On Monday 20 June 2005 12:33 am, Chris Zakelj wrote: > Dave Feustel wrote: > > >I thought you had more insight. All of OpenBSD's security is at risk with > >this technology. > > > The security features of an OS will not stop a physical attack, no > matter how well designed. This is no different than the admin leaving > root's password on a post-it note stuck to the underside of the file > drawer. If you don't trust your physical environment, change it. In > this case, I'd remove the 'secure' flag from ttyCn, and use either a > serial console or SSH in from a keyboard I trusted (by buying it myself > from a retailer, and using appropriate tamper-evident tape).
If you read the FAQ carefully you would note that the keylogger chip is now being installed in oem equipment for the company marketing the keyboard. Buying a unit off the shelf does not guarantee that there is no keylogger chip installed in the keyboard.
