Eric, Thanks for that. I think I now recall you probably mentioned this to me 
before. We originally heard through he grapevine that there had been some  
minor distraction on finals, like an oxygen caption or something equally 
trivial at those heights, but obviously not. Another sad training accident.

Was your buddy a FAIP? The RAF trainee who died won the sword of honour on my 
course at Cranwell. (Yours truly just scraped through following a rather 
unfortunate misdemeanour in the bar one night which provoked a very one-sided 
interview. Why do some officer training staff had no sense of humour or joie de 
vivre?) Coincidentally - and tragically - the guy killed in the Jaguar mid-air 
came second in the sword of honour list. Maybe the Aviation Gods smile upon 
those with lousy social skills. The mid-air wasn't his fault.

For Tom R: Thanks for the follow up on the Marines' experience of ejecting. 
Clearly there have been technical and maintenance issues going on in those 
aircraft fleets, which is interesting (and concerning). I wonder how their F18 
accident rate compares with the USN, if they have been able (or willing) to 
carry out a fleet comparison. Just a thought.

Simon
________________________________
From: ERIC Smith via Mifnet <[email protected]>
Sent: 06 January 2026 20:04
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; ERIC Smith 
<[email protected]>
Subject: [Mifnet ๐Ÿ›ฐ 75053] Re: weird ejection story

"He was on a US training exchange in the T38 which had an inferior seat. HAd he 
been sat on a fairly basic Martin-Baker Mark 4 seat (circa 1950s-60s vintage) 
with its zero feet, ninety knots limit (ie not a "rocket seat")it would have 
saved him from the T38 parameters he found himself in."

That accident happened just after I drove out of Sheppard AFB enroute to 
Holloman AFB for Fighter Lead-in. The instructor was a former roommate of mine 
at the USAF Academy who also trained at Sheppard and came back as a first 
assignment instructor. The ejection seat was indeed inferior to "thrust you can 
trust" Martin-Baker with which they could have survived.

A fateful decision soon after t/o put them at risk. Just after the gear came up 
they pulled up for a closed pattern. Generally these patterns happen at the end 
of a mission putting the a/c at a much lower weight. Unfortunately they were 
about as heavy as a T-38 gets. As soon as they reduced the power for the 
descending 180 degree turn to the runway the plane entered a descent rate that 
exceeded the capabilities of their ancient ejection seat. Before they were 
halfway around the final turn they realized they were in danger and selected 
full afterburner and reduced their bank angle, sending them into the pattern 
for the T-37s on the parallel runway.

Their decision to eject came far too late. The instructor's seat did not even 
make it to the top of the rails before impact and the student's seat made it up 
only a couple of inches. After that accident pilots had to burn down a certain 
amount of fuel before entering the overhead pattern. That was yet another 
expensive lesson for the USAF.

Eric



On Monday, January 5, 2026 at 08:07:13 AM EST, srbrown--- via Mifnet 
<[email protected]> wrote:


There has always been much higher losses in training or peacetime operations 
than war time. This isn't necessarily a result of technical issues with the 
aircraft but just mishandling or flying into things at high speeds (including 
runways). Also from losing control through disorientation and the other 
generally quite dangerous stuff military aircrew get up to and have to 
practice, like tactical take-offs and landings  on the bigger aircraft and 
similar capers they get up to. Back in the warbird years those large 
single-pistons were (and are) a real handful, especially when flying slow 
(which, of course, is when you are also close to the ground). Similarly the 
large piston twins presented major asymmetric handling challenges. I think the 
UK's Canberra bomber (B57 in US parlance) killed more crew practicing 
asymmetric training than it did from actual engine failures, which always 
ignited the debate as to whether it was even worth training for engine failures 
at take off rather than just practicing asymmetric flying higher up. The same 
argument rears its ugly head again and again regarding spinning training in 
smaller aircraft.

Fast jets would often struggle when heavily laden, particularly with underwing 
stores which added further problems even at higher speeds when manoeuvring, 
such as toss bombing or taking evasive action.

