Hey Krimel, Krimel said: My point here is the Newtonian physics, which also uses non-Euclidian geometry, seems to be "correct" that is it is most useful to the community of astrophysicist. This is the community that requires the greatest precision in their work and to whom the rest of us would be most likely to defer to in judging the correctness of such things. Astrophysicist are saying that Newton and Euclid were incorrect.
And yet most other communities knowingly continue to use Newton and Euclid because they are more useful to us. We know they are not true. They are not correct but they are "true enough." They are falsehoods that are useful. My point is that usefulness may be a fine criterion for "true enough" but it is useless as a criterion for correctness or anything like correctness. Or take Dennett's intentional stance which gives us a useful vocabulary and is a useful way to think. I frequently talking about my computer thinking or doing what it damn well pleases. This vocabulary proved very useful but I know it is incorrect. If what you are saying is usefulness is a good excuse to continue doing what we are doing and that wed continue to do what we do because it is useful to do so. Well fine I suppose but doesn't that render correctness or truth in any sense meaningless? Matt: No, I don't think it does. The first thing to notice is that you've already relativized correctness to what a particular community says it is. If you concede this contextualist point, then you've already gone a long ways down the pragmatist path which sees truth as unchanging, but the only path to truth being justification in the face of a community of inquirers. Truth is absolute, but justification is relative. As physics has continued on its merry way into investigation into the very small and very fast, we've begun to see a slippage in the concepts we used to wield with impunity. In older, simpler times, the correct was by definition more useful. But as communities of specialists arose, communities of inquirers who are stipulated to be on different footing from "common inquirers," i.e. laypersons, as specialism arose, there began the slippage: laypeople are behind the cutting edge of the specialists. As laypeople struggled to change their collective common sense (a very slow cultural process of evolution that functions more on the death of old members than on active persuasion), specialists kept updating their models, kept moving forward with their inquiries and coming up with newer "truth." This new stuff began to become more and more sophisticated at faster and faster rates, becoming more and more different than the lagging common sense. Coming up with new "unchanging, absolute truth" is a scandal for another time. I want to use the above, tall-tale genealogy to suggest that the slippage between the correct and useful is simply because laypeople haven't learned to speak like astrophysicists. And besides time-lag, there are several other things that stymie the rise of this new common sense. One, Newtonian common sense still works perfectly well for middle-sized things moving at middle-sized speeds. Two, the massive overhaul to our linguistic habits, from moving to talk about "clouds of electrons" instead of "tables," almost certifies we'll never stop talking about tables. After all, astrophysicists themselves still talk about point mass, tables, and the sun rising, despite the fact that we've known for several centuries that the earth goes round the sun. I don't think this does anything to correctness or truth. First of all, I didn't really notice fully till now, but you've been taking me as suggesting that usefulness is a criterion for correctness. This isn't true, and I'm not sure I ever suggested that. I should've caught that earlier, so let me try and be clearer now. Equating the two indeed doesn't make sense given the cases of physics and common sense (amongst much else), though it is essentially what the early pragmatists made the mistake of suggesting on occasion, which earned them much ridicule. On the other side of a century from James, we've learned that, yes, it doesn't make much sense to say "true for you, but not for me." However, justification is a whole different story, and as it happens the routes of justification are the only routes to truth. The relativity of justification, so we've learned with hindsight, is what the classical pragmatists were really talking about. What I've been trying to suggest about correctness and usefulness is that the concept of correctness only becomes applicable (one could say, "useful") if there are agreed-upon criteria available for settling dispute. For instance, "Is there a rock outside?" We typically don't make them explicit, or call them criteria, but we all agree instinctively that if someone looks outside, that will settle the issue in most cases (not all cases, like the case of the known liar). Now, the trouble with very different vocabularies, for instance the difference between astrophysic-speak and common sense, is that they both seem to have different criteria for settling similar disputes. So what are the criteria for deciding which vocabulary you are using? If you argue about which language-with-built-in-criteria to use, what language-with-built-in-criteria do you use to settle that dispute? On my stolen reading of the history of philosophy, Platonism was the search for a