“…Machiavellian lying 'beats' a technology of truth that relies on openness. We have not developed the conditions for truth that do not give an 'enemy' advantages to beat us down rather than improve the general lot because we live in conditions in which knowledge is not power. This leads me to the sad conclusion that the problem is politics and not philosophy (or sociology, psychology or science).” – Archy
Yes, sadness is one aspect of disillusionment. And, at that point many of the illusions are lifted. Yes too to the fact that one must adapt to an environment…knowing who they are with. However, in the ultimate sense, knowledge IS power. Perhaps not in the Machiavellian way, unless one includes the art of propaganda and other methods of manufacturing consent, which itself includes philosophy, sociology, psychology and science. Justin has it right when it is said that we will fight if only for the duty of it. At a specific level, ones ethos just changes and becomes adamantine. In ritual, the specific time of the war between light and dark has been passed on for millennia. This is a science all of its own. On Sep 6, 6:05 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > A delight to read you Justin. I am out of my depth in philosophy as a > professional subject, much as I would be in maths outside business > teaching these days. Originality might not be where we need to go - > if they'll forgive me I tend to see Orn and Vam as 'original enough' > when they insist on trying to make sense of our own experience, or you > and Francis in 'clarifying mode' - in another way Molly in 'embracing' > something positive when perhaps I have collapsed a bit - there is > something original in being reminded there may be something worthwhile > at what we might call 'points of exhaustion'. > We may well be living in a shadow world of four dimensions of space > and two of time (whatever) and on the point of developing new sensing. > > I rather like the idea that our existing history of 'legitimation' has > collapsed (Lyotard's postmodernism) - but I also feel that we have > developed chronic forms of legitimation in our practical dialogues - > wealth creation is surely now the sacred cow, more securely embedded > in our general-social rationalisations than ever. Lyotard said 'over- > simplifying to the extreme postmodernism is incredulity towards > metanarratives' - the 'over-simplifying to the extreme' was instantly > forgotten. I'll have to miss out the argument here, but I tend to > conclude that the problem in originality for philosophy relates to the > ease with which we can be critical and show problems remain to be > resolved against a desire for certainty and a lust for easy > legitimation more generally. This is all wrapped up in much of the > evidence we would need for fair dialogue being hidden (reasons of > national security and all that jazz). Machiavellian lying 'beats' a > technology of truth that relies on openness. We have not developed > the conditions for truth that do not give an 'enemy' advantages to > beat us down rather than improve the general lot because we live in > conditions in which knowledge is not power. This leads me to the sad > conclusion that the problem is politics and not philosophy (or > sociology, psychology or science). > > The issue is presumably about how to develop arguments that do not > leave people behind to return to what is easy enough for them to > 'chew'. The answer for most philosophers is just to write for those > who are not easily left behind, and leave the real questions alone > (how we don't just form another professional interest group being a > big one). I can point to where I think the professional advances are > being made - but I conclude these are not advances but new esoteric > fashions that neglect the legitimation technology we need to move to > an original state. > > On 6 Sep, 21:54, Justintruth <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > ....Those who reject a physicalist ontology of > > > > consciousness must find ways of modeling it as a nonphysical aspect of > > > reality. Thus those who adopt a dualist or anti-physicalist > > > metaphysical view must in the end provide specific models of > > > consciousness different from the emergent models. > > > Actually this can be false if one realizes that consciousness need not > > be modeled - indeed must not be modeled - as entitative - if it is to > > be correctly understood. Consciousness is not an example of something. > > It isn't something. It is existential not essential. > > > So it comes down to what the word "model" means. If by that you mean > > an entitative description of something that exists "in the world" then > > I think that no specific model will ever be found for consciousness > > and that having one, or attempting to find one, would be distortive. > > Of course you have said modeled "as an aspect of reality" which is not > > limited to presence in nature, so maybe your use of the word is > > actually correct. I tend to think of "modeling" as "objectification" > > and subsequent determination of the rules of objective interaction > > instead of phenomenological or metaphysical description. But maybe > > that is wrong. I am not sure why