To add some modern context, the total RAF aircrew fatalities in the first Gulf 
War numbered 5. Eight aircraft were lost, four to enemy fire. Each with two 
crew per aircraft (all Tornado GR1s which was present in the largest numbers). 
During my three years on the peacetime front line the RAF F4 fleet of six 
squadrons buried eight guys (ie four aircraft worth). Another four, maybe six, 
ejected successfully. Causes varied, some remain unknown. At least four guys I 
went through my various stages of training with were also killed on other 
aircraft. Only one attempted to eject. He was on a US training exchange in the 
T38 which had an inferior seat. HAd he been sat on a fairly basic Martin-Baker 
Mark 4 seat (circa 1950s-60s vintage) with its zero feet, ninety knots limit 
(ie not a "rocket seat")it would have saved him from the T38 parameters he 
found himself in. Such is life. Two were flying Jaguars which had less margins 
for error (one was a low level mid-air). The other was in an F3 Tornado and, 
just for national balance, had he been flying  anF14 with its automatic wing 
sweep he wouldn't have died. The RAF F3's were factory-fitted with automatic 
wing sweep but it was never cleared for operational use for reasons I never 
discovered. We also didn't have life jackets that automatically inflated on 
contact with the water, unlike the USA's aircrew, so if you were unconscious 
after ejecting you were fish food. At least the US forces could recover a body 
if nothing else. (cf Goose in Top Gun #1. But I digress, as always). A Canberra 
crashed in about 1977 when I was in my final year in school, just five miles 
from the local base where my Dad was stationed, also flying on those Canberras. 
That was a nervous phone call home. Another asymmetric practice, another three 
killed, including the Station Commander (Group Captain/full Colonel rank) who 
was doing his annual rating check. That sparked discussions in the official 
accident report about "cross-cockpit authority gradients" . The instructor 
pilot was junior officer rank but who knows what actually happened in those 
crucial seconds?

Simon
________________________________
From: Tom Ronell via Mifnet <[email protected]>
Sent: 05 January 2026 07:42
To: The Mifnet <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Ronell <[email protected]>
Subject: [Mifnet ๐Ÿ›ฐ 75030] Re: weird ejection story


I have a Martin-Baker story, too: they held a reception on Capitol Hill for all 
of their ejection survivors. In speaking to those who I met at this reception, 
I was struck by the fact that the vast majority had ejected during routine 
peacetime flights.

Mentioning my surprise at this and wondering about the maintenance of the 
aircraft which necessitated so many routine peacetime ejections, instead of 
being received as concern about the well-being of the aviators, the Marines 
with whom I went and had availed themselves of the open bar, interpreted that 
observation as an accusation that the ejectees were pussies who ejected 
needlessly, precipitating quite a fracas.

A few years later, at the Paris Air Show, Rick Hatton, founder of 10 Tanker, 
expressed his amazement that I am still alive. When reminded that I am younger 
and in better health than he, Rick said that was not his reasoning. I suppose 
that Martin-Baker reception was but one data point in his calculation....

TR

________________________________

From: srbrown--- via Mifnet <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
CC: [email protected]
Date: 2026-01-05T00:31:57Z
Subject: [Mifnet ๐Ÿ›ฐ 75027] Re: weird ejection story

What I've always found odd about that story is that ejection seats from 
Martin-Baker's earlier era didn't deploy the main parachute until the seat had 
fallen to below either 10,000 ft . (Or 15,000 ft because different barometric 
units could be fitted to the seat  to match the terrain you were flying over). 
Most ejection seat designs - and certainly all Martin-Baker's - incorporate a 
drogue chute which deploys quite quickly after ejection to stabilise the seat 
in an upright attitude. This drogue chute will not deploy the main chute until 
the barostat has reached its assigned altitude. This means the pilot would be 
falling at a bit less than terminal velocity but fast enough to get him to an 
altitude where he can breath. Until reaching that altitude an emergency oxygen 
bottle, also attached to the seat, will deliver oxygen in the descent. Once the 
barostat triggers at it's calibrated altitude the remaining parachute 
deployment sequence can then continue. This involves the release of the main 
chute, which is extracted by the drogue, whilst the main seat harness is 
released such that the crewman falls away from his seat in his main chute but 
still attached to his parachute. All of his other survival equipment is 
contained in the seat pan which also comes away from the seat and is dangling 
beneath him.

