Hi Ham, [Platt] > > Pirsig's moral hierarchy is more of a guide than a hard > > and fast list of rights and wrongs. But, "morality designed > > into the universe?" OK -- as a foil to your ontology.
[Ham} > You see, I don't believe that. I believe morality is an intellectual > synthesis of what philosophers have called the "common good". It's a > pragmatic system devised by man to accommodate a diversity of social values > with minimal harm to the individual. The Golden Rule is a moralistic maxim. > So is Kant's categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim > whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal > law." Both are "rational" solutions to the antagonism and violence that can > result from conflicting values. Conversely, while collective behavior > enforced by empirical decree, religious law, or involuntary servitude may > result in a "moral society", the restriction of individual freedom is > immoral. Hence the need for reason to mediate the free expression of value. Morality an intellectual synthesis? I don't believe that. I agree with Pirsig: ". . . in this culture there aren't any fundamental meanings of morality. There are only old traditional social and religious meanings and these don't have any real intellectual base. They're just traditions." (Lila, 7) Do you agree that in the West today morality is largely based on the Judeo- Christian tradition? [Platt} > > No argument with "an infinite variety of perspectives" as > > witness this very site, not to mention socialists, communists, > > fascists and other collectivist totalitarian perspectives. [Ham] > Of course setting up a moral maxim for the world community, whose members > are indoctinated into cultural traditions and canonic laws that subjugate > the individual, is putting the cart before the horse. The first challenge > for the new millennium is to work toward a metaphysical perspective that > will facilitate a universal "belief system". That perspective must offer a > plausible answer to the questions 'Why are we here?' and 'What is our role > in existence?' > > We can live by moral precepts if we truly value human life. Unfortunately, > we are presently confronting a fertile culture for whom the only accepted > value is the Will of Allah. We also have to deal with totalitarian nations > who don't respect individual freedom. Our international policy thus far has > been to "impose democracy" on intractable "hot spots" of violence, an > approach that our own history has shown to be ineffectual. Freedom cannot > be imposed on a society by external force. Liberty is inspired by > individuals who value freedom and are willing to fight for it. The people > of Islam will eventually reform their inhumane ideology. Meantime, the Free > World nations will have to redouble their vigilance against attempts by the > power-mad hordes to establish a global caliphate. Why are we here? You know the science answer -- by chance. We are flukes. What is our role in existence? You know the Judeo-Christian answer -- to love one another as ourselves. A rather impractical role considering human nature. The emptiness of these two widely held beliefs accounts for much of the slouching towards Gomorrah we see today. [Platt] > > Can you explain the difference between value motivation > > and its relation to behavior per se? Seems to me the two > > are intimately connected as cause (motivation) and effect > > (behavior). [Ham] > In a strictly objective (mechanical) sense, behavior is the effect of > motivation. Practically speaking, however, behavior can be trained (e.g, > "Uto come here!"), enforced by punishment/reward strategies, or left to > animal instinct. Humans are protected by instinctual response mechanisms > when facing danger, but are far more likely to respond to their > value-sensibilities when choosing to act. Since value is sensed > pre-intellectually, it is a more fundamental (i.e., reliable) indicator of > one's relation to Essence or one's psycho-physical status than an > intellectual judgment. In fact, I would venture to say that sensibility is > primary to reason as a motivational factor. Agree. We sense truth (value) before we conceptualize it. [Platt] > > Ability to "exercise freedom" in order to express and act on > > "value sensibilities" appears to be a basic moral principle of > > Essentialism. That which inhibits the ability is immoral, that > > which enhances the ability is moral. Would that be a fair > > description of a moral stance required by Essence? [Ham] > Yes, except for the "required by" qualification. There are no requirements > for value-sensibility other than the willingness to attend to it. Perhaps > that's what the mystics mean by "the stillness of the soul": > > "The Tao is in all things. > Total simplification of your life is realizing that. > There is no advanced course in awareness, only the stillness. > It is in the stillness of your soul that you will connect the Tao to > all things." > -- John MacEnulty, (Eman8tions) I wonder about that "not required." It would seem that freedom to exercise value-sensibility needs to be defended from the likes of Islamic radicals, thus imposing an obligation on those who believe in Essence. Warm regards, Platt Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
