Exercising the reader's intuition does not lead to more power but describes an accelerated decomposition process - is that what you are saying?
On Sat, Nov 5, 2011 at 5:12 PM, James Lynch <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, Nov 2, 2011 at 3:38 PM, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > The question why knowledge is distinctively valuable has an important > > historical precedent in Plato's Meno in which Socrates raises the > > question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. > > Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of > > more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference > > in value, but, as Socrates notes, this claim is far from obvious on > > closer inspection. After all, a true belief about the correct way to > > Larissa is surely of just as much practical use as knowledge of the > > way to Larissa—both will get us to our destination. Given that we > > clearly do value knowledge more than mere true belief, the fact that > > there is no obvious explanation of why this should be so creates a > > problem. We will call the issue of why knowledge is more valuable than > > mere true belief, the Meno problem. > > > > You can get the rest here - > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ > > > > I somehow doubt I will be causing much mouse clicking in posting the > > link! > > I did some work on knowledge justification and value whilst > > bored out of my tree, recovering from a serious injury. I was > > discovering most of academic study is 'witterpiss for wuckfits' at the > > time. There's a big snag in the Meno problem in that it restricts us > > to argument not much informed by science. We could sit down all day > > trying to define knowledge, which might be nice under the Greek sun > > with some Rakis, local beer and imported coffee. No one has defined > > knowledge - rather as we don't have a precise decimal for pi. There > > are, of course, many definitions. > > Knowledge is power, right? > > I object to some attempts to create an atomic image of knowledge, it > is a handy word we have to represent a multidimensional landscape, not > at all a map though inspection can turn up markers to gain > orientation, direction. I found most of that article an endurance > exercise, maybe I was tired last night or my right-brain cringing, it > seemed to take a very long time for the discussion to even scrape the > surface of my first intuitive inclinations (Craig's > historical-adaptation perspective, pluralism). Caveat the strictures > of educational institutions, whatever they were, it read more as an > assignment than my liking. > > Outside of the processes for learning and teaching, acquisition, > refinement and transmission of human comprehension I am not sure there > is so much an independent value to knowledge other than we have > developed a rightly firm orientation. To me it is a powerful > adaptation to our environment, an environment that rewards > comprehension with success, it seems a slight advancement over the > process of gene survival albeit highly accelerated. It exists in the > domain of meta I think, as good faith representations (Baudrillards > first order simulacra) of observed phenomena. There is no fundamental > unit, no perfection, but stringent natural processes built on the > tools and faculties > > Knowledge is not a lucky cup of coffee, neither is a lucky cup of > coffee as valuable as a malfunctional coffee maker. Without reference > these entities simply do not exist, what point would there be to > immaculately produce an entity devoid of reference to any antecedent > causes, purpose, or function and then place values on it presto-magic! > The result is what I think the logical positivist would call 'lacking > in cognitive content', by eliminating reality and dealing entirely in > symbols we are in the domain of third order simulacra, without meaning > (and what is that knowledge), vacuous, unverifiable. > > Just my irritability speaking- that doesn't mean that the desire to > comprehend these things is without value, I just think it is mostly an > exercise presented in a way that is difficult to derive meaning from > and left mostly to the reader's intuition. > > > > > There are lots of teasers like this in philosophy. My take on this > > is : > > 1.there are some things I believe true and have tested scientifically > > or in mathematical proof - these I trust as knowledge > > 2. there are some things I think true and can't do the above with. > > 3. etc. etc. on what I consider reliable or barking. > > > > we worry too much about this kind of stuff and not enough about the > > issues of the condition of ignorance. > > > is a story of accelerated decomposition >