The  oxygen bottle is normally attached to the seat so this disappears too but 
only below 10,000 ft (or 15,000 ft) which isn't a problem. The US Navy's seats 
made by Martin-Baker actually have their emergency oxygen bottles in the seat 
pan, so this stays with the crewmembers. This was a USN specification to give 
the crewmen breathing oxygen in case they went under water following an 
accident off a ship. We poor Brits didn't have such luxuries provided by our 
caring employers. In fact I think only the USN had this feature fitted to their 
MB seats. (Yeah Fly Navy etc etc). I don't know what year they started 
specifying this feature though.

When I looked into this story after first hearing about it many years ago I 
couldn't find a reason why his parachute deployed. Maybe the main chute didn't 
but the strength of the thunderstorm still kept him, his seat and the drogue 
chute airborne, as described. Maybe if his main chute had inadvertently 
deployed early at those altitude it would have been destroyed, leading to his 
death. I read that the early F8s had a seat provided by Vaught which was fairly 
basic but it's hard to find more details on those seats. They were soon 
replaced by Martin-Baker Mark 5 seats which were superior in performance. The 
USN has remained the biggest customer of Martin-Baker seats ever since. (Not 
the USAF though).  I'm not being a biased Brit by claiming any superior 
performance of MB seats. The French and Israelis also used MB seats because of 
their reliability and generally superior performance to alternative 
manufacturers.

These seats could be quite uncomfortable, even on short flights, but crew tend 
to be quite fond of them. There are several euphemisms for ejecting, including 
"banging out" (Brit) and punching out" (USA). My favourite came from a French 
exchange pilot who referred to it as "saving the furniture". (Or, more 
precisely, "sauver les meubles", usually mentioned with a characteristic Gallic 
shrug).

Simon


________________________________
From: Jack Keady via Mifnet <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, January 3, 2026 23:37
To: David Wardell via Mifnet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jack Keady <[email protected]>
Subject: [Mifnet ๐Ÿ›ฐ 75022] weird ejection story

keady

Old Photo 
Club<https://www.facebook.com/Oldphotosclub?__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R>

[https://s.yimg.com/nq/storm/assets/enhancrV2/23/logos/facebook.png]<https://www.facebook.com/Oldphotosclub?__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R>
Log in or sign up to 
view<https://www.facebook.com/Oldphotosclub?__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R>

See posts, photos and more on 
Facebook.<https://www.facebook.com/Oldphotosclub?__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=-UC%2CP-R>


