Matt: I'm not sure I quite understand your line of thinking here. For one, I'm not quite clear on whether you're challenging something I said.
But with respect to the examples you forwarded, those are prime examples of why correctness doesn't seem to apply with vocabulary shifts. The only reason we suspect that the universe is non-Euclidean is because Riemannian geometry seems to work better with Einstein--it is more useful. Likewise, it would be just weird to say Newtonian physics isn't incorrect, but is rather not as useful for stuff that's really small or going really fast. I think Pirsig was right when he said that, when discussing vocabulary shifts, like that between his SOM and MoQ or between Einstein and Newton, saying one was correct while the other not is like saying that polar coordinates are correct and rectangular not. Now, it kind of seems like I was just repeating what you said, so I'm not quite sure in what manner you were responding to me. Why does usefulness trouble you? [Krimel] My point here is the Newtonian physics, which also uses non-Euclidian geometry, seems to be "correct" that is it is most useful to the community of astrophysicist. This is the community that requires the greatest precision in their work and to whom the rest of us would be most likely to defer to in judging the correctness of such things. Astrophysicist are saying that Newton and Euclid were incorrect. And yet most other communities knowingly continue to use Newton and Euclid because they are more useful to us. We know they are not true. They are not correct but they are "true enough." They are falsehoods that are useful. My point is that usefulness may be a fine criterion for "true enough" but it is useless as a criterion for correctness or anything like correctness. Or take Dennett's intentional stance which gives us a useful vocabulary and is a useful way to think. I frequently talking about my computer thinking or doing what it damn well pleases. This vocabulary proved very useful but I know it is incorrect. If what you are saying is usefulness is a good excuse to continue doing what we are doing and that wed continue to do what we do because it is useful to do so. Well fine I suppose but doesn't that render correctness or truth in any sense meaningless? Matt: On Hume, I'm thinking of Hume's analysis of causation in particular. Hume's problem was that if we take seriously the idea that we only get knowledge from the senses, then we have no knowledge of causation because we don't sense it: we only sense rock-at-point-A, rock-at-point-B, rock-at-point-C, our head bleeding, etc., but not the causation, which itself would seem to be needed to connect up rock-at-point-A to being in Person A's hand to our head bleeding, thus establishing responsibility. Pirsig does a good job of describing this kind of reading of Hume's relation to Kant in ZMM (end of Ch. 11). It involves a particular understanding of both "empirical" and "reason," one that isn't required of empiricism as a living philosophical tradition (so I wouldn't say Hume "threatened" empiricism, just showed up some of its early hang-ups, namely epistemology). [Krimel] I always enjoy your historical dashes through history and even agree up to a point. Still I think that certainly by the time we get to William James philosophy has less and less useful to add to empiricism or as you say epistemology. James marks the beginning of the science of psychology and particularly with Wundt and the introduction psychophysics, people began to ask what it means to sense something. What are the limits of sensory perception? How does this actually work? And like natural philosophy gave up any relevance in the face of Newton. Empiricism and epistemology became increasing the subjects of scientific scrutiny. In fact I think a good case can be made that what Hume and Locke and even Kant were doing was issuing philosophical responses to what Newton and his ilk had rendered a fait accompli. It was as you say the common sense victory of empiricism on the heels of a fully functioning scientific method. To that extent the philosophers of the 1700 and 1800s were following in the footsteps of the Greek philosophers who were responding to the powerful ideas generated by the Greek mathematicians. Philosophy is always playing catch up in this respect. In this light it seems to me that philosophy is the tail that almost never wags the dog. It is always going about the business of restructuring its houses of cards after the latest scientific storm passes through. It is like religion in this sense. After all isn't the current line of indignation among theologians and philosophers of science all about how uppity the scientists are? How often do we hear knowing throats clearing as they tell us that maybe science can tell us what is but not what ought to be, or how pretty it is... Within psychology for example the behaviorist were heavily influenced by the logical positivists and forced themselves to stop making rationalist statements that could not be verified. They demanded operational definitions for the terms they used and turned up their noses at fuzzy thinking period. Sure they went overboard and they may have pushed the pendulum a bit too far but they discovered laws of behavior. They created a technology of behavior modification that works on animals and people both as individuals and in groups. It dominated the study of human behavior for 50 years and is still a major force in its various modified incarnations. With the cognitive revolution that expanded the behaviorist program, scientists and philosophers began in earnest the process of reverse engineering the "mind". Philosophers are playing an important role and there is considerable controversy brewing among Searle, Dennett and Peter Hacker about the use and meaning for terminology in the neurosciences. I am not sure how that debate shakes out in terms of rationalism/empiricism but I tend to assume that rationalism has pretty much burned itself out and that most folks are really tired of arguing over the meaning of words. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
