I'll just wander on a bit. Those who reject a physicalist ontology of consciousness must find ways of modeling it as a nonphysical aspect of reality. Thus those who adopt a dualist or anti-physicalist metaphysical view must in the end provide specific models of consciousness different from the emergent models. Both substance dualists and property dualists must develop the details of their theories in ways that articulate the specific natures of the relevant non-physicals features of reality with which they equate consciousness or to which they appeal in order to explain it. There are many such models - no doubt Orn and Vam could explain some of the traditional ones.
I have lost interest, but was once concerned that an informational world might help in concepts in biology. Amongst philosophers, David Chalmers (1996) has offered an admittedly speculative version of panpsychism which appeals to the notion of information not only to explain psycho-physical invariances between phenomenal and physically realized information spaces but also to possibly explain the ontology of the physical as itself derived from the informational (a version of “it from bit” theory). Gregg Rosenberg has recently (2004) proposed an account of consciousness that simultaneously addresses the ultimate categorical basis of causal relations. In both the causal case and the conscious case, Rosenberg argues the relational-functional facts must ultimately depend upon a categorical non-relational base, and he offers a model according to which causal relations and qualitative phenomenal facts both depend upon the same base (this, as you can probably judge from the awkwardness of the language, is difficult stuff) . Some quantum theories treat consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality (Stapp 1993), and insofar as they do so, they might be plausibly classified as non-physical theories. The general response to Dennett has been to ask what he has developed a theory of (Block 1994). I take a fairly stolid view that evidence is what counts, but say this knowing a good theory will change what evidence is for real rather than through lies. Block, N. 1994. “What is Dennett's theory a theory of?” Philosophical Topics, 22/1-2: 23-40. Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stapp, H. 1993. Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Rosenberg, G. 2004. A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. New York: Oxford University Press. On 5 Sep, 16:29, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > That most of our knowledge is in memory at any particular time is a > given. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the degree to which > even our current conscious knowledge typically depends on memory. > Look at the sky and come to believe that the sunset is beautiful. This > is a newly formed belief about an event currently taking place (not I > can assure you round here - we haven't seen the sky for some time). > The justification of a current event is no doubt dependent on other > beliefs that you hold. For example, if you didn't at least tacitly > believe that you were looking west or that it is evening and not > morning, the belief wouldn't be justified (I assume that the > phenomenology of sunsets and sunrises is indistinguishable). Now I am > not, however, supposing that all knowledge of the external world is > inferential. Your belief that the sky is red might well be > epistemically basic. Nor am I insisting that your sunset belief is > psychologically inferential. My only claim here is that many > relatively simple beliefs we form about the external world typically > depend for their justification on background beliefs; and background > beliefs are memory beliefs. Virtually all of what we know (or are > justified in believing) at any given time resides in memory. > > Theories of consciousness are generally: > Metaphysical theories of consciousness - either - > Dualist theories or > Physicalist theories. > There are many variants of these. > > There are a number of specific theories of consciousness I am aware > of, generally - > Higher-order theories > Representational theories > Cognitive theories > Neural theories > Quantum theories > Nonphysical theories. > > I am yet to spot any practical work in this field that might help us > move on as a society. Davies, M. and Humphreys, G. 1993. > Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: > Blackwell might help if you want the punishment! > > What currently interests me is memory and why we have so little > justified knowing consciously involved in the current consciousness of > a decision (or at least its rationalisation). You could get the drift > from this: > > Me: Why are we at war in Afghanistan Prime Minister? > PM: To keep the streets of London safe my boy. > Me: I'm older than you, you patronising dirt bag, but leaving that > aside, it makes no sense to me to go an kill Afghans to keep the > streets of London safe. > PM: This is my profound judgement on the matter. > Me: When I am profound I can usually demonstrate my evidence to > others, why can't you? > PM: You have to trust me. Matters of national security are involved. > Me: As when we and the French got the Israelis to invade Egypt so we > could take over the whole middle east in a policing action in 1956 you > mean? Or as in the secret war we fought in Indonesia for 20 years? > Or as in pretending Iraq was full of WMDs? Or as in bumping off one > of our own scientists? Or as in the way you have set up all kinds of > bodies to find the positive and shut out real criticism across the > board? If we are winning this war why are we now blowing up our > precious helicopters so regularly? > PM: You should be proud to be British. Afghanistan was responsible > for 9/11. > Me: They were mostly Saudi. > > It would go on and on. What is this consciousness they can control? > > On 5 Sep, 15:50, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > The ultimate sum of the universe is often held to be zero. One also > > has the statistical zero of the