 ยทFollow
January 1 at 4:19โ€ฏ
AM<https://www.facebook.com/Oldphotosclub/posts/pfbid02necqB8EPyZ1zF5Jje6Xd7Dr9SytF7KxPNgQtfdpiihB3VtEuvrprn7q4KzCJLzbbl?__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R>
 ยท
His engine exploded nine miles above the Earth. What happened next was worse 
than falling.
On July 26, 1959, Lieutenant Colonel William Rankin was flying his F-8 Crusader 
jet fighter over the southeastern United States when his engine failed without 
warning.
He was cruising at 47,000 feet. That is nine miles above the ground. Higher 
than Mount Everest. So high that the sky turns black and the air is too thin to 
sustain human life. At that altitude, the temperature outside his cockpit was 
seventy degrees below zero.
Rankin had only seconds to make a decision. He could try to glide the crippled 
jet down to a safer altitude before ejecting, or he could pull the ejection 
handle immediately and take his chances.
Smoke filled the cockpit. The controls went dead. He pulled the handle.
The ejection seat rocketed him into the freezing void. The sudden decompression 
hit his body like a sledgehammer. At that altitude, the pressure is so low that 
fluids inside the human body begin to expand and vaporize. Pain exploded 
through his abdomen and his eyes. His emergency oxygen supply failed. He began 
losing consciousness almost immediately.
Then his parachute deployed. And that is when his nightmare truly began.
William Rankin had ejected directly into the heart of a cumulonimbus 
thunderstorm.
>From the outside, these storms look like towering white mountains in the sky. 
>Pilots avoid them at all costs because inside, they are vertical hurricanes. 
>Updrafts can exceed one hundred fifty miles per hour. The violence inside is 
>almost beyond description.
Rankin fell straight into one.
Instead of descending toward Earth, he was caught. Powerful updrafts seized his 
parachute and hurled him back upward. Then he was thrown sideways. Then yanked 
upward again. He was no longer falling. He was trapped, spinning inside a 
living storm that refused to let him go.
Hailstones the size of golf balls hammered his body from every direction. 
Lightning cracked so close that he could feel the static electricity lifting 
the hair on his arms and smell the sharp burn of ozone in the air. Thunder was 
no longer just sound. It was a physical force that slammed into his chest like 
a fist.
Rain flooded into his parachute, collapsing it and sending him into freefall. 
Then the canopy would reinflate and jerk him violently upward again. The motion 
was so brutal that he vomited. He lost consciousness. He woke up still 
spinning, still trapped, still being torn apart by forces no human was meant to 
survive.
The temperature swung wildly. At the top of the updrafts, far below freezing, 
ice formed on his flight suit, his exposed skin, his eyelashes. Then he would 
plunge into warmer air and the ice would begin melting, only to refreeze 
seconds later when he was hurled back up.
The rain was so heavy it felt like drowning in midair. He gasped for breath and 
inhaled water. His lungs burned. His body was bruised and bleeding from hail 
impacts. He was hypothermic and frostbitten at the same time.
Time stopped. Minutes stretched into what felt like hours. He later said he 
believed he was going to die inside that cloud, spinning forever, never 
reaching the ground.
And then, after forty minutes of impossible violence, the storm finally 
released him.
He broke through the bottom of the thundercloud at about ten thousand feet. For 
the first time since he ejected, he was falling normally. He could see trees 
below. He was descending toward a forest in North Carolina.
Rankin crashed through the tree canopy. Branches snapped around him. His 
parachute tangled in the limbs, slowing his fall just enough. He slammed into 
the earth, badly injured but somehow still breathing.
For several minutes he lay motionless on the forest floor, unable to believe he 
was alive.
Then he stood up. He freed himself from his parachute. He began walking.
His body was covered in welts from hailstones. He had frostbite on his hands 
and face. He was bruised from head to toe, bleeding from multiple wounds, 
disoriented from oxygen deprivation and trauma.
But he was alive.
He stumbled through the woods until he found a road. Then a farmhouse. A 
shocked farmer opened his door to find a battered pilot in a torn flight suit 
standing on his porch.
William Rankin looked at him and said simply: "I just fell out of the sky."
When military doctors and meteorologists heard his story, they were stunned. No 
one had ever survived being trapped inside a violent thunderstorm at that 
altitude. The conditions he described should not have been survivable.
Decompression sickness should have killed him. The hailstones could have 
knocked him unconscious permanently. The extreme cold should have caused fatal 
hypothermia. Lightning could have struck him directly at any moment.
But everything that should have killed William Rankin somehow did not.
He spent weeks recovering from his injuries. Doctors documented severe 
bruising, frostbite, minor burns from lightning proximity, and internal damage 
from the violent forces that had thrown him through the sky.
In 1960, he published a book about his experience called The Man Who Rode the 
Thunder. It remains the only firsthand account of surviving such conditions.
His testimony helped meteorologists better understand the internal dynamics of 
severe thunderstorms. Aviation safety protocols were updated. Ejection seat 
designs improved. High-altitude survival training incorporated lessons from 
what he endured.
William Rankin continued his military career after recovering. He flew more 
missions. He never ejected from another aircraft.
When asked about those forty minutes inside the storm, he said it was the 
longest forty minutes of his life. Time had stopped. He had been suspended 
between Earth and space, caught in a force so violent it seemed impossible to 
escape.
But he did escape. Through training, physical resilience, and a measure of luck 
that defies explanation.
He retired from the Marine Corps and lived a quiet life, rarely speaking 
publicly about what happened. He passed away in 2009 at the age of eighty-nine.
More than sixty years after his ordeal, meteorologists still reference his 
account when studying severe thunderstorms. Pilots still learn about him in 
survival training. His story appears in aviation safety manuals and meteorology 
textbooks around the world.
Because William Rankin proved something that science said was impossible. The 
human body can endure conditions that should be unsurvivable. When every system 
fails, when nature unleashes its full fury, when death seems absolutely 
certain, survival is still possible.
He fell nine miles through a storm that tried to destroy him.
And he walked away.
#WilliamRankin<https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/williamrankin?__eep__=6&__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=*NK-R>
 
