Jorge (Marsha and Platt mentioned) On 27 Jan. you wrote:
> Thanks very much Steve for your answer to my question --Is there > anyone that contends that "the lines between levels" are not fuzzy > boundaries? -- I'd like to comment on the paragraphs from Pirsig that > you quote. I assume that the matter in question has been exhaustively > debated here and I apologize if I am repeating arguments which others > may have already presented. These things have certainly been discussed before, but not as academically and thoroughly as this, I'm deeply impressed. I can't go through all your well laid out quotes and comments, but will only use your final paragraph (after having read it all): > What if someone finds patterns that share some properties with the > members of one level and other properties with the members of another > level? Some pattern that is inorganic in some features but biological in > others? Or, more generally, what if the separations between the four > levels were fuzzy boundaries? Would that be threatening to the MOQ? > I'm posing this as questions because, given my ignorance of MOQ, I don't > feel myself qualified to answer them. If I could get hold of the earliest entries to the Lila Squad discussion I would be able to document that I spoke of fuzzy lines between the levels from the start. For instance the virus that no one knows is life or not, but I don't think this pulls the rug from under the MOQ, it's a MOQ tenet that a dynamic pattern of the lower level became the building block of the upper, and also that the first pattern of the next level "was in the service of" its parent until it "took off on a purpose of its own". For instance; intellect (the first sciences) was a social asset until it turned against its social parent and undermined the myths and religions. But I don't think this is your "axe"? You speak of "patterns that share some properties with the members of one level and other properties ...etc." something I have problems with understanding. An organism is a biological pattern, the fact that it is made up of matter does not mean that it shares some properties with the inorganic level. This goes for the human beings who are social level members, this level has nothing to do with the biological body or the body's inorganic matter. When it comes to the intellectual level the same logic applies. I can't find one example that throws spanners in this works, but you may have some that I haven't thought of. Regarding. Pirsig's: > "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided > into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social > patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all > there are." You may have noticed my thesis that the MOQ itself can't be an intellectual pattern because intellect is a MOQ "pattern". This some of the moqsayers object to, but I see it as self-evident. The system itself isn't part of its sub-sets follows from Godel's Incomplete theorem that no system can be totally closed. Much like the assertions that a mystic can circumvent language. Look to Platt's for Marsha Platt: > True, except the words required for Pirsig to communicate his belief, and > the leap of faith to accept his view that sitting on a hot stove has > something to do with morals. Bo Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
