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• • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Separation of concerns, usability, and partial verification Jon Callas
• [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Wasa Bee
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Announcing the EFF Crypto Usability Prize (EFF CUP) Workshop, July 9 Peter Gutmann
• [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Jon Callas
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? elijah
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? elijah
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Moxie Marlinspike
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Tao Effect
  • Re: [messaging] Are we pursuing real solutions for security? Tao Effect
• [messaging] between fingerprint transcription and comparison Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] between fingerprint transcription and comparison Stefan Birgmeier
  • Re: [messaging] between fingerprint transcription and comparison Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] between fingerprint transcription and comparison Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] between fingerprint transcription and comparison Tom Ritter
• Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) George Violaris
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) George Violaris
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) George Violaris
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Thomas
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Christine Corbett Moran
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Christine Corbett Moran
• [messaging] Key Poems Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Key Poems Michael Rogers
• [messaging] DH vs PAKE vs SAS Brian Warner
• [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Guy K. Kloss
  • Re: [messaging] Let's run a usability study (was Useability of public-key fingerprints) Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb
• [messaging] Secure messaging over insecure chat frameworks George Kadianakis
  • Re: [messaging] Secure messaging over insecure chat frameworks Andy Isaacson
• [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Sven Moritz Hallberg
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Rich Griffin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Trevor Perrin
  • [messaging] channel-ID vs PAKE secrets Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] channel-ID vs PAKE secrets Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Introduction secrets and "unlinkable rendezvous" protocols Robert Ransom
  • [messaging] How and When less bits do more Stefan Birgmeier
• [messaging] Sample constant-time base16 coder Robert Ransom
• [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Moritz Bartl
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Peter Eckersley
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Peter Eckersley
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • [messaging] contrasting introduction secrets with public key fingerprints [was: Re: "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints] Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Daniel Thomas
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Joseph Bonneau
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Sven Moritz Hallberg
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints John-Mark Gurney
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] "Pseudoword" base32 fingerprints Brian Warner
• [messaging] Short Auth Strings Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Adam Zimmerman
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Short Auth Strings Daniel Kahn Gillmor
• [messaging] Base32 Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Base32 Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Base32 John-Mark Gurney
• [messaging] Social Security cards and additional issues Watson Ladd
  • Re: [messaging] Social Security cards and additional issues Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Social Security cards and additional issues Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Social Security cards and additional issues Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] Social Security cards and additional issues Robert Ransom
• [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints John-Mark Gurney
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints George Kadianakis
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Nate Lawson
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Nathan Wilcox
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Dominik Schürmann
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Ximin Luo
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Peter Gutmann
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Stefan Birgmeier
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Michael Rogers
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Tony Arcieri
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Moxie Marlinspike
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Robert Ransom
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints John-Mark Gurney
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Tom Ritter
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Brian Warner
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Daniel Kahn Gillmor
  • Re: [messaging] Useability of public-key fingerprints Ximin Luo

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