On Wed, Apr 14, 1999, Matthias Loepfe wrote:
> A renegotiation only happens if:
>
> 1.) if current cipher is not contained in the new cipher list
> 2.) if current cert chain length is longer than the verify depth
> 3.) if verify client is required and no peer cert is available
> 4.) ....
Ok, I've though about this now again and think your suggestions are ok, but
technically read the following for mod_ssl:
A renegotiation _has_ to be performed...
o If the currently active cipher is not contained in the
reconfigured/new cipher suite.
o If the currently active verify type is less (strong) than
the reconfigured/new verify type
(order is: none < optional_no_ca < optional < require)
o If the currently active verify depth is greater than the
reconfigured/new verify depth.
Additionally the following optimization is possible: When the currently active
verify type is "none" but a client certificate is already known/present, it's
enough to manually force a client verification but skip the renegotation
handshake itself.
Is this optimized approach still secure?
Ralf S. Engelschall
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.engelschall.com
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