pattern is being sent to or between you... they can surely do the same with whatever traffic a user pushes. Wherein the users fill traffic may not be subject to the same influence or channel parameters as the users real data traffic.
Parhaps was talked with Briar / others on cryptography list, what would GPA proof Ethernet wire look like? The link level point to point p2p encrypted line / channel would be full 100% of the time, packet size outside attacker control, with fill traffic yielding for data traffic, with detection if it was ever not full or crypto failed (obviously includes received traffic suffered delays or missing packets), and all data traffic received from elsewhere for transport over such a line must be reclocked for insertion into the line to clean any timing / size / data perturbations received. It may be impossible to time or correlate a 100% full clocked bucket line, or network that uses the same principle. The more strayed away towards looser more general more unchecked constraint upon random fill and the traffic channel, and the less network wide, perhaps the less benefit it is. The lines may not need to be full, but they seem to must need to be fully parameterized, cleaned, checked and enforced. These are only a few lines of thought among many out there. Is there a subset list of research papers being curated somewhere that deal specifically with these sorts of traffic issues (anti-GPA / fill / decoy / whatever)? > zcash transactions: from client to blockchain. For a "privacy" coin, it's counter productive that almost all coins still don't support TLS, bootstrapping and full use entirely within overlay networks, etc. The first I know of to begin making those leaps is Zencash... https://zensystem.io/ _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list Messaging@moderncrypto.org https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