language-with-built-in-criteria that would be able to settle disputes about which language to use when and where. It is why Kant thought of philosophy as the queen of the sciences. Without that super-language, however, all we have is what the Greeks called phronesis, the practical muddling through, the exchange of reasons, which is usually about the relative utility of your way of going about things in this particular situation. When I'm at home, "tables" always wins over "clouds of electrons." But at the lab, that's another story. So I suppose, I might have been saying that usefulness is the (amorphous) criterion for whose criteria of correctness we are going to use. And I'm not sure that's such a bad thing to say. Krimel said: I always enjoy your historical dashes through history and even agree up to a point. Still I think that certainly by the time we get to William James philosophy has less and less useful to add to empiricism or as you say epistemology. James marks the beginning of the science of psychology and particularly with Wundt and the introduction psychophysics, people began to ask what it means to sense something. What are the limits of sensory perception? How does this actually work? And like natural philosophy gave up any relevance in the face of Newton. Empiricism and epistemology became increasing the subjects of scientific scrutiny. Matt: I think we may agree more than not on the overall pattern. I think the above is a pretty good explanation, but I hesitate to use "empiricism" and "epistemology" as designations of positions or subjects that anybody but philosophers use. On the one hand, you can catch me saying things like, "empiricism had become common sense," but on the other hand, I don't want to say that laypeople had become empiricists. This has to do with the fact that I just don't think it is wise to impute to people a whole host of beliefs that, I think at least, are only induced after one has taken a few philosophy classes. You only identify as an "empiricist" if you've come to think there's a reason to do so, and most of those reasons are fairly remote from most people's lives. I think for the most part you could convince a new friend at a bar that they are an empiricist, after explaining the kind of stuff it entails (which should be easy, since it is mostly common sense), but the end of the conversation would be probably, "Yeah, alright, fine. I'm an empiricist! [roll of the eyes] Can we talk about football now?" And then they'd never think of it ever again. So, in the case of empiricism, the question for philosophers was increasingly, "Why is it important that we keep calling ourselves empiricists?" There had to be something pernicious that they were opposed to, but the more it became common sense, the less need there was to identify as one, because the question was increasingly, "Yeah, as opposed to what?" What is empiricism if it is philosophy, as opposed to just common sense? Even up to now, you can find answers, but all of them have to do with a subject called "epistemology." And on this, I have to demur on saying that epistemology is a subject of scientific scrutiny. For one, I again think it is too fancy a word for laypeople and we should just reserve it for philosophers. But two, and more importantly, if epistemology is something like "the study of knowledge," then only under a very loose sense of "science" does science increasingly come to occupy the length and breadth of knowledge. I think it would warp our linguistic habits far too much to deny something called "ethical knowledge," to never again say, "Yes, I knew it was bad." I think the question philosophers faced was, "Well, if science is really good at dealing with nature, telling us what we know about it and all that, then what are _we_ going to tell people about? What do we know?" After Kant, philosophers went into the business of knowing about "knowing," which is epistemology, and I don't think there's a whole lot that is too interesting to be said about it, but it is what keeps driving most philosophy and it is why empiricism doesn't die. If empiricism is common sense, then what is it to be a philosophical empiricist? Why keep repeating it? Only to ward off Descartes? Empiricism won't die because it is still needed as an antidote to something. Indeed, some, including me, think that empiricism is a self-stoking fire because it only behooves you to identify as an empiricist to stave off unrepentant rationalists, but that involves taking seriously the subject of epistemology, and by doing that you've already committed yourself to the assumptions--reason as a distinct faculty--that keeps rationalism alive. In other words, the only way to kill rationalism properly is to kill empiricism, too. More words: empiricism has been involved in a purifying process, slowly eliminating the bad bits, working out all the kinks. And at the end of the line, empiricism will have purified itself out of existence. Which I think is only proper if philosophy is a critical tool applied to culture: philosophy gloms onto whatever is going on in society and keeps nudging common sense until there's no reason to nudge anymore. I agree absolutely with you and Dewey that "Philosophy is always playing catch up in this respect." That's essentially what Hegel meant with his dark saying "When philosophy paints its gray in gray, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's