#TheManWhoRodeTheThunder<https://www.facebook.com/hashtag/themanwhorodethethunder?__eep__=6&__cft__[0]=AZZIaIc5baLXGWKF_6P_isWNHKf0inSTQiovZ0-YV01hiJsOB1V3FONAfoVvKsIFZ8_hxsWAnwwoT9DeWAdhUdLMOcpjG7-RjfNbj9M85HGfOKsV2wcxCAHOmrIwQpP4bPiMXGLcq4rXcCGN0RiNP-b6hDf7VXyVDQpaClZqtjm1hQ0nUixa4Bi-S8sn277tPFGYmRWw9Z5lLiHq3VhbAz2g&__tn__=*NK-R>
~Old Photo Club

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revised: 20250507

You are receiving The Mifnet because you requested to join this list.

The Mifnet is largely a labor of love, however the infrastructure isn't exactly 
cost-free. If you'd care to make a small contribution to the effort, please 
know that it would be greatly appreciated:
https://wardell.us/url/mifbit

All posts sent to the list should abide by these policies:

1) List members acknowledge that participation in Mifnet is a privilege--not a 
right.
2) Posts are always off the record, absent specific permission from the author.
3) The tone of discussions is collegial.
4) Posts are expected to be in reasonably good taste.
5) We discuss ideas and not personalities, and we don't speak ill of other 
Mifnet members.

* The Mifnet WEB SITE is:
  https://www.mifnet.com/

* To UNSUBSCRIBE from this list at any time please visit:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/
  OR: SEND THIS MESSAGE via email: [email protected]?subject=leave

* Send Mifnet mailing list POSTS/SUBMISSIONS to:
  [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>

* You may reach the person managing The Mifnet at:
  [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>

* Please consider the DIGEST version of The Mifnet, which consolidates all list 
traffic into 1-3
  messages daily. See instructions at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/

* Manage your personal Mifnet SUBSCRIPTION at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/

* For a list of all available Mifnet commands, SEND THIS MESSAGE via email:
  [email protected]?subject=help

* View The Mifnet LIST POLICIES and PRIVACY POLICY at:
  https://mifnet.com/index.php/policies

* View instructions for Mifnet DELIVERY PROBLEMS at:
  https://mifnet.com/index.php/delivery-problems

* View The Mifnet LIST ARCHIVE at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revised: 20250507

You are receiving The Mifnet because you requested to join this list.

The Mifnet is largely a labor of love, however the infrastructure isn't exactly 
cost-free. If you'd care to make a small contribution to the effort, please 
know that it would be greatly appreciated:
https://wardell.us/url/mifbit

All posts sent to the list should abide by these policies:

1) List members acknowledge that participation in Mifnet is a privilege--not a 
right.
2) Posts are always off the record, absent specific permission from the author.
3) The tone of discussions is collegial.
4) Posts are expected to be in reasonably good taste.
5) We discuss ideas and not personalities, and we don't speak ill of other 
Mifnet members.

* The Mifnet WEB SITE is:
  https://www.mifnet.com/

* To UNSUBSCRIBE from this list at any time please visit:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/
  OR: SEND THIS MESSAGE via email: [email protected]?subject=leave

* Send Mifnet mailing list POSTS/SUBMISSIONS to:
  [email protected]

* You may reach the person managing The Mifnet at:
  [email protected]

* Please consider the DIGEST version of The Mifnet, which consolidates all list 
traffic into 1-3
  messages daily. See instructions at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/

* Manage your personal Mifnet SUBSCRIPTION at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/

* For a list of all available Mifnet commands, SEND THIS MESSAGE via email:
  [email protected]?subject=help

* View The Mifnet LIST POLICIES and PRIVACY POLICY at:
  https://mifnet.com/index.php/policies

* View instructions for Mifnet DELIVERY PROBLEMS at:
  https://mifnet.com/index.php/delivery-problems

* View The Mifnet LIST ARCHIVE at:
  https://lists.mifnet.com/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/

Reply via email to