dmb says:
Again, the original MOQer says otherwise. In the MOQ, where experience IS 
reality, epistemology replaces ontology. Or, if you prefer, there is no 
ontology except for experience. You could say there are no essences or 
things-in-themselves. This is follows from radical empiricism, where 
ontological categories such as subjects and objects are seen as reified 
concepts, as abstractions mistakenly given concrete existence. There are many, 
many ways to say it but sticking with the MOQ's empiricism and LILA's  art 
gallery example, Pirsig says,...

Krimel replied:
Again your only point here is an appeal to authority. I can hear the explosion 
in you head from here. But the truth is, "Bob, says" is a lousy argument. Are 
you seriously claiming that you have not confused ontology with epistemology 
but rather claim there is no ontology at all? Is this you just being witty or 
are you saying literally there is nothing.

dmb replies to the reply:
Argument from authority, again? Nonsense. In both cases the contention was over 
what Pirsig did or did not say, what Pirsig does or not not think. It is 
perfectly normal to use textual evidence in such a debate. In fact, I can think 
of nothing more relevant to such a debate and in that context your objection to 
it is laughable.

More importantly, yes. I'm saying ontology is essentialism and the MOQ ain't 
got none. The primary empirical reality is neither physical nor psychical. Its 
not behind experience or the cause of experience or the conditions of 
experience or the ontological ground of experience. That's why there are no 
TITs. Literally nothing? Only if experience counts as nothing. I realize this 
sounds crazy to you but that's pretty much been the main point all along. 

Krimel said:
What I have said is that experience is the product of these neural processes. 
Experience emerges from those patterns of neural firings.

dmb says:
Yea, I know. And when you say stuff like that I explain that this view is 
callled reductionism.

Krimel continued:
Understanding those physiological processes can add greatly to our 
understanding of how experiences arise. 

dmb says:
Gee, ya think?

Krimel said:
You claim not to deny natural processes but you do want to ignore them. I don't 
see a distinction there.

dmb says:
The first distinction you should take a look at is the one between my actual 
claims and what you imagine I want. The second distinction to notice is the one 
between biology and metaphysics. As I already explained, your SOMist, 
reductionist assertions are all predicated on the very assumptions in question. 
If SOM is in contention, it simply begs the question to make assertions as if 
SOM were true. I'd add that all your criticisms of the scientific points bare 
the same mark. You take them to task as if they were being made from within the 
assumptions they're intended to replace. Beside that crucial point about the 
nature of the topic, you're just stating the obvious. Who would deny natural 
processes? What would that even mean?

"The MOQ subscribes to what is called empiricism. It claims that all legitimate 
human knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about what the senses 
provide. Most empiricists deny the validity of any knowledge gained through 
imagination, authority, tradition or purely theoretical reasoning. They regard 
fields such as art, morality, religion and metaphysics as unverifiable. The MOQ 
varies from this by saying that the values of art, morality and even religious 
mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for 
metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons. They have been excluded because of 
the metaphysical assumption that all the universe is composed of subjects and 
objects and anything that can't be classified as a subject or an object isn't 
real. There is no empirical evidence for this assumption at all. Its just an 
assumption."

Krimel said:
Furthermore, for all your talk of mysticism and the perennial philosophy you 
have precious little to say about their relevance.

dmb says:
Philosophical mysticism is totally down with these these anti-essentialist 
claims. As Marsha will tell you, all that talk about emptiness and nothingness 
(as in no 'thing' ness) is anti-essentialism. Two other names for the primary 
empirical reality are the preconceptual reality and the undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum. These terms also get at the idea of no 'thing' ness. In 
the former you could say it is the cutting edge of experience prior to any 
concepts of things and in the latter you could say that things are not yet 
differentiated from the continuum of experience. This is also what James's 
Radical Empiricism calls pure experience, before it is sorted out in terms of 
subjects and objects. Mysticism is not just relevant to these things. These 
things add up to mysticism, they are among the most important components of the 
position called philosophical mysticism.  

Krimel said:
Good luck with school. I hope you pay attention in your social sciences 
classes. Let me know if I can help.

dmb says:
Thanks.




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