gray in gray it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk." Philosophy isn't the vanguard of culture. Philosophy is a gadfly, playing its part in nudging it forward, but not at the front as it has always thought of itself. But I would be more expansive than saying, as you did, that philosophy "is always going about the business of restructuring its houses of cards after the latest scientific storm passes through." There is much more going on in the world to glom onto and explain than just science. I don't think it takes a knowing throat at all to make the clearing noise meant to put scientists back in the lab. Most people can do it, and I think do it rightfully. I have no idea what guys like Pinker and Wilson think they are going to tell us about how we should live our lives, but I do know that when they open their mouths about it, they've relinquished their authority as scientists qua scientists, and have come down to the level we are all at, all of us "culture suggesters." This isn't to deny that the perspective of scientists as scientists won't have something to add to the conversation, but it is to say that their card doesn't have the trumping power they are so used to it having in other fields of inquiry. When talking about life in general, it is all phronesis, a muddling through as the best we can, and all of us are for the most part on equal footing, persons as persons. All of what I'm talking about may seem like "arguing over the meaning of words," which you seem to evince some fatigue with, but I've come to the point where there's no such thing as a "meaning" that does not impact life. We can, of course, make a very simple distinction between meanings and disputes that seem to have very little impact on anything most people consider important (we call this "scholasticism" in philosophy, in honor of the apocryphal period in philosophy in which we argued over the number of angels that would fit on a pinhead) and meanings and disputes that do, that are important, but haggling over what the hell our words mean will always be part of the process. Matt > [Krimel] > I always enjoy your historical dashes through history and even agree up to a > point. Still I think that certainly by the time we get to William James > philosophy has less and less useful to add to empiricism or as you say > epistemology. James marks the beginning of the science of psychology and > particularly with Wundt and the introduction psychophysics, people began to > ask what it means to sense something. What are the limits of sensory > perception? How does this actually work? And like natural philosophy gave up > any relevance in the face of Newton. Empiricism and epistemology became > increasing the subjects of scientific scrutiny. > > In fact I think a good case can be made that what Hume and Locke and even > Kant were doing was issuing philosophical responses to what Newton and his > ilk had rendered a fait accompli. It was as you say the common sense victory > of empiricism on the heels of a fully functioning scientific method. To that > extent the philosophers of the 1700 and 1800s were following in the > footsteps of the Greek philosophers who were responding to the powerful > ideas generated by the Greek mathematicians. Philosophy is always playing > catch up in this respect. > > In this light it seems to me that philosophy is the tail that almost never > wags the dog. It is always going about the business of restructuring its > houses of cards after the latest scientific storm passes through. It is like > religion in this sense. After all isn't the current line of indignation > among theologians and philosophers of science all about how uppity the > scientists are? How often do we hear knowing throats clearing as they tell > us that maybe science can tell us what is but not what ought to be, or how > pretty it is... > > Within psychology for example the behaviorist were heavily influenced by the > logical positivists and forced themselves to stop making rationalist > statements that could not be verified. They demanded operational definitions > for the terms they used and turned up their noses at fuzzy thinking period. > Sure they went overboard and they may have pushed the pendulum a bit too far > but they discovered laws of behavior. They created a technology of behavior > modification that works on animals and people both as individuals and in > groups. It dominated the study of human behavior for 50 years and is still a > major force in its various modified incarnations. > > With the cognitive revolution that expanded the behaviorist program, > scientists and philosophers began in earnest the process of reverse > engineering the "mind". Philosophers are playing an important role and there > is considerable controversy brewing among Searle, Dennett and Peter Hacker > about the use and meaning for terminology in the neurosciences. I am not > sure how that debate shakes out in terms of rationalism/empiricism but I > tend to assume that rationalism has pretty much burned itself out and that > most folks are really tired of arguing over the meaning of words. _________________________________________________________________ Get Free (PRODUCT) RED™ Emoticons, Winks and Display Pics. http://joinred.spaces.live.com?ocid=TXT_HMTG_prodredemoticons_052008 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
