I wrote on Jan.13:
" Pirsig is quite right when he says that Science
is unconcerned with social
> values and morals. What I fail to see is what's so
bad about it. I am quite happy
> that present day scientists recognize that
limitation. Our civilization paid a dire
> price when, in the past, Science presumed to have
answers for everything,
> including even the existence of God and of the soul.
Just to recall a couple:
> Aryan race supremacy and the morality that sprung
from it, had a
> (pseudo)scientific basis, so did the notion that men
are more intelligent than
> women. In my opinion, the farther we keep Science
away from morality, or Art or
> Religion, the better for all concerned.
>
> I don't think that this is an attitude peculiar
to scientists. Are artists
> uncomfortable about Art having nothing to say about
morality or about the creation
> of the universe? Are truly religious people
uncomfortable because their religion
> is unconcerned about unveiling the secrets of the
atom?. This does not mean in the
> least that scientists or artists are are unmoral,
not even amoral, they are as
> concerned about right and wrong as the man next
door; perhaps, more perplexed,
> but as concerned."
=======
On which Platt commented on Jan 14:
I may be wrong but aren't you assuming in the above
comments that morality is
about human behavior in a social setting? Pirsig's
whole point is that
morality extends far beyond just it's familiar social
context into all aspects
of experience. So an artist is being moral in choosing
what note to place next
is his composition, and a scientist is being being
moral in choosing
to study the atom rather than the sex life of queen
bees. In other words, the
whole world consists of a jillion decisions of this
being better than that, from
the crowing of a rooster to getting out of bed in the
morning -- all moral
decisions. These have led to the creation of thousands
of static moral patterns
that stay the same year after year, especially at the
inorganic and biological
levels. Or so says the MOQ as I understand it.
======
My comments on Platt's digest above:
Not quite sure but I'd answer: Yes, I am assuming
that morality is about human behavior in a social
setting". My "not quite sure" stems from what I said
in my first digest of our exchange of views: Mine is
an acute case of Moral Perplexity and, if there's
something in this world I'm quite unsure of, it is
Morality. So, instead of putting forward my point of
view, I'd like to argue on the lines of J.M. Brennan,
a British philosopher, whose writings on Morals make
sense to me.
Suppose I want to buy me a new bike but I'm not
sure if I should. I may be not sure if I should buy it
because I may think that my old bike could last some
more years and, also, because "they don't make bikes
as good in these days" . Since I am not sure, I'd
ask for advice, in this case, from a friend who knows
a lot about bikes. This doubt or dilemma of mine is
what Brennan calls a 'technical' question and, as such
will be answered by my friend in strictly technical
terms. Nothing at all to do with morality.
It could be though that I'm not sure about
buying a new bike because there's a number of poor
children in my street that cannot afford even an old
one. May be, instead of self-satisfying my needs, I
could use the money for buying some old bikes for some
of those children? Faced with this dilemma I wouldn't
seek advice from the said friend; I would ask the
local priest for advice or, if I don't trust priests,
go to the local library and seek guidance from the
various treatises on Ethics and Morality shelved
there. This because now it's not a technical question
but a moral one; moral, because I think that my buying
or not buying may affect the welfare or wellbeing of
others than me.
Who decides, in the bike example, whether my
doubts are of a technical or a moral character? Only
me; if I don't put forward a moral question there's no
moral dilemma. The example of the bike is rather
innocuous because society at large might not be much
concerned about my indulging in a new bike or not.
But, although innocuous, it is of the same character
of your example about a scientist doubtful about
whether to investigate the atom or the sex life of
bees. As long as she doesn't ask herself a moral
question there's no moral dilemma involved.
But what about a scientist trying to decide
whether or not to pursue her research on some lethal
microorganism, knowing quite well that her findings
may be used for biological warfare? Even if she
doesn't pose herself a moral question and only cares
about her salary, the society in which she lives may
well pose moral questions about her research.
In the case of an individual asking herself a
moral question or, if not asking, when the society
poses that question to her, it looks to me that both
look like "a problem of individual behavior in a
social setting". I hope, Platt, that this answers your
question about my view on morals.
The point I've been trying to stress though in
former digests is that the argument between
alternative
human actions and the norms of the social setting is
not within the area of concern of Science. Our
scientist could argue that her research is vital for
the understanding the effect of tittivuluesterase, the
social setting may counter-argue that biological
weapons are not fair play in war. Science as such is
impotent faced with this argument, it has no tools or
methods for contrasting the value of further knowledge
on enzymes with the value of human lives or war
ethics.
As I've been saying in my later Posts the
farther we keep Science away from Morality, the better
for all of us. And I also have been saying that a
Science unconcerned with morals does not imply that
scientists, as human beings, should be unconcerned. It
is within this context that I'm rather uneasy with
Platt's "jillion of decisions about this being better
than that, being all moral decisions" . This because,
if "technical decisions" in Brennan's sense, that is
decisions about artistic, medical, engineering issues,
are all moral decisions, morality may be lost in the
struggle of conflicting values. IMHO, "this being
better than that" cannot be the sole guideline for
moral judgments. What of an engineer claiming that
building a pipeline through some particular route "is
better than" building it through another even if "the
better" route traverses a wildlife reserve? What of an
economist claiming that private prisons are "better
than" State ones, because they are cheaper to run?
With all the shortcomings of the social setting's
pronouncing of moral judgments, I'd rather leave them
there than in the hands of individuals of the various
professions whose interests are perforce narrower than
those of the society at large. It may look a bit like
a slogan but I can't resist it : "Thinking that
everything is moral may well lead to think that
nothing is unmoral". Hence my uneasiness about using
"this being better than that" as a supreme criterion
for distinguishing good from evil.
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