Good review Justin. I doubt though that physicists have been unaware of the philosophy, but perhaps become bored with it. There is always some element of approximation and tiny inconsistencies lead back to such alternatives as 'many worlds' (David Deutsch - but many others) and 'mirror worlds' from which energy is borrowed. I don't see science as much other than a world-view (or set of them) that accepts critical reasoning. In this sense, there is much to explore. Molly often wants to explore without constraints and science (to me) often tries to do the same in the sense of wanting to observe with the known constraints off or controlled. I think there might be a world to create, rather than one to explain.
On 25 Mar, 23:20, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > The Snell and Ludwig programmes address the further problem of how to > determine the extension, e.g., the numerical values, of a theoretical > term from a given set of observational data. This is called the > “measurement problem”, not to be confounded with the well-known > measurement problem in quantum theory. Typically the measurement > problem has no unique solution. Rather the values of the theoretical > quantities can only be measured within a certain degree of imprecision > and using auxiliary assumptions which, although plausible, are not > confirmed with certainty. Using Newton's work on motion one would have > to use the auxiliary assumption that the trajectories of the particles > are twice differentiable and that other forces except the > gravitational forces can be neglected. The feature of imprecision and > approximation plays a prominent rôle in the structuralistic programs. > In the context of the measurement problem, imprecision seems to be a > defect of the theory which impedes the exact determination of the > theoretical quantities. However, imprecision and non-uniqueness is > crucial in the context of evolution of theories and the transition to > new and “better” theories. Otherwise the new theory could in general > not encompass the successful applications of the old theory. Consider > for example the transition of Kepler's theory of planetary motion to > Newton's and Einstein's theories: Newtonian gravitation theory and > general relativity replace the Kepler ellipses with more complicated > curves. But these should still be consistent with the old astronomical > observations, which is only possible if they don't fit exactly into > Kepler's theory . Once speaking like this, of course, one may as well > be dead to most ears. > > On 25 Mar, 23:03, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > There already is a lot of precision with language in the area Craig > > (just remember how hard the logical positivists tried). Reality is > > often held to be 'somewhere else' and there are all kinds of > > measurement problems - the Copenhagen one that has been tossed out to > > the layman being relatively uninteresting to scientists. There are > > many competing views. Science is often more concerned not to let the > > Idols skew decent thinking or prevent experiment than with words - > > thinking just really ain't about language, but then comes the point of > > discussion with others and so on. The danger then is that people > > outside your field don't know enough of your specialist language-games > > to understand what you are on about. 'Reality' as a term bobs around > > in many language-games - it would be a mistake to pin it to one > > definition, and it's probably a mistake to conflate the reality in > > someone's head to the real - we are surely aware of something beyond > > unless we have gone mad. Sooner or later we end up with a gadget or > > concept that crosses boundaries, and as Pat says, sooner or later > > science may all lapse to dross. If it happens next wek I hope I give > > it up more gracefully than those dolts who cling to religion! > > > On 25 Mar, 18:05, Justintruth <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > What is it about relativity and quantum mechanics that causes so much > > > trouble? > > > > I think it comes down to this: > > > > Relativity: In classical physics there is an image of what is at any > > > given point in time. Given two observers one can then use the physics > > > to predict what the results of their observations will be. However, > > > relativity breaks this concept down. There is no "what is at a given > > > point in time" rather the image that one must use to predict what one > > > will see is relative to the frame of reference meaning it is different > > > for two people who are moving relative to each other.. So if you ask > > > the question "What is right now?" the relativist will answer "relative > > > to which frame of reference?" Once you know what frame of reference > > > you are talking about then you know which image to use and you can > > > predict what observers will observe. > > > > Now this property of the theory causes many to equivocate it with > > > philosophical relativism. The claim can be made that the fact that > > > there is no answer to the question "What is right now?" means that > > > philosophical relativism is correct where the term philosophical > > > relativism means roughly that what is real is relative to the > > > perceiver and there is nothing tying different perceiver's perceptions > > > together. Several aspects of the scientific theory however causes this > > > equivocation to be false: First, the total set of events that occur is > > > the same for all observers. It is just when and where things occur > > > that is relative not whether and what occurs. Second, the way the sets > > > are arranged is not arbitrary. There are transformation equations > > > that, given one set of pictures corresponding to the nows of a frame > > > of reference, will allow me to produce any other observers pictures. > > > Third, by conceiving of the reality in a four dimensional space with > > > an appropriate metric one can, through a process of projection that is > > > very similiar to the way classical physics projects reality onto > > > observers, determine the "presents" of all frames of reference. > > > Fourth, relativity preserves the possibility of causality. Fifth, for > > > a given frame of reference all observers have the same set of nows and > > > the process of observation is like in classical physics. Sixth for all > > > frames of reference the observations are the same at collocated > > > points. No one disagrees about what is observed only how to arrange > > > that into a series of images that represent time by means of > > > calculations. > > > > Quantum Mechanics: The problem here is with the wave particle duality. > > > Prior to quantum mechanics there was a clear image of "what was" at > > > any given time. Either light was a wave or it was a particle. There > > > was no doubt that it could be both because they are not the same > > > thing. Everyone knew reality had to be in some imaginable way. Quantum > > > mechanics however does not state that there is some particular > > > objective image that constitutes the way things are. Quantum mechanics > > > does this by assuming that there are waves the amplitude of which > > > predict the probability of appearing of a particle. There is nothing > > > other than this probability of appearing in the theory that would > > > correspond to an image of "what really is". Due to the nature of waves > > > there are inherent uncertainties in what can be predicted. The > > > observation of the location of a particle results in complete > > > uncertainty about its motion and that uncertainty cannot be eliminated > > > by more careful observation-it is inherent in the reality. However, > > > again this cannot be equated with philosophical relativism since the > > > reality (here the actual appearings that really do appear at the > > > probabilities predicted by the theory) are the same for all observers > > > and again objectivity in the sense of something being the same for > > > everybody is preserved. > > > > It seems to me that the "objective" world of science is preserved > > > therefore and relativity and quantum cannot be equated with > > > relativism. The real philosophical issues therefore arise equally in > > > both classical and modern physics. The fact is that physical reality > > > is not determinable logically. One cannot derive physical law without > > > observation. Therefore it is dependent on observation. However, the > > > fact is that when observation is conducted then the laws of physics > > > that result are remarkably stable. They result to an amazing degree in > > > constraints on the logical possibilities. Throw a baseball. Logically > > > it can go out from your hand five feet then stop and hover. Physically > > > it won't, a statement that is not absolutely certain as it is based on > > > observation but is still very certain given the stability of the > > > essent and our to date scientific experience. The mystical > > > interpretation of reality are all based in careful analysis of > > > observation itself and on the basis underneath science and really are > > > about the foundation of science itself. The scientific theories do not > > > speak to it and the questions being asked are not scientific > > > questions. On the other side, mystical insight can frequently be > > > misinterpreted as science and you have the mistakes that can be seen > > > in "New Age" fundamentalism. > > > > So the net effect is to just eliminate naive objectivity in which one > > > imagines the world as a bunch of little marbles or as a wave continuum > > > or something. Still there is a description of a reality that allows > > > one to make predictions about future appearances - admittedly with > > > some uncertainty due to quantum mechanics. And these theories have > > > existential implications given our incarnate nature and the > > > possibility of death. > > > > Science does not lead to philosophical relativism and leaves open all > > > of the work necessary underneath the physical theories to determine > > > their meaning. The philosophical issues remain open to philosophical > > > inquiry and since the science is all based on observation the > > > uncertainty inherent in the process is always present. Those who > > > interpret scientific theory ontologically and state that scientific > > > law is true for all of the future and that scientific theories > > > determine all reality are making a simple non sequitor. They are > > > concluding that things will be as they have been. This conclusion is > > > justifiable scientifically (explicitly it is the assumption of > > > homogeneity of time) but is unfounded philosophically. In fact there > > > is the permanent possibility that future scientific experiment could > > > contradict current theory. They are also making another > > ... > > read more » --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/Minds-Eye?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