I think the word "model" need be used > > that way. Perhaps because it implies the separation of what is meant > > from the meaning itself? > > > I am not saying that "consciousness" does not have a meaning that it > > cannot be understood and that the word does not have a meaning. > > However this meaning ultimately is existential. And that means it is > > at that nexus where meaning and what is meant are not distinct. Your > > post is fascinating that is for sure. > > > It also does not mean that the content of consciousness and the > > sequence of experiences that one has, or potentially can have, cannot > > be mapped onto a physical structure and then, by predicting the > > physical future via physical theory and doing the inverse map we can > > then even determine what the content of the future consciousness will > > be. Nor does it mean that "killing" does not "cause" "death" and sex > > does not "cause" "life" - and both sex and killing are ultimately > > physical acts. (Interesting that one is considered "ethical" and the > > other not) > > > But this is no great insight and is not in the least dependent on > > neurology. One can already do this based on simple object models. For > > example just look down at the current computer screen and you can > > predict to a large extent what you will experience if you shut the > > computer off. You can also predict, - not advocating it however ;) - > > that if you were to remove your eyeballs that you would be what is > > called "blind". There are a host of other conclusions that we have > > made for years. Way before neurology ever entered the picture people > > who were called "crazy" were called "sick in the head". Now they are > > just more detailed. For example I don't think it has been long that > > people have know that the back of the head is particularly relevant > > for vision and I am sure currently they have a lot of the processing > > mapped out. > > > Both substance > > > > dualists and property dualists must develop the details of their > > > theories in ways that articulate the specific natures of the relevant > > > non-physicals features of reality with which they equate consciousness > > > or to which they appeal in order to explain it. > > > You have to be careful. You are assuming that consciousness has a > > nature. That can mean that conscious is natural. It actually is not > > natural. It is existential. To put it another way, consciousness is > > never positionally conscious of itself. To paraphrase Sartre > > consciousness is always a non posititional (or non - thetic) > > consiousness (of) itself else it would be an unconsciousness. But this > > does not imply that consciousness can ever be thetically conscious of > > itself (or of anothers consciousness). It is sort of like > > consciousness will be as a mirror reflecting into a mirror if it ever > > were to attempt to become conscious of itself and there would be no > > content. > > > Now this all presupposes that consciousness experiences itself as an > > it-self. There are experiences in which the notion of separation of > > self from the experienced goes away and there is then an experience in > > which consciousness is what it experiences, or better experiences > > being what it experiences, or even better experiences being > > experience, or even better experiences being, or to put it as best I > > can experiences Being, or realizes Being Being, or Is the realization > > of Being Being (obviously struggling for the phrase here maybe becomes > > Experiencing Experiencing Experiencing? - where the first > > "Experiencing" is nominative, the second, verbal, and the last > > directly objective but in which the meaning of these categories have > > completely broken down and one sees their essential unity in the true > > meaning of Being - sorry - best I can do - maybe Vam can help or maybe > > Molly can help). These experiences are foundational for a true > > understanding of the meaning of consciousness itself, its existential > > nature, and at the same instant foundational for the meaning of all > > Being to include objective being and in particular material objective > > being or matter as described by physics. > > > Rosenberg argues the relational-functional facts must > > > > ultimately depend upon a categorical non-relational base, and he > > > offers a model according to which causal relations and qualitative > > > phenomenal facts both depend upon the same base (this, as you can > > > probably judge from the awkwardness of the language, is difficult > > > stuff) > > > Wow. Definitely will be checking this out. Thanks! > > > . Some quantum theories treat consciousness as a fundamental > > > > feature of reality (Stapp 1993), and insofar as they do so, they might > > > be plausibly classified as non-physical theories. The general > > > response to Dennett has been to ask what he has developed a theory of > > > (Block 1994). > > > Thanks again! Block?! Wow... Thanks. > > > Do you know of any contemporary living philosopher who is - making > > progress is probably the wrong word but - lets say doing original > > work?- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/minds-eye?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
