Hi Ron --
In clarifying my comment on Pirsig to Jos, I defined "dynamic" as change or transition, and "static" as constant and unchanging. Apparently, you have a different interpretation of SQ. [Ron]: > Interesting, I did not perceive Pirsig as stating this in his > ontology. I had the impression that Pirsig was stating that > all existence is dynamic. What we perceive as physical reality > are the more static patterns of dynamic quality (that which > changes slower and may be perceived) for there are no true > constants and thus there is nothing which is immutable or > absolute. > > I think you are interpreting MOQ. DQ and SQ dualistically. > Your logic and your ontology seems of a dualistic nature > for it rests on the tension of opposites. > When MOQ is interpreted in this light it does not work logically > by those standards. My impression was that RMP was > dropping opposites for patterns of value. Yes, my ontology is dualistic, but not in the way your conception of the MOQ describes it. Ontology concerns the nature of being, therefore applies only to existence. The essentialist ontology is a dichotomy of two mutually exclusive but dependent contingents: proprietary sensibility (individual awareness) and otherness (being). Neither of these contingents is integral to Essence, nor is Essence itself a duality. Since there are very few definitive statements in Pirsig's philosophy, it is really inferences or implications that we are debating. You are saying that a "static pattern" is NOT static but only "changes slower" than dynamic quality. From that definition I gather that you understand DQ as a state or mode of high-velocity (perhaps ultra-high frequency?) transition. I recall reading somewhere that movement (acceleration and velocity) is always measured against something else, which makes it relational. Such an ontology would seem to be based on a duality of relatively slow versus relatively fast patterns. How, then, could Pirsig be "dropping opposites for patterns of value"? Where has he made such an assertion? There are many energy patterns -- molecular motion, for example, or X-rays -- that are beyond our natural range of perception. Yet, they are phenomena of our physical world. How do you distinguish such phenomena from DQ? Or are they one and the same in your view? Your statement that "there are no true constants and thus there is nothing which is immutable or absolute" confirms my contention that the MOQ does not acknowledge a primary source. In fact, it never gets beyond the physical world. And without that perspective, it is incapable of providing meaning or purpose to existence relative to an uncreated source. Thanks for defining your conception of the MOQ ontology, Ron. I found it quite interesting. Regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