vacuum hinting at massive energies > > 'elsewhere'. I share Justin's reservations about Dennet. In the > > detail of phenomenology (something most of us could get into) there is > > attention to 'the things themselves' (and in marxism too - > > methodologically). Science is phenomenological in my view, yet very > > few scientists are aware of the detailed explanations of what they > > do. One can do a lot of poking about as a technician without ever > > understanding what any of it means beyond the monthly pay cheque > > continuing to arrive. The old arguments are whether what we call > > consciousness is an emergent property of enough complexity in the > > organisation we call life, or sneaks in from another world (however we > > want to put this). Physics has lots of stuff being borrowed and lent > > to 'other worlds' these days. > > > On 5 Sep, 14:48, Justintruth <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > These experiments lend a lot of experimental support to > > > > > consciousness being primarily chemical and electrical. > > > > Actually they do not. > > > > They just lend a lot of experimental support to consciousness being > > > manipulate-able through chemical and electrical manipulation of ones > > > brain. > > > > But we already knew that. All it takes is to ingest a beer (or two), > > > or -and I am not an advocate- ingest some LSD, and you will know. But > > > even without the mind altering chemicals you need only understand the > > > laws of perspective and observe the fact that the point of view of > > > your consciousness is from your body. A little anatomy and you have > > > the role of the brain. This was known for a long time. Look at the > > > anatomy of the senses all of them tied by little wire-like structures > > > called nerves with signals on them the interruption of which > > > terminates the conscious experience of the connected transducing > > > sensor. Otherwise why wouldn't we believe that destroying ones eye > > > would cause deafness instead of blindness. > > > > None of that is even one shred of evidence for your mind being your > > > body... or, if you prefer to use that language... and say that your > > > mind is your body ... then you must be willing to reform the current > > > meaning of the phrase "your body" and therefore the meaning in physics > > > of matter ultimately needs to be reformed to include consciousness > > > unless you agree that "your body" is not material. Something has to > > > give somewhere. Either your mind is not your body, or your mind is > > > your body. If your mind is your body then either your body is physical > > > (made of matter) or it is not. If it is made of matter and your mind > > > is your body then matter is conscious and the laws of physics need to > > > incorporate that into their descriptions. Otherwise, if your body is > > > not solely material but your mind is still your body then there is > > > something non-material in your body that is your mind. Or else you can > > > say your mind is not your body and your body is material which is the > > > current method I think. > > > > Consciousness cannot properly be described as a "property" of matter > > > as it is not something essential but has an existential role for the > > > one who is conscious. It appears to be associated with specific > > > structural arrangements of matter and not the individual components > > > and dependent on the movement of the mechanism as well as its shape. > > > However, neurology has not yet nailed down the specifics completely > > > but is making fast progress. It will be very interesting when > > > neurology leads to technology and will be a major ethical challenge. > > > > What we know is that the arrangement of matter in the form of a > > > neurology results in reports of consciousness from others and an > > > experience of our own consciousness. This can be deduced from very > > > simple evidence independent of modern neurology which is currently > > > engaged in flushing out the details of the relationship. > > > > No doubt we will eventually understand the specific correlations and > > > what produces our own experience of Being and being conscious meaning > > > what the specific arrangements are and how they are tied to detailed > > > phenomenological descriptions of experience. This was what Husserl > > > wanted to do about hundred years ago. It will take a little more time > > > for the likes of Dennet to catch up. > > > > Perhaps then, we can even get a read on some of the problems like > > > Synchronicity and get a serious look at it scientifically. Perhaps > > > not. I suspect that our current world view will be very nearly > > > completely eliminated by the progress and the surety with which the > > > simple assumptions of our current thought are held will one day be > > > seen as, if not an unexplainable superstition or ignorance, like we > > > consider those who killed in Greece over arguments about whether the > > > number 0 existed, or else as a kind of arrogance that was prevalent in > > > history. > > > > Hell, the truth is Dennet is a provacateur not a philosopher. When you > > > look in detail at his position it evaporates and he is not at all > > > saying what he causes his audiences to believe that he is saying. > > > Check out Searle. Again, like Dennet he is not a heavy hitter > > > historically but he has Dennet in checkmate. > > > > On Sep 5, 8:01 am, sjewins <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Are you aware of Dr. Michael Persinger's experiments wherein he > > > > subjects the brain to focused electro-magnetic force and creates > > > > "spiritual" sensations in the subject? > > > > > He also has done experiments with focused applications of psychotropic > > > > drugs and generated "neuro-realities" in the consciousness of the > > > > subject. These experiments lend a lot of experimental support to > > > > consciousness being primarily chemical and electrical. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. 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